"Custer's Last Rally," by John Mulvany (Courtesy of Library of Congress)Although some soldiers ran from Custer's Hill, they did hold their ground and fight from their position as long as they could. The participating warriors called it a Last Stand. Deal with it
The Battle of the Little Bighorn, fought on the banks of the river of that name in Montana Territory in June 1876, is the most often discussed fight of the Indian wars. It has been said that we will never know what happened there because there were no survivors. That is nonsense. There were thousands of survivors. The Indians clearly told us what happened. We need only to listen to what they said.
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There are also many misconceptions about Lt. Col. George A. Custer and the 7th Cavalry, among them being that Custer had long yellow hair and that he and his regiment carried sabers into the battle. In reality, Custer's hair was cut short, and the regiment left its sabers behind.
An examination of 10 of the major myths about the Battle of the Little Bighorn follows. The first two myths are widely held fallacies that do not require Indian testimony to discredit; the last eight myths are largely discredited by eyewitness accounts of those on the winning side.
Custer and All His Men Were Killed
The 7th Cavalry on June 25, 1876, consisted of about 31 officers, 586 soldiers, 33 Indian scouts and 20 civilian employees. They did not all die. When the smoke cleared on the evening of June 26, 262 were dead, 68 were wounded and six later died of their wounds. Custer's Battalion – C, E, F, I and L companies – was wiped out, but the majority of the seven other companies under Major Marcus Reno and Captain Frederick Benteen survived.
Custer Disobeyed His Orders
Many Custerphobes insist Custer violated Brig. Gen. Alfred Terry's orders. We only need to read Terry's written instructions to clarify the situation. Terry wrote that he "places too much confidence in your zeal, energy, and ability to wish to impose upon you precise orders which might hamper your action when nearly in contact with the enemy." Terry gave Custer suggestions that he should attempt to carry out, "unless you shall see sufficient reason for departing from them."
In addition to the written orders, Terry entered Custer's tent before he left on his final march, and told him, "Use your own judgment and do what you think best if you strike the trail."
Custer did not disobey his orders.
Custer Did Not Listen to His Scouts
Even using binoculars from the traditional Plains Indian lookout known as the Crow's Nest, Colonel Custer of the 7th Cavalry had trouble seeing the village in the valley some 15 miles away. His scouts told him a large village was there. He believed them, but he wanted to wait one more day, until the morning of June 26, 1876, to attack. He told Half Yellow Face, "I want to wait until it is dark, and then we will march." The Crow scout replied, "These Sioux…have seen the smoke of our camp," and argued that they must attack immediately.
Custer still wanted to wait. Another Crow, White Man Runs Him, said, "That plan is no good, the Sioux have already spotted your soldiers." Red Star, an Arikara, concurred that the Crows were right, and believed that Custer must "attack at once, that day, and capture the horses of the Dakotas [Sioux]." Shortly after, soldiers discovered Indians rummaging through some supplies they had dropped on the back trail. Custer now knew his scouts were right. He followed their advice and attacked immediately. Custer did listen to his scouts.
The Indian Village Was Immense
Traditionally, the village on the Little Bighorn has been depicted as the largest ever seen in the West. Actually there were at least one dozen villages larger, and geographical and spatial considerations illustrate the impossibility of the exaggerated size estimations. A village that has been depicted as large as six miles long and one mile wide, in reality was 11⁄2 miles long and one-quarter mile wide. It contained about 1,200 lodges and perhaps 1,500 warriors. Custer was not "crazy" for attacking.
The Indians told us the village size. Pretty White Buffalo said that the Cheyenne and Sans Arc camps were at the lower end of the village, across from the Medicine Tail crossing of the river. Standing Bear said that the mouth of Muskrat Creek (Medicine Tail) was north of the Santee camp, which was the northernmost of the circles. Two Moon said that the village stretched from Sitting Bull's Hunkpapa camp at Shoulder Blade Creek, to the Cheyenne camp at Medicine Tail's place. Wooden Leg stated that the Cheyenne camp was just a little upstream and across from Medicine Tail Coulee, and at the other end were the Hunkpapas, just northeast of the present-day Garryowen Station, with all the camps east of the present road. A soldier named Wolf drew a map depicting the camp conforming to the course of the river with its northernmost limits across from Medicine Tail. Fears Nothing's map showed the entire camp between Medicine Tail in the north, to Shoulder Blade Creek in the south. Standing Bear and Flying Hawk both produced maps that showed the northernmost limit of the camp to be south of Medicine Tail Creek.
The Indians showed us that the camp conformed to the river and was, at most, 11⁄2 miles long. It was a large camp, certainly, but it was not several miles long and unconquerable.
Sitting Bull Set Up an Ambush
It is said that the Indians knew Custer and the 7th Cavalry were coming, and set a trap. They did no such thing. Pretty White Buffalo said that no one expected an attack; the young men were not even out watching for the soldiers. "I have seen my people prepare for battle many times," she said, "and this I know: that the Sioux that morning had no thought of fighting."
Moving Robe was digging wild turnips with other women several miles from camp when she saw a cloud of dust rise beyond the bluffs in the east. She saw a warrior riding by, shouting that soldiers were only a few miles away, and that the women, children and old men should run for the hills in the other direction.
Antelope Woman (Kate Bighead) was bathing in the river with many others. Scores of naked men, women and children were in the river and not expecting a battle. Neither were many others playing or fishing along the stream. Everyone was having a good time, said Antelope, and no one was thinking about any battle.
Low Dog said the sun was about at noon, and he was still asleep in his lodge. He awoke to the shouts of soldiers, but thought it was a false alarm. "I did not think it possible that any white men would attack us," he said.
After breakfast, White Bull left his wife's lodge and went to tend the horses with no thoughts of any approaching danger. When he heard a man yelling an alarm, he climbed a hill and could see the soldiers approaching. He jumped on his best horse and drove the ponies back to camp.
Standing Bear awoke late that morning. While they ate breakfast, his uncle said, "After you are through eating you had better go and get the horses, because something might happen all at once, we never can tell."
Before they could finish eating, there was a commotion outside, and Standing Bear learned his uncle's premonition was correct. The soldiers were coming. They had been surprised.
Wooden Leg had been to a dance the night before, and slept late that morning. He and his brother Yellow Hair went to the river and found many Indians splashing in the water. The brothers found a shade tree and dozed off. Suddenly an old man called out: "Soldiers are here! Young men, go out and fight them."
Red Feather slept late that morning and awoke to the words: "Go get the horses – buffaloes are stampeding!" Indians began dashing into the camp with the ponies. One, known as Magpie, shouted, "Get away as fast as you can, don't wait for anything, the white men are charging!" Red Feather could see soldiers firing into Sitting Bull's camp. Some Hunkpapas and Oglalas, caught up in the early panic, ran away.
Runs the Enemy heard that soldiers were coming, but did not believe it. He sat back down with the men and continued smoking. Rain in the Face admitted the soldiers came to the valley without warning. "It was a surprise," he said.
Sitting Bull, the chief who was said to have masterminded the ambush by the Indians, was caught up in the confusion. When the soldiers attacked, his young wife, Four Robes, was so frightened that she grabbed only one of her infant twins and ran to the hills. When asked where the second child was, she realized she had left it behind, and raced back to the lodge to retrieve it. Later, the one left behind received the name Abandoned One. This was not the household of a man who supposedly knew soldiers were coming and set a trap for them.
It is apparent from the Indian reactions that Custer had surprised the camp. There was no ambush. Custer's approach was successful. In spite of attacking in broad daylight, he did surprise the village.
Custer's Tactics Were Faulty
It is said that Custer foolishly divided his force and allowed the regiment to be defeated in detail. Yet, using part of a force to fix the enemy in front, and sending another portion to envelop the flank is a standard tactic of professional armies. While Major Marcus Reno attacked the southern end of the village, Custer made a flank march to the north along the river bluffs. The Indians, snapping out of their initial surprise, counterattacked Reno and chased him across the river to the east bank. When they climbed the bluffs, they had another surprise: Custer was already beyond them, 11⁄2 miles north and closer to the village than the Indians were.
