Custer had Martin sound officers’ call at about noon, and when the officers had gathered, he gave them orders out of Martin’s earshot. Shortly thereafter, Martin observed Captain Benteen with Companies D, H and K riding off to the left of the regiment, which was preceding roughly southwest along what would later be named Reno Creek. At the meeting, Custer had put 11 of the 12 companies that made up the 7th Cavalry into three maneuver battalions. As senior captain, Benteen was ordered to take one battalion and scout the valleys to the southeast to prevent the Indians from slipping away in that direction; he led his battalion away from the main column at about 12:12 p.m. The other two battalions, under Custer and Major Marcus A. Reno, the 7th Cavalry’s second-in-command on the expedition, continued to advance along Reno Creek.

Custer’s plan for defeating the Indians impelled him to make the classic error of dividing his force in the face of a numerically superior enemy. He did this, however, for the sound tactical reason of preventing the Indians from escaping. After advancing for about two hours, Custer ordered Reno and his battalion, comprising Companies A, G and M, down into the valley of the Little Bighorn, across the river, then roughly west along its left bank to attack the south end of the village. He himself, with Companies C, E, F, I and L, a total of 221 men, continued along the bluffs to the east of the Little Bighorn, heading toward what he thought was the far end of the village. Custer was confident that Benteen would rejoin him shortly, increasing his strength to eight companies. The slow pack train with the extra ammunition and supplies followed well in the rear. Because Company B, to which August De Voto belonged, was the last to report ready to march that morning, it drew the inglorious assignment of escorting the pack train.

At about 3:10 p.m., Major Reno’s battalion charged the south end of the village. Reno, however, daunted by the size of the village, did not press home the charge. Instead, he dismounted his troops short of the village and formed a skirmish line to defend himself against the enraged defenders who began to boil out of the huge encampment. In the meantime, Benteen, who had found no Indians to the south, was following on Custer’s trail but was still some four miles behind him. At about the time that Reno attacked, Custer reached a promontory and, for the first time, saw the village in its entirety. His original plan apparently had been to attack the north end of the village in support of Reno, who was attacking the south end. This would have prevented noncombatants from escaping the village to the north and hopefully would have allowed their capture and a successful end to the battle. Having seen how large the village was, he realized he would need all possible troops and additional ammunition if his plan were to succeed. At 3:20 p.m., he sent trumpeter John Martin with a written message to Benteen to hurry his advance and bring up the pack train. The message was written because Martin, who had only been in the United States three years, spoke very little English. As he rode away from Custer’s battalion, Martin became the last surviving white man to see Custer and his men alive.

What happened next to Custer and his battalion has been a matter of conjecture and controversy for more than a century. It appears likely that he attempted to cross the Little Bighorn at Medicine Tail Coulee and attack the middle of the village but was forced to withdraw in the face of Indian resistance. This attack on the middle of the village instead of the far end probably was precipitated by the fact that Custer could visually observe Reno’s abortive attack and felt he had to get into action against the village to distract the Indians and give Reno some relief. If this were his objective, he was more than successful: large numbers of Indians began to move away from Reno’s beleaguered force toward Custer’s. Custer and his men were attacked by overwhelming numbers and surrounded. They ended up dismounted and entrenched on a high point, later called Custer Hill, and the battle was probably over for them by 4:45 p.m.

John Martin, whose horse had been wounded by an Indian sharpshooter, reached Captain Benteen at 3:35 p.m. At that time, Benteen was some three miles east of Custer, and the pack train was a couple of miles behind him. He could not see how he could proceed quickly and still go back for the pack train. He told Martin to fall in with Company H, and he continued his advance up to the area now known as Reno Hill. There, at 4:10 p.m., he came upon the remnants of Reno’s battalion, which had not fared well in the valley below. Benteen determined not to advance to Custer as ordered but to join Reno and dig in on high ground until the situation clarified. The pack train and Company B subsequently came up and joined this force at 5:15 p.m.

Indeed, Reno had fared poorly in his attack on the village–and no little blame could be placed squarely on himself. Approximately 10 minutes after the beginning of the action, Indian pressure on both his front and left flank forced Reno to withdraw northeast to the edge of a wooded area in a bend of the Little Bighorn; there, he formed a second skirmish line, which faced roughly south. Although the position seemed to be holding, Reno became panicky and at 3:55 p.m. ordered another withdrawal, this time to the east, across the Little Bighorn, and then up the bluffs on the other side to Reno Hill. However, perhaps due largely to Reno’s panicking, the withdrawal turned into a rout. Reno lost 40 percent of his command before he and other survivors made it to the top of the bluffs. Not everyone got word of the withdrawal, which swiftly degenerated into a complete disaster with Indians attacking from behind and on both flanks. First Lieutenant Charles DeRudio and 18 other men remained behind in the woods.

DeRudio and the others either never got word of Reno’s withdrawal, lost their mounts, or became separated from the main body of the battalion. Surrounded by Indians, they took refuge in the heavily timbered area. Shortly after the formation of the first skirmish line, DeRudio, on his own initiative, led a half-dozen Company A troopers to the northwest corner of the woods to head off an attack on the right flank of the line. From this position, DeRudio later claimed he could see Custer’s column atop the high ridge to the north. DeRudio and his detail remained in this position until the battalion pulled out. DeRudio was informed of the withdrawal by Company A’s trumpeter, who brought DeRudio his horse. The men with DeRudio panicked and fled, and though he supposedly tried to save the company guidon, he was also compelled to flee. Unfortunately, his horse bolted and ran away when he tried to mount, leaving him stranded in the woods.

After hiding for a while and following an unsuccessful attempt by the Indians to fire the woods, DeRudio began to cautiously move about in the undergrowth. While doing so, he observed Indian women mutilating dead and dying soldiers who lay on the open ground between the woods and the high ground, men shot down during the battalion’s flight from the valley. Moving stealthily about, DeRudio met Private Thomas F. O’Neil of Company G, who was also on foot. Later, the two met Frederic F. Gerard, a civilian interpreter of the Lakota, and Billy Jackson, a half-blooded enlisted scout. The latter two men still had their mounts. Gerard and Jackson planned to make a dash on horseback for Reno on the bluffs, but DeRudio dissuaded them, fearing that such an attempt would lead the Indians, who were moving around nearby looking for stragglers, to the two men on foot. At this point, in the late afternoon, there were two groups of stragglers in the woods: DeRudio’s group of four and another group of 15 led by George B. Herendeen, a civilian scout. By 5 p.m. Reno’s command faced relatively few Indians; most had earlier moved off to the northwest to engage Custer. This provided an opportunity for the second group of stragglers (with two exceptions who were later killed) to rejoin Reno on the bluffs by 5:30 p.m.

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