Cholon became a mangled mess of destruction. Everywhere there were ruined businesses, ruined homes, smashed-up cars, broken windows, blown-out walls and dead bodies, both civilian and VC. It often was hard to tell the difference between the two, which was exactly what the Communists wanted. They tried to blend in with the population of Cholon, but most civilians fled as quickly as they could. They wanted no part of their supposed liberation from the Saigon regime.

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Within days, the Americans and South Vietnamese had a major troop presence in the Saigon area. The ARVN committed five ranger, five marine and five airborne battalions, while the Americans had seven infantry, one military police and six artillery battalions fighting in the city. The battle had turned against the Communists. The element of surprise was gone; their soldiers were in a difficult spot, fighting on U.S. terms in a bloody struggle for each block. The South Vietnamese, for political reasons, requested that American troops be withdrawn. They wanted to prove to the world that they were strong enough to win back their own capital without any more help from their American partners.

The 7th infantrymen, dirty, tired and red-eyed, piled aboard helicopters and flew back to Binh Chanh, where they resumed their patrol routine. For several days, they humped through the paddy country and took fire from stray VC who had managed to escape Saigon.

Try as they might, though, the South Vietnamese could not quite administer the coup de grace at Cholon. The stubborn VC, augmented by a few NVA, were hanging in there, killing many ARVN soldiers. The Cotton Balers got the call to return. On February 10, the entire 3rd Battalion boarded helicopters at Binh Chanh and flew back to Cholon.

The operation was a bit bizarre. The Americans did not seem to know that the VC had taken back Phu Tho Racetrack, and helicopters landed on the main field, right on top of the VC command post. What could have been a bloody tragedy, however, turned out instead to be a fairly quick victory. The M-60 fire of the door gunners suppressed the enemy, while the grunts hopped off the choppers and into the strangest LZ any of them would ever experience. They stumbled and staggered into fighting positions and laid down fire on the stands, sending chips of concrete and dust everywhere. Within minutes the 3rd Battalion had Phu Tho back.

From there they repeated the routine of a week before, cautiously securing buildings, blasting VC and warily watching each other’s backs. The fighting lasted for the better part of another four days. This time the VC were not as well armed or as determined. Some fought to the death, but others melted away into the city, assuming other identities, hoping to fight again another day. They were the lucky ones. Most of the VC who infiltrated into Saigon amid so much hope and expectation in late January were dead by the middle of February. The capital remained firmly in allied hands. The 3-7th Infantry later received a Valorous Unit Citation for its action at Cholon. It was even thought-erroneously, as it turned out-that the unit had killed the VC commanding general in addition to destroying his command post.

In pure military terms, the Tet Offensive had been a disaster for the Communists. They achieved no major physical objectives and incurred tens of thousands of casualties. The Viet Cong were decimated in the kind of open, conventional fighting that guaranteed their demise. Basically, the Communists had abandoned their hit-and-run attrition tactics in favor of an all-out battle of firepower and maneuver, exactly the kind of fight at which the U.S. Army excelled. The Communists paid a heavy price in the process. ‘I think the VC made two major mistakes,’ General Weyand later wrote. ‘First, by attacking everywhere at once, they fragmented their forces and laid themselves open to defeat in detail. Second, and most important, they believed their own propaganda and thought there would be a ‘great general uprising’ wherein the South Vietnamese people would flock to their banner. There was a general uprising all right, but it was against them rather than for them. The vast majority of the South Vietnamese people wanted nothing to do with the VC.’

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