White Bull went up the bluffs where he saw something of great importance. "Where we were standing on the side of the hill we saw another troop moving from the east toward the north where the camp was moving," he exclaimed.
One Bull found a vantage point on the hill and saw more troops coming from the south, leading what appeared to be pack mules. But a bigger problem was the troop force to the north. Soldiers were already beyond the Indians and were heading toward the other end of the camp.
American Horse was in the valley while Reno's survivors climbed the hill. When he turned to the river, he heard a man's voice calling out that more bluecoats were moving to attack the lower village, American Horse's own people. He spun his horse around and quickly headed north.
Fears Nothing reached the river and heard an Indian on the east bank calling that more soldiers were coming down from behind the ridge. He rode up the bluffs to see for himself and clambered back down. Once in the valley, he galloped north toward the mouth of Medicine Tail Creek.
Runs the Enemy noticed two Indians waving blankets on the eastern bluffs. Crossing over with another Indian, he heard them yell that the soldiers were "coming, and they were going to get our women and children." He continued to the crest and the sight shocked him. "As I looked along the line of the ridge they seemed to fill the whole hill," he said. "It looked as if there were thousands of them, and I thought we would surely be beaten." Runs The Enemy raced downhill, across the river and back down the valley.
Wooden Leg had climbed a hill north of Reno's hilltop position when another Indian cried out: "Look! Yonder are other soldiers!" Peering downriver, Wooden Leg saw them on the distant hills. The news spread quickly, and the Indians began to ride after them to meet this other threat.
Short Bull was busy driving Reno out of the valley and into the hills. He never noticed Custer until Crazy Horse rode up with his men.
"Too late! You've missed the fight!" Short Bull called to him.
"Sorry to miss this fight!" Crazy Horse laughed. "But there's a good fight coming over the hill."
Short Bull looked where Crazy Horse pointed. For the first time he saw Custer and his men pouring over a hill. "I thought there were a million of them," he said.
"That's where the big fight is going to be," Crazy Horse predicted. "We'll not miss that one."
Many Indians who chased Reno up the bluffs also realized that there were more soldiers already north of them, in a position to interpose themselves between the warriors and the village. Moving along a ridge above Medicine Tail Coulee, less than two miles away, was Custer's Battalion. It was a shock. Custer had surprised them not once, but twice. His tactics were working.
Custer Was Killed at the River
One of the major misconceptions of the Little Bighorn fight is that Custer was shot down in a midstream charge while crossing the river. The idea stems from two sources: one was the Lakota White Cow Bull, and the other was two Crow scouts who were not there. Many other Indian eyewitnesses who were there never said anything of the sort.
Two Moon said that Cheyenne guards were already posted on the east bank when Custer rode down. In addition, many Lakotas had already crossed to the east side. Warriors were across the river, some going upstream and some downstream, trying to get on each side of the soldiers.
Yellow Nose said he and his companions were already on the east side of the river when the soldiers first fired at them.
From the east bank of the river, White Shield saw that the troops were heading straight for them, and he believed they would break through and get across the river. When the Gray Horses (Company E) got close to the river, they dismounted, and both sides fired at each other.
Bobtail Horse said the soldiers began shooting as they neared the ford leading to the camp. He said: "Let us get in line behind this ridge and try to stop or turn them. If they get in camp they will kill many women." Bobtail Horse said that his "party had not advanced toward Custer, but were on the bank of the Little Horn on the same side as Custer."
The soldiers advanced, but, "the ten Indians were firing as hard as they could and killed a soldier," Bobtail Horse explained. The man's horse ran on ahead, and Bobtail Horse caught it. The soldiers finally stopped. This all happened on the east bank.
Red Hawk was fighting Reno's men, but went north in time to see a second group of soldiers coming down the ridge in three divisions. They did not make it to the river, he said. The first division only got to a point about one-half to three-quarters of a mile from the water.
Lone Bear said the soldiers got near the river, dismounted and began leading their horses, but they never got to the river. Lone Bear watched as large numbers of warriors, both mounted and on foot, crossed over to the east bank and started after Custer before he reached the stream.
More warriors indicated the confrontation occurred east of the river. Kill Eagle said, "The Indians crossed the creek and then the firing commenced." Wooden Leg said that the first three Cheyennes to cross the river were Bobtail Horse, Roan Bear and Buffalo Calf, and they fired on Custer while he was "far out on the ridge." He Dog said 15 or 20 Indians fought the troopers from the east side of the stream – near the dry creek, but not near the river. Standing Bear also said that the Indians crossed the river as soon as Custer came in sight. They took position behind a low ridge and were reinforced rapidly as more warriors crossed over. "There was no fighting on the creek," Standing Bear said. Bobtail Horse, who was right there, indicated without hesitation that they were all on the east bank, on the same side as Custer. Two years after the fight, Hump, Brave Wolf and Ice told 5th Infantry Lieutenant Oscar F. Long that the Indians crossed the river before Custer could possibly have forded. They had already gained a small hill on the north side of the Little Bighorn and placed themselves between Custer and the river.
It is clear from the explanations of the Indians who were there that Custer's soldiers never got across the river, or even into it; the Indians were already on the east (north) bank fighting them. Where do we get the idea that Custer was killed in the river? Mostly from White Cow Bull. His story has caused more mischief than almost any of the tales that have been circulated about the battle.
It is only White Cow Bull who supposedly said that he and Bobtail Horse shot a buckskin-clad soldier in the river. Neither Bobtail Horse nor any of the other Indians who were there mention anything of the sort – they don't even say White Cow Bull was there. Yet, White Cow Bull says that he, almost single-handed, stopped a full-scale cavalry charge in midstream. No other Lakota or Cheyenne saw it. They were not fighting on the river, but east of it. White Cow Bull's story is just that – bull.
The Crow scouts Goes Ahead and White Man Runs Him reportedly told stories of Custer dying in the river. Goes Ahead's tale comes from his wife, Pretty Shield, who was not there either, but said little other than Custer drank too much and rode into the river and died. White Man Runs Him did not see Custer, but heard later that Custer was hit in the chest by a bullet and fell into the water. From such tales grew the myth that Custer was killed at the river. It did not happen.
Crazy Horse's Ride to the North
One standard tale of the battle involves the legendary ride of Crazy Horse. The story goes that Crazy Horse, with his tactical genius, judged the situation in a flash, gathered hundreds of his warriors, went north down the valley, crossed the river, swung east and swept down on an unsuspecting Custer from the north, completely surprising and overwhelming the befuddled commander.
Many historians and novelists have followed this scenario: Cyrus Brady, George Hyde, Charles Kuhlman, William Graham, Mari Sandoz, Edgar Stewart, David H. Miller, Stephen Ambrose, Henry and Don Weibert, James Welch, Robert Utley, Evan Connell, Jerry Greene and Doug Scott. A slight variation on this theme comes from Richard Fox; he has Crazy Horse approaching from Deep Ravine. With all those historians concurring at one time or another over the years (some have since modified their interpretation), the story must be true.
It is not.
How did it really happen? Again, the warriors who were there told us where Crazy Horse went. After fighting Reno, Crazy Horse and Flying Hawk went back to the village to drop off some wounded warriors. They immediately went to Medicine Tail Ford, where Short Bull and Pretty White Buffalo saw Crazy Horse crossing the river. He was next located in the area of Calhoun Hill by numerous Indians who fought with him that day, including Foolish Elk, Lone Bear, He Dog, Red Feather and Flying Hawk. White Bull rode from the bluffs where Reno had retreated, directly north on the east side of the river. He approached Calhoun Hill from up Deep Coulee and worked around the hill where he joined Crazy Horse and his men, already fighting. Had Crazy Horse gone on his mythical northern sweep, or done half the deeds ascribed to him, he could not have been fighting near Calhoun Hill in this phase of the battle.
