Terrorism in the Ancient Roman World
By Gregory G. Bolich

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For Sulla marched again on Rome. His second triumph was punctuated by his seizure of power as dictator. He issued proscriptions against his opponents, posting rewards both for informers and those who murdered his enemies. After publicly killing Quintus Lucretius Ofella, an accomplished and ambitious man, in the open Forum, Sulla justified himself simply on the grounds that Ofella would not obey him. Sulla then told the assembled people this story: Lice troubled a farmer plowing his field. Twice he stopped work to shake them out of his tunic. However, when the biting continued, he burned his tunic to not lose any further time. With this anecdote, Sulla warned a people he had already defeated twice not to try his patience further. Few dared.

Then things got worse. Armed with the lessons of the recent past, Gaius Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon and won for himself the position of dictator for life. It proved a short life, as people who feared living under a despot assassinated Caesar. Heedless of the warnings of his own day, Caesar would have done well to attend the warning of Aristotle: Those to be watched and feared most among potential assassins are they who are heedless of their own life in their desire to take life.

These exemplars of terrorism during the Late Republic were often faithfully followed in the Empire. Perhaps the one thing these various figures shared in common was the belief that their objectives justified the use of terror. Where a ruler was simply brutal or capricious by nature, the idea of divine right became a pretext to do whatever he could get away with. Roman historians tended to find a common thread in their studies: Power illuminates character but can also corrupt it. The most ferocious emperors invariably started out far less evil than they became after years of absolute rule. They learned what they could get away with, and then their own characters determined the limits and uses to which they put their power.

The speech Tacitus attributes to Calgacus climaxes in an insight any entity, whether sovereign state or disaffected terrorist cell, ignores at its peril: Apprehension and terror are weak bonds of affection; once break them, and, where fear ends, hatred will begin. The choice to embrace terrorist acts as an instrument of rule has always been costly. Terror inevitably engenders more terror — and hatred. Not even the might of Rome could protect the republic or the empire from paying that price. Whenever Romans indulged in state-sponsored terrorism, subjugated people responded in kind.

This article was written by Gregory G. Bolich and originally published in the Spring 2006 edition of MHQ.

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Tags: Ancient-Medieval, Historical Conflicts, Military Technology

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