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Tet Offensive: Inside MACV Headquarters| Vietnam | 3 comments | Print This Post | Email This Post A general’s chief of staff requires a diverse set of skills — tactical, supervisory, coordinating, leading and negotiating. He must fulfill many roles, on occasion acting as the commander’s most ardent advocate, harshest critic, closest adviser and alter ego. Major General Walter T. ‘Dutch’ Kerwin, who served as General William C. Westmoreland’s chief of staff during the 1968 Tet Offensive, understood those challenges very well. Subscribe Today
Even today, General Kerwin can vividly recall how U.S. forces fought their biggest battle since the end of the Korean War. Twenty-three years of retirement have not dulled the 84-year-old Kerwin’s remembrance of the harrowing days following the outbreak of the battle or the grueling weeks of fighting that turned back the North Vietnamese invasion.
Kerwin’s assignment as MACV chief of staff topped an action-filled career. He graduated from West Point in 1939 and received a commission in the field artillery. When World War II broke out, Kerwin rose quickly to become the 3rd Infantry Division’s artillery operations officer, participating in campaigns in North Africa, Sicily, Italy and southern France. No operation was more trying than the landings at Anzio, Italy, in 1944. After an almost effortless landing, the Allies found that well-dug-in Germans were holding the Alban Hills, blocking the route to Rome and claiming an unrestricted view of the beachhead. The German advantage in observation made artillery fire a significant threat to Allied troops. The challenge of organizing effective counterbattery fire against the enemy guns thoroughly tested Kerwin, bringing out the best of his organizational and tactical skills.
Wounded in southern France, Kerwin returned to the United States. After World War II he rose through the ranks of America’s postwar Army to command the 3rd Armored Division and serve as assistant deputy chief of staff for operations on the Army Staff before deploying to Vietnam.
In a recent interview conducted by Lt. Col. James Jay Carafano, General Kerwin recalled the difficult and complicated world of the MACV chief of staff. Kerwin’s May 1967 assignment was no matter of chance. He previously had served under MACV’s deputy commanding general, Creighton Abrams, who had a reputation as a difficult and demanding boss. Kerwin, however, thrived on pressure and challenges. The two officers had long ago earned each other’s respect and confidence, and Abrams had become a friend and mentor. When Abrams was posted to South Vietnam, Kerwin received three days’ notice to follow him.
Dutch Kerwin arrived in Vietnam as the level of the U.S. Army’s involvement in the war was nearing its peak. While military operations were expanding throughout South Vietnam, the theater’s complicated organizational arrangements strained to keep up. Although General Westmoreland, or ‘Westy,’ was the military leader most visibly connected with the war, his command, MACV, did not directly control all the forces involved. The air and naval units, for example, answered in part to the theater commander in chief in Hawaii.
Kerwin was appalled by the inefficiency of the organization when he arrived in-country. ‘The Marines were sitting up there in I Corps almost entirely by themselves,’ Kerwin recalled. ‘The bombing and other fire support was being run out of many other organizations. It was split…initially MACV was in a small headquarters downtown [in Saigon], and, in my opinion, not organized to get the best out of everything.’ According to him, the staff was simply not taking full advantage of the preponderance of power available from the various forces crammed into the theater. Theater rotation policies that moved officers through the MACV staff in less than a year did not help. ‘In retrospect,’ Kerwin said, ‘the one-year tours were a mistake.’ The staffs were never as cohesive and competent as the ones he had seen in his service with the 3rd Infantry Division during World War II. Pages: 1 2 3 4 5Tags: 20th - 21st Century, Historical Conflicts, Vietnam War
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3 Comments to “Tet Offensive: Inside MACV Headquarters”
I am a retired Chief Master Sergeant, USAF, Served in Vietman from Sept 67-68 at MACV/J-2. I worked in CIIED and Col Sam Roberts , USAF was the deputy under Col ………………USArmy
My job was to run the J-2 conference room and provide for the visuals in the intel briefings. I had three other enlisted men working for me in this assignment.
One specific event involved General Kerwin. During one of the Saturday morning whole staff conferences/briefings, something came up that General Westmorland wanted to discuss a slide that had already been shown. There was some delay and confusion since the system was a “rear projection” facility and the “slide handler” did not know of the situation since he was unable to hear. After some discussion – the Commander was able to “see” the slide in question.
At the conclusion of the meeting, General Kerwin came into the projection room and disucssed with me (I was in charge) although there were certainly officers of the Division there who I worked for.
He asked if I could come up with a better projection system where the previous problems could be solved. I told him I was very knowledgable of how to solve it but I did not have any of the equipment. He told me then that he would direct the Signal Officer over at Tan San Nhut to provide me with what I needed. This direction was also given to the Armed Forces Radio/TV in Saigon.
I was able to provide a communication system that could be used for monitoring the briefings, and if directed, make a sound recording of the what was directed.
All of this sound system was of course vetted by the Army Security group there at MACV.
There were a number of times, I was directed by General Kerwin to “record” a particular session taking place in the conference room. And, the audio tape given to the General when completed.
I also recall on a few occasions that General Kerwin came into the “back room” and directed it be cleared of all personnel except me to run and monitor the recording that he wanted done.
Interesting to recall that on most Saturday morning briefing that there was little room in our projection room due to the high number of officer’s who were not privy to a seat in the theater – but would attend in “my room”
After this was accomplished , a number of times I was called to the General’s conference room to provide audio visual support for some high level VIP visit.
My tour at MACV was a highlight of my 30 year career in the Air Force.
John E Schmidt Jr
CMSgt, USAF (Retired)
Tallahassee, Florida
Jan 2009
By John Schmidt on Jan 13, 2009 at 11:10 pm
TRYING TO FIND OUT ANY INFO ON USAF 821ST COMBAT SE CURITY POLICE SQUADRON STATIONED AT PHAN RANG R.V.N.
1968 APR-AUGUST ATTACKS OR INCIDENTS THAT OCCURRED AT THIS TIME PLEASE HELP
By JOE CUSIMANO on Mar 14, 2009 at 2:41 pm
I worked for the Command Group (1969-1971) and enjoyed it very much.
I ran the Commander’s conference room.
We had VIP types visit the general from time to time (for example, Secretary of Defense Laird, George Wallace, Bob Hope, General Wheeler, etc.).
E-9 (retired)
By C. Phillips on Oct 31, 2009 at 9:17 am