Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge visits the U.S. Marine compound at Da Nang on September 13, 1965, accompanied by Maj. Gen. Lewis Walt, then commander of the III Marine Amphibious Force. (USMC)

Not only was Ky unwilling to withdraw his troops, he seemed to welcome this confrontation with the Americans. According to his memoirs, Ky told his local commanders in Da Nang to aim their biggest guns at the Marine base. If the Americans took action against the threatening Vietnamese aircraft, the commanders were to ‘destroy the Marine base. That is an order.’ Ky then describes in considerable detail how he flew to Da Nang and reprimanded General Walt for interfering in affairs that were none of his concern. Better at displaying flamboyance and arrogance than at conducting diplomacy, Ky was fond of sporting silk scarves and a pearl-handled revolver. His alleged dressing down of Walt, however, is not mentioned in the latter’s memoirs or in the Marine Corps history of events in Vietnam.

On May 18, Vietnamese marines moved to cross a bridge over the Da Nang River that connected the city with the Tiensha Peninsula. They were fired on by ARVN troops associated with the Struggle Movement positioned on the other side. The dissidents sent a message to General Cao, stating that they had wired the bridge with demolition charges. If the Vietnamese marines crossed, they said, the bridge would be destroyed. Cao relayed this message to Walt. Since this bridge was essential to U.S. Marine Corps operations, Walt again dispatched Colonel Chaisson to prevent hostilities between the Vietnamese military factions.

Chaisson convinced the Vietnamese marines to pull back, allowing a company of U.S. Marines to occupy its former position on the west side of the bridge. Chaisson then tried to get permission from the Struggle Movement commander to position U.S. Marines on the east side, but permission was denied. Chaisson ordered the Marines into the ARVN positions anyway. The Americans sat down in the middle of the rebels and made no attempt to dislodge them. Walt arrived at the scene. He and Colonel Chaisson walked together across the bridge to the east side. A Vietnamese warrant officer told them to stop, threatening to blow up the bridge. Not only had the Vietnamese engineers rigged the bridge for demolition; they also had similarly rigged a nearby ammunition dump containing 6,000 tons of munitions.

The Vietnamese had two heavy machine guns pointed at the U.S. Marines. They fired at the Americans, who dived for cover. The situation was very tense. According to Chaisson, while Walt spoke to the Vietnamese warrant officer and ‘really gave him hell,’ the Americans were secretly cutting the demolition lead wires. The Vietnamese officer was not intimidated; rather, he told Walt, ‘General, we will die together,’ and brought his raised hand down to his side. At that signal, another Vietnamese engineering officer pushed down the plunger on the detonator. According to Walt: ‘There was no doubt he expected the bridge to blow on his signal. I shall never forget the expression on his face when his signal did not blow up the bridge and us with it.’ By then, U.S. Marines had secured the ends of the bridge. Demolition charges were removed from both the bridge and ammunition dump by the Vietnamese engineers who had placed them there. The second bridge incident was over, but the crisis continued.

By late May, Struggle Movement forces still held several strongpoints in Da Nang. These antigovernment forces were well armed and willing to use their machine guns and other automatic weapons against government troops from time to time. On May 21, General Walt learned the Saigon regime had decided to use its air force to destroy the resistance forces. Walt was alarmed, fearful that aircraft bombing and strafing in Da Nang would cause civilian casualties, including Americans (there were more than 1,000 U.S. civilians in Da Nang at the time). Walt told the Vietnamese corps commander (the fourth since the crisis had begun) of his concerns. He got no help there; the commander, afraid of being killed by his own men, moved into Walt’s headquarters to ensure his personal safety, claiming he had no control over the air forces. Walt talked with the VNAF commander at Da Nang with no greater effect. Walt next received information that VNAF attack planes were taking off from Da Nang with full loads of rockets and bombs. Since discussion was yielding no results, Walt ordered the commander of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing to arm four jet fighters with air-to-air ordnance.

Struggle Movement machine gun teams operating near U.S. Marine positions opened fire on ARVN troops. In response, two VNAF planes attacked with rockets. Three rockets fell short of the Struggle Movement positions and landed in the Marine area, wounding eight U.S. Marines. The Marines launched two jets with instructions to orbit over the Vietnamese aircraft and shoot them down when Walt gave the order. Walt then told the VNAF commander he would destroy his planes if one rocket, one bomb or one round landed in Da Nang.

Next, Walt got a telephone call from Washington, relaying a complaint from Saigon that the U.S. Marines were interfering in Vietnamese internal affairs. After Walt explained the situation, he was told to use his best judgment. The Vietnamese then launched four more aircraft to orbit above the Marine jets. The VNAF commander told Walt that if his planes fired on the Vietnamese planes, they would be shot down. Walt launched two more jets with instructions to take positions over the second tier of Vietnamese airplanes sandwiched over Da Nang. This standoff continued for two hours, and then the Vietnamese planes returned to base.

The Struggle Movement was not making any more progress on the ground than the VNAF was making in the air. About 150 Vietnamese on both sides were killed in the fighting; another 700 were wounded. Twenty-three Americans, including 18 Marines, were wounded. General Thi, whose dismissal had initiated the crisis, met with General Westmoreland on May 24. On May 27, Thi met with Ky at Chu Lai, and they agreed that the most helpful thing would be for Thi to leave I Corps for good. Before leaving, Thi tried to convince General Cao to return to I Corps headquarters. Cao feared for the safety of his family, and asked Westmoreland for asylum in the United States, where he said he would like ‘to become an American citizen, to join the Marines or Army, to fight against the Communists….’ Later in the year, Thi went into exile in the United States. The Saigon government then appointed a new I Corps commander — Maj. Gen. Hoang Xuan Lam — who turned his attention to fighting the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong instead of the U.S. Marines and antigovernment forces.

The Struggle Movement in Da Nang collapsed, although it continued in Hue. On May 26, a large crowd attended the funeral of the Vietnamese officer who was killed after firing at General Cao’s helicopter. Afterward, the crowd burned down the U.S. Information Services Library. Over the next few days, three Buddhists doused their robes with gasoline and set themselves on fire. Tri Quang, the Buddhist leader, went on a hunger strike to protest American support for the Saigon regime and interference in Vietnamese affairs.

After threats were received, the ARVN 1st Division dispatched guards to protect the U.S. Consulate in Hue. The guards fled when a mob stormed the mission, which was set on fire with barrels of gasoline. In response, and with the assistance of the Americans, Ky sent Vietnamese airborne and marine battalions to the military base at Phu Bai. By June 19, all of Hue was under government control. U.S. Ambassa-dor Lodge publicly praised the Ky regime for putting down the Struggle Movement, calling it ‘a solid political victory.’

According to influential Cornell University scholar George Kahin, the lesson South Vietnamese critics of the Saigon government learned was that the dominance of Generals Ky and Thieu could not be contested as long as they had the support of the United States. After June 1966, the only challenge Ky and Thieu had to face was from Hanoi and the Viet Cong.

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The article was written by Peter Brush and originally published in the April 2005 issue of Vietnam Magazine.

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