Crazy Horse was very reticent about speaking to white recorders. His spokesman, Horned Horse, said that the soldiers' assault was a surprise. The Indians had no plan of ambush. Crazy Horse believed Custer mistook the women and children stampeding in a northerly direction down the valley for the main body of Indians. The warriors merely divided into two groups, one staying between the noncombatants and Custer and the other circling his rear.
That is all there is to it. Only after the collapse of the Calhoun-Keogh position did Crazy Horse continue north where he may have, finally, confronted the last of Custer's men making their stand on the far knob of the ridge. Or maybe not. Flying Hawk indicated that during the final phase of the battle, Crazy Horse jumped on his pony and chased off after one of the last fleeing troopers. Crazy Horse likely had nothing at all to do with the final fight on Last Stand Hill. He did not make a several mile sweep down the valley and hit Custer near Last Stand Hill from the north, and he did not attack from up Deep Ravine.
Much of this incorrect story stemmed from Gall. Edward Godfrey recorded him as saying, "Crazy Horse went to the extreme north end of the camp." He turned right and went up a very deep ravine and "he came very close to the soldiers on their north side." Remember, however, that the northern end of the camp was at Medicine Tail Coulee, not three miles farther, as many white historians believed, and "north" to most Indians, is "east" to white observers.
Why did we get it so wrong? It developed from a number of factors: different terrain perceptions between Indian and white, white exaggeration of the village size, poor critical examination of the accounts and a reluctance to take the time to re-research the primary sources. An incorrect premise was accepted and perpetuated with each telling, and Crazy Horse's ride has drifted out of the realm of history and into the land of fantasy.
There Was No Last Stand
Of late there have been archaeological studies that have shined new light on some of the mysteries of the battle. One of them, by Richard Fox, has taken the stance that the Custer battle had "no famous last stand," and that the Last Stand is a myth, determined mainly because of artifact clustering patterns and because some men ran toward the river at the end of the fight. Certainly, there was no Last Stand as in the 1941 movie They Died With Their Boots On, but there was a stand.
Good Voiced Elk said, "No stand was made until the soldiers got to the end of the long ridge…."
Flying By rode Battle Ridge to the north where he saw bodies of the soldiers who had been killed all the way along his path. As far as he could see there had been only one stand, and it was made in the place where Custer would be killed, down at the end of the long ridge.
Lone Bear said the fight on Custer Hill was at close quarters, and, "There was a good stand made."
Gall neared the end of the ridge where the last soldiers were making a stand, he said, and, "They were fighting good."
Lights said the stand made at Custer Hill was longer than anywhere else on the field.
Two Eagles said the most stubborn stand by the soldiers was made on Custer Hill.
Red Hawk said the bluecoats were "falling back steadily to Custer Hill where another stand was made," and, "Here the soldiers made a desperate fight."
Iron Hawk saw 20 mounted men and about 30 men on foot on Last Stand Hill. "The Indians pressed and crowded right in around them on Custer Hill," he said. But the soldiers were not yet ready to die. Said Iron Hawk, "They stood here a long time."
He Dog participated in the chase that broke the soldiers' line, and helped drive the fleeing troopers along the ridge. At the far end, Custer's men were putting up a good fight.
Red Hawk said that only after making a desperate fight on Custer Hill did the remaining soldiers retreat downhill.
Flying Hawk said they kept after the fleeing soldiers until they got to where Custer was making a stand on the ridge. There "the living remnant of his command were now surrounded."
Although impressions of the stand's time length and degree of intensity vary among the observers, the fact that it took place cannot be erased. Soldiers defending the northern portion of Custer's field inflicted most of the Indian casualties – the best defense was not made at Calhoun Hill. The time spent in their fight and the results of their shooting are all the evidence we need to show that they defended their ground tenaciously. An interpretation claiming that few government cartridges were found on Custer Hill cannot change this. Although some soldiers ran from Custer's Hill, they did hold their ground and fight from their position as long as they could. The participating warriors called it a Last Stand. Deal with it.
28 Soldiers Died in Deep Ravine
Recent visitors to the battlefield may have walked down the Deep Ravine Trail to its end and read the interpretive sign. The sign perpetuates another myth: that about 28 soldiers died within the steep-walled gully. It has several quotes from Indians and soldiers who said they saw bodies in the ravine. What are not listed are the statements from eyewitnesses who said that few, if any, bodies were there.
Interpretation should be based on historical and physical evidence whenever possible. Battle relics and bones have been found virtually on every part of the Little Bighorn Battlefield. Where they have not been found is in the trench of the Deep Ravine. When the archaeological record shows no sign of bodies, it ought to be matched with the appropriate historical record – that there were few, if any, bodies in the Deep Ravine. It is incredible that diametrically opposed historical and archaeological interpretations are presented as facts.
Since there is no physical record of soldier bodies in Deep Ravine, the interpretive sign should contain the appropriate historical commentary.
The Oglala warrior He Dog, said, "Only a few soldiers who broke away were killed below toward the river."
Lone Bear said Custer Hill was "the first and only place where the soldiers tried to get away, and only a few from there."
Waterman said, "A few soldiers tried to get away and reach the river, but they were all killed."
Flying By said that "Soldiers were running through [the] Indian lines trying to get away…only four soldiers got into the gully by the river."
Two Moon explained that Custer's men "stayed right out in the open where it was easy to shoot them down. Any ordinary bunch of men would have dropped into a watercourse, or a draw."
Red Hawk tellingly reported, "Some of the soldiers broke through the Indians and ran for the river, but all were killed without getting into it."
Iron Hawk said that at the fight's end, "We looked up and the soldiers all were running….The furthest headstone shows where the second man that I killed lies…probably this was the last of Custer's men to be killed….there was only one soldier sneaking along in the gulch."
Probably the clearest white voice that denies bodies in the Deep Ravine came from eyewitness Lieutenant Charles F. Roe, who was there right after the battle, and whose job it was to return to the field in 1881, rebury the bodies on the ridge and place the stone monument above them. In a letter to Walter Camp in 1911, responding to Camp's persistent, incorrect questions about bodies in the ravine, Roe finally said: "I put up the markers near the deep ravine you speak of. There never was twenty-eight dead men in the ravine, but near the head of said ravine, and only two or three in it."
What can we gather from all this? There were many participants who saw what happened at the Little Bighorn, and we should not discount their stories in favor of speculation from those who did not see the events – neither those who lived in the 19th century nor those who make their livings by writing stories today. It is difficult to debunk the old legends, however. Myths die hard – even when hundreds of eyewitnesses have already told it like it was.
Historian Gregory Michno, who writes from Longmont, Colo., is a frequent contributor to Wild West. His much acclaimed books Lakota Noon: The Indian Narrative of Custer's Defeat and The Mystery of E Troop: Custer's Gray Horse Company at the Little Bighorn are recommended for additional reading, along with Lakota Recollections of the Custer Fight: New Sources of Indian-Military History, by Richard G. Hardorff, and Wooden Leg: A Warrior Who Fought Custer, by Thomas B. Marquis.
Editors's Note: See a discussion of sabers at the Little Bighorn in For Want of a Saber the Battle was Lost.
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" The time spent in their fight and the results of their shooting are all the evidence we need to show that they defended their ground tenaciously. An interpretation claiming that few government cartridges were found on Custer Hill cannot change this."
Could it not be said in an equally accurate statement that:
All the interpretation in print cannot change the fact that few government cartridges were found on Custer hill?
Seems strange to ignore physical evidence from archaeological science on page 6 and then use the same archaeological evidence to support the contention that few or no bodies were found in the Deep Ravine.
Your comparison is not faIr, though. There are zero pieces of human remains found in various test holes in Deep Ravine. 28 bodies would leave 5,768 bones.
