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The Dahlgren Papers RevisitedAmerica's Civil War | Single Page | 6 comments | Print This Post | Email This Post
At two points in his instructions Dahlgren wrote, 'As General Custer may follow me, be careful not to give a false alarm.' Schultz points out that Brig. Gen. George A. Custer's orders for a diversionary cavalry operation did not mention cooperating with the Dahlgren raiders and that therefore this is evidence of a Confederate forgery. In fact, Custer was directed to meet with the raid's leaders before he issued his final orders, and it is reasonable to suppose that he and Dahlgren discussed a possible cooperation for carrying out the orders to destroy Confederate communications on the upper James, and Dahlgren wrote of this conference in his planning notes. Custer, ordered to march toward Charlottesville, would have been only some thirty miles from the point where Dahlgren intended to cross the James. A manuscript of unknown origin, and therefore uncertain credibility, even has Dahlgren revealing his secret orders to Custer. However that may be, it at least indicates the two were together prior to the raid. As for the Confederates forging these Custer references, there is nothing on the record to indicate that by March 4, when any deceit had to be completed, they even knew Custer would lead the cavalry diversion. Finally, no possible purpose would be served by adding this entirely irrelevant Custer detail to their forgery plot.29 Subscribe Today
In another supposed proof of forgery, Schultz finds it strange that three Confederate officers involved in the Dahlgren party's ambush–Captain Edward C. Fox (who led the late-arriving Fifth Virginia Cavalry), Lieutenant James Pollard, and Colonel Richard L.T. Beale–made little or no mention of the infamous papers in their reports. In Fox's case there is nothing strange about this omission, for there is no mention in Captain Halbach's account of ever showing the papers to Fox. Pollard's reports focused on the ambush itself, in response to queries from headquarters for details of the action to ascertain proper credit. In any event, Pollard, in an unpublished account of the incident, offered a fulsome description of the contents of the papers. Colonel Beale told of receiving 'a note-book and sundry papers' taken from Dahlgren's body, certainly all that he needed to say on that subject for his report. By then, March 9, everyone knew of the papers and their contents, and there was no need for colorful writing. Nothing here supports a case for forgery.30
Finally, there is the question of why Colonel Dahlgren, 'an experienced military officer,' saw fit to carry such incriminating evidence on his person during a mission behind enemy lines.31 That is indeed a good question, but it speaks more to the character of Colonel Dahlgren than to any argument for forgery of his papers. Dahlgren was in fact utterly inexperienced in a command position. His voluminous note-taking suggests anxiety about that role, and his failure to take the basic precaution of destroying any mission papers he was carrying, much less these explosive ones, is evidence of his inexperience and his poor command judgment. Ulric Dahlgren was reckless, immature, and careless of consequences, characteristics perhaps suited to executing a bloody agenda like his but certainly ill-suited to rescuing a mission gone bad.
It can be accepted then that the authenticity of the Dahlgren papers is established beyond a doubt. There is not the least scrap of credible evidence for their forgery. There is ample evidence, on the other hand, for their content being exactly what was printed in the Richmond newspapers. The label 'contestable' does not apply to the Dahlgren papers.
That does not end the story, however. It leaves one further question of crucial importance to be answered: Who authorized the secret agenda of arson, pillage, and murder as set forth in the papers? The answer cannot be documented as readily as the question of the papers' authenticity. Still, a credible presumption of guilt can be offered. Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14Help HistoryNet by bookmarking to
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6 Comments to “The Dahlgren Papers Revisited”
I like your analysis and mannner of speaking, thank you for this interesting ticcket, it s always nice to visit this beautiful blog :)
By douce51 on Mar 14, 2009 at 8:06 pm
Very interesting article. However, part of your premise is based on COL Dahlgren being an outsider and able to carry out Kilpatrick's plan.
Dahlgren was every bit the opportunist that Custer and the other Cavalry officers were. Three young men promoted very quickly as the Union formed its Cavalry Corps organization for the Army of the Potomac.
Dahlgren was a Captain at Gettysburg and attemtping the daring missions that secured Custer, Merritt and Farnsworth not to mention Kilpatrick's rise.
Dahlgren had his father's coat tails to ride as well. Having a senior admiral as a father also helped in his rise to Colonel from Captain in less than one year.
Dahlgren, had he not been killed, was going to be a Brigade, if not Division Commander in Sheridan's forces by the end of the war.
Dahlgren was an insider.
Added to that, this raid and the killing of Davis was out of charactor for most everything else the Union did with its covert operations.
Now the Confederate covert operations was a different story. The burning of major cities with Greek Fire. The capture of US merchant ships on the high seas. The capture of civilian and military ships on the great lakes and rivers in Union cities. The cladestine operations across the boarder in Canada to attack or subvert the FederalGovernment. The Confederacy had a long pattern of such acts that we would call today terrorist.
The Union, maybe because they never developed covert organizations like the Confederacy did, had no great coordinated effort. Judah Benjamin was the cabinet level Confederate organizer of covert operations – to include the capture of President Lincoln and everything listed above.
If the Dahlgren letter is true, it was developed by Kilpatrick and Dahlgren alone and outside the bounds and generally against the wishes of President Lincoln.
By Don Herko in kansas on Apr 24, 2009 at 9:44 am
This article is well=written and makes a strong case for the involvement of Stanton. However, the author says, "It certainly cannot be imagined that the president countenanced political assassination and black flag warfare against civilians. Lincoln approved the capture of Davis, perhaps as a hostage for the release of Union prisoners, but nothing we know about the man suggests he would have gone beyond that."
The author seems to forget Athens, Alabama, where US Col. Turchin told his men, "I shut my eyes for three hours," thereby granting his soldiers permission to rape, rob, and pillage. Turchin's conviction by courtmartial was overturned by Lincoln's promoting Turchin to Brigadier General.
I see no reason to leave Lincoln out of speculation about the source of Dahlgren's orders.
By Charles Hayes on May 24, 2009 at 10:05 pm
Hayes asserted that "It can be accepted then that the authenticity of the Dahlgren papers is established beyond a doubt." I disagree; many doubts remain for the impartial student of this incident. Hayes fails to acknowledge the weakness of the chain-of-custody evidence for possession of the papers following Dahlgren's death, and the slowness of transferring Dahlgren's notebook to RIchmond. In fact there was ample time, opportunity, and Confederate motive for the alteration of Dahlgren's papers. Indeed, Hayes admits that the writing on the publicized version of Dahlgren's papers was altered, but attributes that to the actions of a lithographer. Evidence that was the only alteration is not compelling. Hayes also dismisses the suspicious signature that uses just the first initial, rather than the full "Ulrich", which appears on no other Dahlgren document, He claims that officers commonly use their initials on "formal official documents" and that this was the only time Dahlgren ever composed such a document. That is simply not true. Hayes also ignores the absence of Kilpatrick's approval endorsement on the publicized version of the Dahlgren letter, which is consistent with it being a forgery. When given the choice between believing the testimony of Admiral John Dahlgren, who had a sterling reputation, or that of Gen. Jubal Early, who was personally responsible for a self-serving disinformation campaign about the Gettysburg campaign, I find Dahlgren, and his son, much more credible than their adversaries. Like any failing administration, the Confederate government routinely issued lies to generate outrage and bolster morale. It is sad to see people still being taken in by Rebel propoganda a century and a half later.
By Michael R. Cunningham,Ph.D. on Mar 4, 2010 at 1:40 am