|
|
Tet Offensive: Inside MACV HeadquartersVietnam | 3 comments | Print This Post | Email This Post
‘This team’s purpose,’ said Kerwin, ‘was contingency planning in case we had a catastrophe. It wasn’t a full-time job. We met two or three times a week just to discuss things and see what the planners had come up with. Basically the plan looked at using a few tactical Air Force weapons, bombs that we could drop on one focused, constricted area.’ Subscribe Today
The choice of targets for such an operation, according to Kerwin, ‘depended on whether we had sufficient troops or not. One place we looked at was near Vinh, because that was the only main avenue of approach on the DMZ. Also, that would be a place where you could use a nuclear weapon, because you would have a target that was of sufficient size. You bottle up the enemy and then block the approach.’
Eventually, the plan to use nuclear weapons was dropped when’somebody, somewhere heard about it.’ Looking back, Kerwin said: ‘I guess we should have expected that. We were told pretty firmly to knock it off.’
The Aftermath
Kerwin also witnessed MACV’s rapidly deteriorating relations with the press. The American media generally portrayed Tet as a horrendous military setback. As a result, Americans back home were becoming increasingly disillusioned with the war effort.
After Tet, Kerwin remained as chief of staff during the transition between Westmoreland and Abrams, helping the new commander begin to address the flaws they both saw in MACV’s operational approach to the war. Later on Kerwin served in combat as the commanding general of II Field Forces, a corps-level command. After returning to the United States, he held a succession of high-level posts, retiring as the vice chief of staff of the U.S. Army in 1978.
In retirement Kerwin has remained an influential figure, supporting the post–Vietnam War revitalization of the Army, encouraging the renaissance in thinking on operations, and — perhaps most important — supporting a return to an emphasis on the basics of soldiering, professionalism, integrity and character. Today he remains a valued adviser to the Army’s senior leadership, who frequently seek out his counsel.
This article was written by Lieutenant Colonel James Jay Carafano and was originally published in the February 2001 issue of Vietnam Magazine.
For more great articles be sure to subscribe to Vietnam Magazine today! Pages: 1 2 3 4 5Help HistoryNet by bookmarking to
            Tags: 20th - 21st Century, Historical Conflicts, Vietnam War
 |
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
||
What is HistoryNet?The HistoryNet.com is brought to you by the Weider History Group, the world's largest publisher of history magazines. HistoryNet.com contains daily features, photo galleries and over 5,000 articles originally published in our various magazines. If you are interested in a specific history subject, try searching our archives, you are bound to find something to pique your interest. |
From Our Magazines
|
Weider History Group |
Weider History Network: HistoryNet | Armchair General | Great History | Achtung Panzer! Terms of Use | Copyright © 2009 Weider History Group. All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part without permission is prohibited. |
||
Loading ...
3 Comments to “Tet Offensive: Inside MACV Headquarters”
I am a retired Chief Master Sergeant, USAF, Served in Vietman from Sept 67-68 at MACV/J-2. I worked in CIIED and Col Sam Roberts , USAF was the deputy under Col ………………USArmy
My job was to run the J-2 conference room and provide for the visuals in the intel briefings. I had three other enlisted men working for me in this assignment.
One specific event involved General Kerwin. During one of the Saturday morning whole staff conferences/briefings, something came up that General Westmorland wanted to discuss a slide that had already been shown. There was some delay and confusion since the system was a “rear projection” facility and the “slide handler” did not know of the situation since he was unable to hear. After some discussion – the Commander was able to “see” the slide in question.
At the conclusion of the meeting, General Kerwin came into the projection room and disucssed with me (I was in charge) although there were certainly officers of the Division there who I worked for.
He asked if I could come up with a better projection system where the previous problems could be solved. I told him I was very knowledgable of how to solve it but I did not have any of the equipment. He told me then that he would direct the Signal Officer over at Tan San Nhut to provide me with what I needed. This direction was also given to the Armed Forces Radio/TV in Saigon.
I was able to provide a communication system that could be used for monitoring the briefings, and if directed, make a sound recording of the what was directed.
All of this sound system was of course vetted by the Army Security group there at MACV.
There were a number of times, I was directed by General Kerwin to “record” a particular session taking place in the conference room. And, the audio tape given to the General when completed.
I also recall on a few occasions that General Kerwin came into the “back room” and directed it be cleared of all personnel except me to run and monitor the recording that he wanted done.
Interesting to recall that on most Saturday morning briefing that there was little room in our projection room due to the high number of officer’s who were not privy to a seat in the theater – but would attend in “my room”
After this was accomplished , a number of times I was called to the General’s conference room to provide audio visual support for some high level VIP visit.
My tour at MACV was a highlight of my 30 year career in the Air Force.
John E Schmidt Jr
CMSgt, USAF (Retired)
Tallahassee, Florida
Jan 2009
By John Schmidt on Jan 13, 2009 at 11:10 pm
TRYING TO FIND OUT ANY INFO ON USAF 821ST COMBAT SE CURITY POLICE SQUADRON STATIONED AT PHAN RANG R.V.N.
1968 APR-AUGUST ATTACKS OR INCIDENTS THAT OCCURRED AT THIS TIME PLEASE HELP
By JOE CUSIMANO on Mar 14, 2009 at 2:41 pm
I worked for the Command Group (1969-1971) and enjoyed it very much.
I ran the Commander’s conference room.
We had VIP types visit the general from time to time (for example, Secretary of Defense Laird, George Wallace, Bob Hope, General Wheeler, etc.).
E-9 (retired)
By C. Phillips on Oct 31, 2009 at 9:17 am