As far as LSH vs Calhoun Hill. Michno is merely stating that Scott does not have enough data to support a theory that there was more fighting on Calhoun Hill. Millions more have visited LSH as opposed to Calhoun Hill. Virtually every visitor goes to LSH, relatively few to Calhoun Hill. In the monument's early years, there was unrestricted gathering of relics. In fact the battlefield was long ago robbed of most battle artifacts. There wasn't even a road in the monument's early years from LSH to Calhoun Hill , which is nearly a mile distant. Because of this, relic hunters had much more opportunity to strip LSH of copper casings from the Springfields.
Comparing the relative few casings found in the 1980s and 1990s is meaningless as far as determining where the fighting was heavier.
One correction. I mixed up archeologists. Michno was addressing Fox's conclusions, not Scott's.
Fields of fire, and their patterns moving forward over the course of a battle, can be charted with a great degree of accuracy, by analyzing the unique firing pin marks imprinted on spent cartridges.
Those examined at the Ford area of the LBH River show scant evidence of any type of coordination at all- and plenty of evidence of random discharges of weapons 'wild firing' in multiple directions at once- in the ground, in the air, etc.
The direction of fields of fire is likewise random at LBH, and given the former speaks more of a Company in the throes of confusion and panic of men being caught by surprise by an overwhelming amount of foe, rather than the far more popular image of an organised and impressive 'last stand.'
The ballistic evidence at LBH also supports the eyewitness accounts of Braves that Custers Troopers 'stampeded like Buffalo' in response to the onslaught of warriors that overwhelmed them.
A last note of interest: contemporary archeological analysis of the LBH site also shows that far less rounds were even fired than expected, given the last stand theory. This is also supported by Indian accounts of the cartridge belts (a prized item of booty) taken from Troopers bodies after the battle. The Indians reported that most of the belts they recovered still had live cartridges in them. This would seem to indicate also more of a panic reaction, than a ground standing response from Custers men.
In addition, the physical amount of rounds expended at the site, is disproportionatly low
Mr. Michno,
I understand that you are a published author and expert in Custer's battle at the Little Bighorn. Therefore, I'm hoping you may provide an explanation regarding the conversational and confrontational style used in your article. It's rather surprising to read something so juvenile from a published author. Frankly, sir, I would be embarrassed by such an effort. Grammatically, you have made a few errors which should have been amended during routine editing.
Scholastically, your research is wonderful but incomplete. Your sources appear to be primarily native Americans; their reliability as eyewitnesses is tenuous, yet you fail to even mention this fact. Many of these testimonies were provided years after the battle, at a time when memories tend to obfuscate the realities.
Sorry for the criticism. Or, as you so eloquently wrote, "Deal with it." Seriously, did your teenage son write this for a class?
I have to say that I was very interested when I first saw this article but have to agree with above posters. I was rather disappointed by the way it was written and the rhetoric used.
I have read many history books over the years and many articles on this site. I'm afraid this article is sub par to anything I have read so far.
My instincts asked me if it was april first.
I, too, agree with the other posters. This article is trite at best, and I'm rather shocked that it would even be published on this site. I don't think I'll bother to look at this site in the future.
One additional myth often posed about this battle-The Indians used bows and arrows, with Custer's men better armed with rifles. The fact that many of the indians were armed with better weapons (some with repeating arms) and outnumbered their blue coated foes were the primary factors in the battle's outcome. The poor performance of the black powder cartridges that the cavalrymen used, and the unfortunate tendancy of their single shot spencers to jam when hot (brass couldn't be extracted after firing) contributed to the problems faced by the troopers. BTW, If Custer's tactics were as good as the author portrays here…why did he lose?
I AGREE WITH THE COMMENTS ALREADY MADE. THE AUTHER COMMENTS ABOUT CUSTERPHOBES. THE AUTHOR COMES ACROSS AS A CUSTER FANATIC. THE BEST COMMENT ABOVE IS, IF CUSTER'S TACTICS WERE SO MASTERFUL, WHY DID HE LOSE?
you have been talking about the battle of the greasey grass,and assume that the oral history of whites is horrable,so indian oral history must be worse,,,biggates
I am a little taken aback by the strongly negative comments on this article. I found it to be interesting and informative, and I did not see the grammatical errors that one commentator mentioned. I agree that the term "Custerphobe," was probably inappropriate in the context of a "myth buster"-style discourse that purports to set the record straight, since it suggests the author has an agenda. It would have been nice to have a map or two so that one could see the locations referenced. Otherwise, good job.
I too agree with most people here. As someone studying and putting together my own article on what went wrong and why Custer lost, I felt this article lost the mark on many levels. The biggest problem was, as noted, that Custer did everything right, but no reflection on why he lost. I suggest in my article that the loss was deliberately calculated by the government as a whole – or for those who hate conspiracy theories – that the government was too stupid to know how many Indians had combined in protection of the Black Hills. Custer believed all the reports at the time that there would be no more than 800 to 1,000 Indians out there and felt he could make them run, the way he always had. He was wrong, this time.
By the way any Indian version is as valid as any white's. But they relate things differently, each with a different perspective. That has to be taken into account.
I believe Spencers were actually repeating rifles…Custer's troops were probably armed with a mix of Springfields, Sharps and perhaps a few Remington Rolling Blocks…these were indeed single shots and very prone to jamming…particularly when overheated from rapid firing.
Regards from a retired Cavalry Colonel, and former troop commander in 4/7th Cavalry, Korea, 1973…Garry Owen
Custer's troops were armed with the 1873 Springfield trap-door, breech-loading, single-shot carbine, and the Colt 45 pistol. A few officers had their personal weapons with them. Also First Sergeant John Ryan, had his own rifle. The 7th carried Sharps in the 1860s. But in the 1870s, the Army changed to the Springfield.
There are obviously some commenters on here who don't know a thing about the so-called "Custer's Last Stand". If you don't know how Custer lost after all the literature on him, then you shouldn't be commenting.
I'm sure this article was written for people of all ages. That would include grade school children. But, then, there are some on here who don't know why Custer lost that probably benefitted by the simplicity of the article. Maybe the will go on to read something at a bit higher level.
I was very open to a "New" idea reguarding the 28 odd missing bodies of deep ravine, and was hop9ing Greg Michno's book could have been better developed. When you have vivid recollections from Benteen, McDougal, and others stating emphatically that they saw and counted those men lying in a heap at the bottom of such a steep-sided ravine, and a trail of dead leading right to it, it is indeed a far cry to try to establish them being covered in somthing as shallow as cemetary ravine. Sorry Greg, I think you are way out -of -bounds on this one and just wanted to get out another book.
Custer did everything right, he used the best tactics and he surprised the indians, in a village that you state categorically was not unconquerable, yet somehow your brilliant lt col not only got himself killed(which is his right) but he got all of his men killed uselessly. How can you possibly square those things up?
By the way, the village WAS unconquerable for both Reno AND Custer, the facts have proven that to everyone except a Custer-phile like the author.
There are some who feel that Custer may have been killed or seriously wounded on the onset of the fight causing severe demoralization. It is a picture most of us "Custer" buffs can't grasp.I think the village could have been captured,or should I say the non-combatants could have been taken, and that is probably what drew Custer's contingent so far to the north. Custer was probably at first elated when Reno was occupying the fighting men at the south end of the Villiage. He thought he had smooth sailing!What could the warriors have done if the wives,children and old ones were surrounded by armed cavalrymen? Picture the Indian's exodus of flight, and Custer's men persuing them until they themselves were swallowed up by really angry warriors.
Willaim, according to Kill Eagle (an Indian in the Camp of Sitting Bull), a man named Ridgely (a white captive who witnessed the battle) and Curly the Upsaroka scout…the battle began at two o'clock and continued until the sun went down behind the hills.
Custer lived until nearly all his men were killed or wounded(the last man killed reported to have been Adjutant Cook who rode a white horse). Custer took a bullet to the left side and sat down pistol in hand: another shot struck him and he fell over. He was apparenly not wounded prior to the first shot to the side since Curly went to him in a lull in the fighting when he saw that the party was to be entirely cut to pieces, he approached the General begged that he would permit him to show a way of escape which his powerful thoroughbred could easily have aided him to accomplish. Custer dropped his head upon his breast and after a moment of thought looked at Curly, motioned him away with his hand and went back to die with his men. Had he been wounded I beleive Curly would have mentioned it. In addition, concerning weapons. Custer refused General Terry's offer of a battery of Gatling guns, saying it might embarrass him.
