http://www.historynet.com/the-big-one-world-war-ii.htm From the World's Largest History Magazine Publisher Sun, 19 May 2013 22:40:21 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.2 http://www.historynet.com/the-big-one-world-war-ii.htm#comment-329342 LtCol (ret) Ed Kennedy Thu, 02 Sep 2010 19:11:03 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/?p=13682718#comment-329342 Professor Citino is right-on target. The Israelis learned this lesson the hard-way in the summer of 2006. However, many students I teach at the Army's staff college think that Operation Change Direction was an aberration. We've dumbed-down our thinking about COIN vs high intensity conflict with simplistic, byte-sized sayings about how much more intellectual COIN is than bayonet charges. O.k., but it's no more complex than large unit, conventional warfare. Time-space factors and size of operations are hugely different and tremendously more complex. Students who have only done COIN are grasping the concepts we teach very well. They are having a very difficult time grasping large unit, conventional operations with the same degree of clarity. Like the Israelis, they haven't practiced large scale operations and we now have the same dilemma facing the IDF in July 2006. Unfortunately, many of these students who are technically proficient don't have an interest in reading military history and therefore are missing a perspective that would help them visualize the complexities of high-intensity conventional operations. Some people in the military are thinking about "high intensity conflict, large-scale operations, and big battles" but they are not the younger generation of leaders I teach. These officers’ world-view has been shaped by their immediate experiences over the last few years. This could portend of problems in just a few years when these young officers are our senior leaders. Professor Citino is right-on target. The Israelis learned this lesson the hard-way in the summer of 2006. However, many students I teach at the Army's staff college think that Operation Change Direction was an aberration. We've dumbed-down our thinking about COIN vs high intensity conflict with simplistic, byte-sized sayings about how much more intellectual COIN is than bayonet charges. O.k., but it's no more complex than large unit, conventional warfare. Time-space factors and size of operations are hugely different and tremendously more complex. Students who have only done COIN are grasping the concepts we teach very well. They are having a very difficult time grasping large unit, conventional operations with the same degree of clarity. Like the Israelis, they haven't practiced large scale operations and we now have the same dilemma facing the IDF in July 2006. Unfortunately, many of these students who are technically proficient don't have an interest in reading military history and therefore are missing a perspective that would help them visualize the complexities of high-intensity conventional operations. Some people in the military are thinking about "high intensity conflict, large-scale operations, and big battles" but they are not the younger generation of leaders I teach. These officers’ world-view has been shaped by their immediate experiences over the last few years. This could portend of problems in just a few years when these young officers are our senior leaders.

]]> http://www.historynet.com/the-big-one-world-war-ii.htm#comment-323279 The Big One: World War II » HistoryNet Wed, 25 Aug 2010 05:33:31 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/?p=13682718#comment-323279 [...] the rest here: The Big One: World War II » HistoryNet Post a [...] [...] the rest here: The Big One: World War II » HistoryNet Post a [...]

]]>