He was basically intending to hold position until the rest of Gen.Terry's, Gen. Crook's and Colonel Gibbon's forces arrived. Reportedly, Terry's troops numbered 600 cavalry and 400 enfantry. Crook's troops consisted of 47 officers, and 1000 men. Gibbon marched with 450 cavalry and infantry. Had Reno and Benteen done their duty it is quite probable the the Indians could have been kept in check until General Terry arrived.
Apparently, they had enough man and fire power to prevail…but Shit Happens.
From this article it seems that the "battle" was just a rout till the last of Custer's troopers reached the end of the ridge. Hmmm….seems a lot like the Alamo "battle" where almost half of the Alamo "garrsison"(about 125 "defenders") jumped the walls of the Alamo compound into the surrounding countryside, only to be killed by Mexican lancers!
I have to agree with most of Michno's article. However, as I have come to realize from my 3 visits to the battlefield and reading some 40 books on the subject. No one has the answer to what really happened, but many have theories about what happened. One big question that has not been answered for me is why one of the most respected and bravest and aggressive calvary soldier in the Civil War never actually attacked the village. And as a disciplanarian why his 5 troops were so unorganized in the end. One answer for me is that Custer was incapacitated at Medicine Tail Coulee ford. Probably with the chest wound . This had a ripple affect on the command and resulted in little evidence of an organized defense by the command other than at Calhoun Hill. I know that many have Custer not part of the troops approaching MTC ford, but what else other that Custer going down could have stopped the attack on the village. Particularily since by all Indian accounts the ford was lightly defended. And where better to divide the warriors from the rest of the village fleeing.
There is no evidence that Custer was killed early, save a little bir of testimony about a buckskin clad man shot at MTC. Virtually all the officers wore buckskin. Custer had buckskin pants, but a blue shirt.
But the biggest evidence that Custer did not die early is that his body was found with headquarters. Keogh was senior captain and would have assumed command if Custer were killed or incapacitated. Yet Keogh was found with his Company I. There were experienced officers and NCOs with Custer's command. Death of a commander does not render his men leaderless and useless.
In addition, brass casings from Custer's Remington were found with his body, a strong indication he was fighting from that position. A few were collected and given to Libby Custer.
I found Greg Michno's article on the Ten Mistakes about the Little Bighorn to be an excellent introduction to the subject and — obviously — a springboard to controversy. Two contributions of my own to some of Michno's detractors: Ridgely, who claimed he saw the battle, was obviously lying — he was cutting hay in a different part of Montana on June 25 and his account is ludicrous in parts. Ridgely has the Lakota burning six captives alive and claims that Sitting Bull was a half-breed — both nonsense; Curley the Crow scout never got anywhere near Custer Hill. Curly told Walter Mason Camp — and Curley's relatives confirmed to me almost a century later — that he left the column at the same time as Daniel Kanipe, Custer's next-to-last messenger, and well before Giovanni Martini, Custer's final messenger. Conversely I think that the 28 dead men found in the Deep Ravine were pretty much evidential fact. Leaving out the question of the "last ditch," the rest of Michno's article is just about perfect. My entire research staff concurs — well researched, well written, a solid contribution to "Wild West."
I am a high school senior and I guess you would say a history geek. I have read historical books throughout my lifetime and I would have to agree with other commentors. The article's narrative voice is TO strong.
In historical articles, one has to watch what he says and presents BOTH sides of the agrument. One also has to take in account that Native Americans never wrote their history down; they would tell their children or their children's children. AND there are over thousands of Native Americans languages alone, so translation could've been lost and other things.
This article is good, but there should be both sides of the argument and it's very opinionated which is a bad thing in an artcile.
Please excuse my spelling mistakes ^_^
NB — "Thousands" of American Indian languages is mild hyperbole — there were probably about 300 in the days of Eurpean contact. Only three — Lakota, Cheyenne, Crow and Arikara — would have been a factor at the Little Bighorn.Also, worth noting is that Little Bighorn accounts were generally told to officers or reporters within the participant's lifetime — many errors came not from the Indians but with reporters trying for a bigger headline. One problem that does exist is the each Indian tended to describe his own part in the fighting rather than trying for a comprehensive picture. The archeology of Richard Fox and Doug Scott broadly confirms the accuracy of what the Indians had to say. The shady stories about a "Siouz ambush", grass braided together and visual descriptions of Custer's Last Moments came mostly from white pe0ple who weren't there.
Personally, I found the article to be too the point. That said, it would have reflected better on the author and this magazine had the sarcasm and rather juvenile comments (ie: Deal with it, etc) been deleted before the article went to press.
What I also find interesting is that there appears to be 2 main schools of thought: Those who love Custer and those who despise him. Even after all this time, anything written about Custer or the Little Big Horn is sure to get some response.
While not a bad thing by itself, it also can be as detrimental to those who are merely seeking the truth as totally discounting the Indian accounts on one hand, and totally discounting the whites accounts on the other. My guess is the truth lies somewhere in the middle.
I have been studying the general since I was an impassioned boy. I am 51 now and have written several academic papers on the man since. One particular question continues to plague me : why has so little been made of Renos intoxication in the feild, as was testified to in the militarys investigation of the days events? In what appears to be one of the most critical moments of the day, Reno lost the battlefeild initiative and subsequently ignorred repeated commands from Custers order for packs/support and Capt. Thompsons plea to heed them with his own column. As with any calamity, the buck stops at the bosses feet. And Custer was in charge. But the military swept a great deal under the rug at the time to not tarnish the images of many still in the regiment. We all tend to focus so much on Custer on that day because of his aura. But he was, even with the civil war record he had, ultimately human, and was colosally failed that day by the two men he required his own zeal and tenacity from–Reno & Benteen. I've always wondered why Custer kept Benteen in his command as well. The man loathed his leader and that is a cancer in an army unit. All their fault? Of course not. Could they have made a major difference? Obviously. The reconstruction of june 25th 1876 on the Little Bighorn River begins with motives, just like any current investigation. Find the truth by following the particapents motives and witnesses records. The rest is forensics. The complete picture is probably one that lines up everything that possibly could go wrong in the chain of command, and ultimately did. Churchill said that all the best laid plans of battle dissolve in seconds once the fray has begun. The only thing that keeps it from falling apart is unit cohesion. But then, if that had happened Custer may have become president, as many know. THAT is where any sane man would have drawn the line….LOL….
Having been employed as an interpretive ranger at the site for 10years, I had the opportunity to both meet Mr. Michno and discuss the myths that he advances.
While many of you may not like his rather brusque approach, no two people (including all Sioux and Cheyenne participants) saw the total action, and could not be on all parts of the field at one time. Mr. Michno offers the most plausible analysis circumstances of the pertinent event.
Actions were occurring simulatenously on Calhoun Ridge, Calhoun Hill, and the Keogh sector (among many), and with black powder smoke, screaming, and loose animals running amok, I defy anyone (this includes Custer and Crazy Horse) to give me exact information on what specifically was happening with any of the subordinate commands or bodies of warriors.
Mr. Michno illustrates, if you read it, that a commander makes decisions based upon the information known to him at the time, or in a very fluid action like the Little Bighorn, what some of his scouts thought the village was doing, where it was going, etc. In retrospect, some of it looks foolish, but at the time the decision was rendered, it was made on sound reasoning.
Custer was playing a dangerous hand on 25 June 1876, and there was little latitude for failure. I assume that at least one of has made a decision in your own life (based upon the best information and research available), that later bit you in the ass. Or are you all smothered in millions from your winnings on the stock market?
good one!
I've read this article several times over now and must say I don't agree with how some of these people are commenting.(Including the one that comments about the "grammatical" errors.) I think this is one of the better articles on Custer.
Custer's biggest mistake was not accepting the offer of taking four companies of the 4th Cavalry with him. It would have augmented his force by about 200 troopers. In addition, the 4th would have been eager for a fight and formed an aggressive battalion, perhaps even being sent on "the scout" that Benteen took his lazy time on. You can bet that if Benteen and Reno where BOTH attacking the village with six companies instead of three while Custer circled behind the initial attack wouldn't have cut and run so fast. Plus, the 4th would have had employed much more haste in getting to the field of combat.
That said, let's give the Native Americans credit. They were fighting to protect the lives of their old people, women and children. They fought hard and well in terrain perfectly suited to their style of fightinng. But Custer did surpirse the camp not once but twice. A larger attacking force with reinforcements arriving 30 minutes sooner might have just tipped the balance in Custer's favor and allowed him to capture a large group of fleeing non-combatants, thus ending the battle with a lot fewer troppers being killed and a lot fewer Native Americans getting killed and harassed until the following spring.
Most of this makes no sense. Of course there was a "Last Stand" no matter who named it that as described in your own article. We you flee so far, turn to fight because you can't go any further THAT is your last stand.
Lt. Rose got to the battle ground 5 years after the fact; how do you with any good sense take the number he gave as being in the revine as the acurate body count? That's just stupid.
I think this was a wonderful, very informitive article. The light of truth is yet to be shined on this tragic time in our history.
A cover up? Definatly. Avoidable? Absolutly, but before the job is givin to the army. The one thing here in this article that jumps out at me is just how close Custer came to "winning"! But for a couple of incidents that could have gone either way, the battle was lost. ( this one among many others) In my opinion factors were as follows: Indian bravery and fighting prowess, Reno's cowardice, Benteen's hatred, lack of tactical cohesion on the part of the troopers due in large part to poor training and too many
"feriners"! Custers ego, and lastly destiny! Weaponry was not an issue. The 7th was armed to the teeth
Hey. It doesn't matter. The Indians won. I salute them. Nobody will ever know or care exactly when Custer bought it. He was a putz, bottom of his class, in love with himself. Stop glorifying him. Get a life. You people, whose grammar and spelling is atrocious, I might add, probably dress up in 7th Calvary outfits every weekend to play make believe like little six year olds. He deserved to die just as much as Jesse James or Billy the Kid deserved to die. Unless you were actually there I don"t care to hear your opinions because that is all they are.
LOL, you are 61 years too late to talk to someone who was "there." I imagine many would find your pursuits to be juvenile, too. And for what reason were you reading posts on this forum, if you found them so trivial?
Jack-o…it's Cavalry, not Calvary…ugh.
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"One additional myth often posed about this battle-The Indians used bows and arrows, with Custer’s men better armed with rifles. The fact that many of the indians were armed with better weapons (some with repeating arms) and outnumbered their blue coated foes were the primary factors in the battle’s outcome. The poor performance of the black powder cartridges that the cavalrymen used, and the unfortunate tendancy of their single shot spencers to jam when hot (brass couldn’t be extracted after firing) contributed to the problems faced by the troopers. BTW, If Custer’s tactics were as good as the author portrays here…why did he lose?"
By CDB on Mar 10, 2009 at 2:13 pm
The standard issue rifle for Custer's troopers were .45-55 (.45-70) single-shot Springfield carbines. They were indeed loaded with 55 grains of black powder. Black powder is very fouling and it is conceivable that after firing many rounds they may have had functioning problems. As another poster above noted, some few may have had Sharps single-shots and it is reported that Custer himself may have had his Remington rolling block which I believe was in .50-70 caliber, which was the standard military cartridge before the adaptation of the .45-70. The Indians had everything from bows and arrows to Sharps single-shots to muzzle-loading muskets to repeating Winchesters, Henrys, and Spencers. All BTW loaded with black powder cartridges. Generally, I think the Indians had more firepower. And of course they had wayyy more in numbers of combatants. Even the best laid plans and strategy is not enough if you are so significantly outnumbered and outgunned. CDB actually answers his own question within his post.
For what I consider the best theory as to how the Custer part of the battle unfolded, his movements, his strategy, and finally, a movement that he made based on his interpretation of the troops he saw on Weir Point, which most probably caused the unraveling of his command, read the book: Sole Survivor, by Douglas W. Ellison. In his book it is Mr Ellison's contention that it was actually 1st Lt. Algernon Smith (Co. E) who was shot at Medicine Tail Coulee. And yes Mich Bouyer sent Curley away before the Custer fighting began, although he was able to later report Custer's movements prior to his leaving.
i agree with the people who reacted negatively to the several "deal with it" comments. this type of writing is extremely off-putting, even if the author is correct in his analysis.
one analysis of the battle that i read stated that a major reason for the defeat was that cavalry is almost useless once it is fighting on foot (1 out of 4 troopers has to hold horses) and that the terrain worked against the 7th because of all the ridges and gullies.
i think that we should rely heavily on physical evidence in analyzing the battle — eye-witness testimony is often unreliable.
every military person involved, including custer, made decisions that can be seen as mistakes in retrospect. However, the general who finally defeated the sioux respected custer when he realized that custer was one of the few men in that sector who actively pursued the indians.
the general who was quoted about custer was gen. nelson miles, one of our great military leaders. he basically mopped up the sioux after custer's defeat.
despite all of the criticisms of custer's tactics, the main difficulty the US army faced was in trying to catch up to the indians, who were generally more mobile. custer's tactics were based on this viewpoint — his main fear was that the sioux would get away, not stand and fight.
gen. miles defeated the sioux by persistently following and attacking them during the winter time, when the indians lost their mobility.
I find it amusing how so many people are quick to denigrate eye-witness testimony and accounts from Native Americans who were actually at the battle, while clinging desperately to their cherished hokum about this battle.
Just because historical fact challenges your Hollywood-myth belief-system coupled with white approbation, doesn't make it any less accurate. Historical fact isn't interested in your feelings or what you think is right or what should be.
You are entitled to your own opinions, you are not entitled to your own facts. This article lays out in detail myths that have been perpetuated throughout the years. If that upsets your world-view, well, too bad. Get over it.
–KMH
Some excellent sustenance Mr. Michno and much to chew on. Ten is a good number and will capture one's attention, though not convinced 2-3 of these myths remain at the level you insist. But one must have 10, and 10 you produce.
I have no problems with the flippant comments closing several of your myths, as I've read enough blogs and Internet articles to know such attitudes are the norm. It antagonizes, rattles and polarizes. I've read 10-15 books on this battle and assume others have a similar level of knowledge on this historic event. But after reading several comments above, I realize I am once again wrong. Several of the myths bandied about, which must date back to the 19th century, are cartoonish in level, revealing a complete lack of understanding on this engagement and the Native Americans who participated. White captives witnessing the Last Stand, some burned at the stake while children fired red hot arrows into their bodies, is the stuff of blood thirsty pulp fiction and Lone Ranger radio serials.
Anyway, the image of Crazy Horse riding north, gathering warriors as he rode along like an ever increasing, deadly snowball preparing to smash Custer's foray, is part of the legend of this battle capturing the imagination of students and tourists. The image is one of several reasons this battle fascinates the world. We can scoff and snort and sneer at the portrait, but without it, would people be as interested in this 1876 event? Would as many people buy your books? Which Native American accounts do we believe and which do we throw away? And why?
You mention this extraordinary encampment of militant warriors was not unconquerable, and yet, were they conquered? Crook retreated after the Rosebud battle, and all indications were he was rattled to the bone. He certainly did not conquer them. Reno retreated to a hilltop and was close to being routed before Benteen's arrival, so he did not conquer them. Custer and all of his men were cut, shot and beat down within an hour. He most certainly did not conquer them. So the very fact they carried the week and the day without defeat, means they were, in fact, unconquerable.
Custer may have indeed made some very strong and intelligent military moves while on the battlefield. And yet, if he had made strong and intelligent moves, shouldn't he have been successful? The fact he and every man with him were killed is evidence his decisions were poor. He underestimated the size of this enormous camp, evidence of this being his fateful decision to separate his men prior to battle. Furthermore, surprising the camp in such a manner, if anything sealed his doom. The Native Americans instinctively reacted, attacked and swarmed, thus Custer was routed quickly.
I've read so much information on what his scouts did or did not say I grow dizzy from all the conflicting information. By most accounts, these scouts were terrified and knew the size of this village was considerable. To attack at midday, when men and horses were exhausted from a fast, overnight march, and then to separate his men in such a fashion, was foolhardy. It's hard to imagine scouts would have recommended such action. And there were so many scouts, some fighting, others not, that I suspect there were as many opinions as teepees on the river. Custer attacked this village as if he was reliving Washita. But this encampment was 10 times the size of that village. And as historical results show, it was indeed unconquerable.
I could go on with several additional points you've made in your attempt to revise not only the legend, but many facts. No matter. You have written some interesting points – many of which are false – and in several cases you have sculpted a picture to fit your needs. Such is the fascination of this battle. This is still good work.
With so much conflicting information I cannot how you can take the stand you have?
Indigenous and none Indigenous, victor and the vanquished, all make conflicting accounts of what happened.
Regards to blame as C/O Custer is to blame. If the fate of Custer instead had been the fate of Reno, Custer would have been blamed. I can remember senior staff saying that IF Custer had survived he would have been court martialed.
As C/O I can only see Custer at fault for the overall command and preparation.
1) It was he who had his command rush to LBH, tiring man and horse alike.
2) He had no idea how much he had pushed man and horse because he always had a spare during a march, a luxury other ranks did not have.
3) He made the decision to attack. OK his intention, it is said, is to wait until next day but his advisers said to attack now (this has puzzled me for some time…for it seems although the scouts etc are said to have advised an early attack,,,they also seemed reticent about attacking at all..preparations for possible death were made by many)
4) He did not support Reno with the whole outfit, as he said he would.
5) His eventual deployment was to spread out to provide effective fire and support.
6) His battalion assignments meant that there could be no real mutual support between himself and the Reno/Benteen Battalions.
7) People criticize the other two battalions for not marching to the sound of the gunfire? Is this not what Custer did? When Reno was engaging was not Custer seen in the distance traveling AWAY from Reno? Should he not have traveled to the sound of Reno's guns?
8) Custer let his ego overtake common sense. The Indians would have waited, even if they struck camp there was enough troops in the field to deal with it. Sure warriors on ponies travel fast…but women and children do not…that is all the troops really needed!!!
It is my belief that Custer intended to let Reno get the bloody nose while he captured the women and children…who obviously would head away from the Reno attack. In fact there are tales of Sitting Bull running away with his family at this point.
Hammer and anvil people say? I think the reason Custer was seen riding away was because his intent was to capture the women and children.
If he had no intention of supporting Reno then why say he would? If he changed his plan he should be telling his battalion commanders.
I believe as the village was stretched out longer then Custer believed, he had further to travel to operate his capture plan. Meaning he was getting further from any support he may need.
Because of the length of the village I think the Custer end of it may have only just started moving out to attack Reno, so when Custer got there it was not just women and children…maybe not a lot of warriors but enough to get Custer thinking and be delayed. Maybe he realized that his 210 guys couldn't escort a few thousand women and children.
Washita was probably in the back of the Native American minds, so when word reached the other end of the camp no doubt they thought that the troops were after the women and children.
This prevented Reno from being annihilated but meant Mr Custer had to contend with a mighty, mobile army, who knew the terrain and used the long grass and brush as effective camouflage.
Much is made of lack of ammunition, in the blame Benteen culture. Custers battalion had about 210 x 100 rounds between them of carbine ammo. That's 21,000 rounds plus something like 24 pistols rounds a man at 5,040 rounds in his Battalion.
Now obviously men died and Native Americans did pick up guns and ammo. Also many horses were lost with up to 50 rounds a man lost. But just to say that if every round of the 21,000 rounds of carbine ammo were exhausted in this 3 hour battle you speak of..that gives a rate of fie of 116 RPM for the whole command or 1 round every 1.8 minutes for the individual trooper. Research has shown me that a competent troop could fire 10 RPM meaning all the ammunition, including that on the horse…would give him 10 minutes of continuous fire.
If ammunition were an issue then the battle could not have lasted 3 hours. For close quarters all they had was maybe knife and a Springfield or Colt club!!!
The battlefield archaeology suggests that about 3% of cartridges were found to have been 'jammed' and manually ejected. However, I do wonder if accounts of soldiers holding up their carbines was more about a jammed weapon used as a club? I would suspect that in the later part of the battle fighting was the most intense so weapons would jam more frequently and…here's a thought….if the warriors were in number and very close you would not have time to clear it…you club one warrior, one kills you and takes your jammed weapon. It maybe the only time it jammed in the whole battle..but we will never know. I think it telling that after LBH the cases went over to brass :(
Of course it is possible that Custer went somewhere for a picnic, then came back 2 3/4 hours later and fired off all the ammo!!! But there is no way 100 rounds would allow a troop to shoot for 3 hours in an intense life or death fight.
Personally, I do not think it was a complete immediate destruction I think he rode around and tried to find a way out of it.
As for a last stand. Stupid point. Any battle surely has the last of the command realizing that they are about to die, so make good account. Even when Varus and three Legions were defeated by Arminius, the last few guys out of 20,000 fought and fought until the Germanic tribes let them go with honor.
Almost any battle you research you find an area of rout and an area of a stand..or two. I read a Native American account that said there were 5 'stands', which I always thought they fell by the company?
As for Benteen and Reno. Benteen did ask Martini for more information regarding Cookes message but his English was not to good. I know the Custerphiles say this is an excuse!!! Regardless of what anyone else thought the message read, it is what Benteen thought it to mean. Bring packs? What the pack train? Or just ammo? I am unsure of the weight of the .45 55 (or 70) but a contemporary weapon the Martini Henry used by the British gave a total ammo weight of 4.8 kg per 100 rounds, so at that sort of figure the total ammo reserve was @ 50 rounds a man is over a 1,000 US pounds…just for Custers Battalion!!
I have always assumed that it meant take the pack animals with the ammo to Custer….but if it is supposed to mean Benteen take the ammo, then with his own reserve getting close to 2,000 pounds of munitions had to be carried. Also I believe they are carried in boxed stores? How are they carried on a horse? However you look at it, to carry extra weight maybe 10lbs a horse, who were very tired animals by now seems crazy…especially given that they left sabers behind as too much weight.
Whatever Benteens motives for not joining Custer, if Custer with FIVE companies couldn't reinforce Reno (as Custer said he would) or make his way through the Warriors, what chance would a smaller command of THREE companies (maybe 4 with B in attendance) have traveling through the warriors, burdened by either extra ammunition weight or slow mules?
If the Custer fight was the ordered disciplined event it is said to be and his battalion were an efficient fighting force, in a defensive position, why did he lose? If Custer, allegedly a better officer, with more troops than Benteen couldn't hold off the Indians how could a moving Benteen?
Fact is the same warriors who beat Custer, fought the so called inferior Benteen, Reno command. They survived and he didn't. I believe they weighed up the situation and made a good fortified defense. Tactically they done the best they could with what they had.
Custer had his troops too spread out for fire support and concentration. They were to far away from other battalion support. People say he was just '15 minutes gallop away'. Yes but Benteen had a 1,000 plus warriors in the way!!!
I believe Benteen did not know where Custer was, went to Reno, saw the situation and decided to stay put. Of course there is talk about hearing the Custer fight and not going to aid him. The guy was miles away, with warriors between them and him. When Weir went out they realized it was over by then.
Custer had disregarded orders many times before, like some say Benteen did. Custer also left men behind to their own fate, as they say Benteen did.
Does anyone seriously think that Benteen deliberately left Custer to die?
If Benteen and Reno were flawed it is up to their commander to whip them in shape…and know how much he can trust them. If he couldn't trust them surely wouldn't they had been better where he could keep his eye on them?
They do say Custer had mood swings and maybe that is indicative of some psychological issue? He certainly seemed a different man at officers briefings towards the end.
He wanted glory, live or dead I believe. There was a reason why the columns were due to link up together…the number of hostiles expected.
I know Terry gave Custer a bit of a free reign…but was there not an instruction telling him NOT to split his command?
I do believe that there is a lot of the story we are not being told…but it is not the tale of rivalry and betrayal between US 7th officers.
I believe that the weapon choice was an issue, especial copper cases. The Springfield was a good rifle but I think its main reason for acquisition was saving ammo and cheapness….a lot of them were just conversions of older weapons.
Also marksmanship and shooter training was practically none existent, this taken into account of the fact that many shooters aim high…and rolling terrain makes it difficult to judge range.
Carbines had no bayonet (nor ramrod!!) and with no saber all the troops had was a club!!! The pistols, being gate loaded were pretty much pointless at close quarters…having to gate eject and reload after discharging…accounts do tell of troops firing six and throwing them away a picking up the carbine, as it was quicker than holstering the pistol…leave alone loading it!!!
I do think that Benteen, Reno and Weir had more to say, than they did…but what is speculation. Weir puzzles me. He died a shocked, distraught alcoholic shortly after if I remember? After he went out to look for Custer…he made his observations returned with the others and we hear no more of him. What did he see that so shocked him? Was it the realization that Custer, whom he highly regarded, was in the final stages of defeat and the realization that had they gone to join him it may have been his fate to. Or was he haunted because he didn't join him?
It is indeed a very interesting tale..whatever the truth of it…..it is a shame Commanche couldn't talk!!! I find equal fascination with the British defeat at Islandlwana. I do hope to visit either or both fields one day…
You know what gets me is that each time there is a documentary or book on LBH it is always polarized with a viewpoint, with selective quoting. Wouldn't it be nice to get advocates of most major theories together and talk through what they do and do not agree with? Hmmm could be another battle though !!!
While I agree that the author could be scholarly in his tone, many of the poster seem just as guilty in their response. If the author is a Custer defender, then many of the posters seem to me to be History Channel Revisionist.
My main point oif agreement with the author is regarding the "archeology" of Dr. Fox. Mr. Foxs analysis is impressive, it should be highly valued, BUT it can not be take as Gospel. If this were a crime scene rather than a battlefield, no jury would convict on Foxes analyis. Foxes "forensic analysius" overlooks that eveidence has been tampered with PARTICULARLY around the bodies of the 7th Cavalry men: they were buried, disinterred and rebuired, people have been walking abouth the areas where they fee (because they were marked) far mor than the firing positions of the American Indians. The area has been in weather for for over 125 years and has been the scene of brush fires. So you can make "Interesting Observations" (and they add to the puzzle), but they are they have their limits, limits the NPS choses to ignore, my belieif, for political expediency.
It comes down to this: None of you know what happened. Michno's opinions are exactly that. This is proven based on the fact that there will never be any agreement. on the actual events. No amount of research will validate or disprove any of your claims. You take one point and extrapolate it to reach a conclusion. That's okay and acceptable since this is an open discussion. But we all need to face the fact that we'll never know, and all of our little opinions are so much dust in the wind.
What I object to is juvenile writing by a professional author. The entire "deal with it" smacks of an insecure man who is afraid of being discovered, of others seeing his scholarship as retreaded material. "Deal with it" is something I would expect from an uneducated man, not a published author. It's really an embarrassment to all of us.
Come on now let's be real! If the tribes wer e surprised by Reno and the coward did not follow his orders tocause panic and confusion on the south end it was doomed for failure. Imay be wrong but there is a great advantage for cavalry to be mounted when Reno dismounted his men not only did he decrease his force by having each fourth man hold horses he turned his men into infantry. I to this day cannot believe that Benteen could not hear firing of some kind and had plenty of time to help George I believe George said "Be Quick" another officer disobeying a written order .Like I said a let's be real if everyone would of followed orders it very well could of turned out different. THank you.
To say Custer did not disobey orders is ludicrous.
First, he was clearly told NOT to follow the trail directly toward the Little Bighorn. "…proceed up the Rosebud until you ascertain definitely the direction in which the trail above spoken of leads. Should it be found (as it appears almost certain that it will be found to turn towards the Little Horn, he thinks that you should still proceed southward, perhaps as far as the headwaters of the Tongue, and then turn towards the Little Horn, feeling constantly, however, to your left, so as to preclude the possibility of the escape of the Indians to the south or southeast by passing around your left flank…."
You can say he was given certain latitude, "…the Department Commander places too much confidence in your zeal, energy, and ability to wish to impose upon you precise orders which might hamper your action when nearly in contact with the enemy…" He was more than 20 miles from the village when HE CHOSE to disobey and follow the trail directly toward the Little Bighorn. That cannot possibly be construed as "nearly in contact".
Also, per the order…"The Department Commander desires that on your way up the Rosebud you should thoroughly examine the upper part of Tullock's Creek, and that you should endeavor to send a scout through to Colonel Gibbon's column, with information of the result of your examination." He was given a scout (George Herendeen) for that specific purpose. He did NOT do it; and here there is no ambiguity nor is there any "latitude" for changing the orders.. Additionally, that would have been a golden opportunity to send word to his commanding officer that he had absolutely changed the plan without any knowledge or consent from his commanding officer or the cooperating unit(s).
I am not "throwing stones" or "kicking a dead lion" as Gen. Miles said. I am merely pointing out that orders were clearly not followed. Was that the cause of the defeat? Can't say, but it surely set things in motion and the commanding officer and cooperating units no longer had any knowledge of the actions of the 7th Cavalry and were in no position to suport them.
After re-reading the article and the numerous posts I must point out that there seems to be some misguided concept that Cavalry fought on horseback all the time. That is not the case. It makes great Hollywood visuals with the gallant cavalry charging to the rescue. Cavalry, by this time had to fight almost exclusively on foot (Look at Farnsworth's debacle at Gettysburg to see a prime reason. The Brits at Balaclava could tell you why also). The horse was transportation; not a weapon. The 7th didn't even bring their sabres to save weight and the troopers were BARELY trained in how to fire their weapons at stationary targets while standing still on the ground, let alone trying to hit moving targets (that are shooting back) from the back of a charging horse! Basically, Cavalry was a scouting and screening force that could move quickly, cover ground, and become (very) light infantry. The Indians fought Cavalry with some success throughout the west from pre-Red Cloud's War until the end. They rarely, if ever tried to take on infantry if they could avoid it and had very few successes when they did.
Also, repeating weapons do not necesarily mean better weapons. The Henry and Winchester Rifles of the time were basically firing pistol rounds at about 1/2 to 2/3 the range and power of the .45-55 Carbine (the disparity becomes even greater compared to the .45-70 rifle which the Infantry carried). Which means that the soldiers should have been able to hold them at bay with the superior range of their weapons (200 soldiers with 100 rounds each is 20,000 rounds on hand even without the "pacs". Even at the most outlandish estimates of indian numbers it should have been plenty to at least buy time). Unfortunately, the terrain allowed the indians to close the distance and appear then disappear then reappear… negating this advantage; combine this with the indians going after the horses and horse holders thus depriving the troopers of 1/2 of the ammunition and 1/4 of the manpower available (HMMM, which side's tactics were working better???). If, as accounts say soldiers threw away pistols because it took too long to holster them, or used the carbine as a club because they didn't have time to re-load how do you think they could re-load the 12 plus rounds in a Winchester??? At best, they would have become single shots or clubs at the pivotal moments. Also, while a gun is generally superior to a Bow and Arrow; in this case, the arrow, not being a line of sight weapon could be "lobbed" into formations from behind ridges and the bow does not give off a tell-tale puff of smoke when fired making it even harder to see where the shots came from.
The research in this article seems superficial and the very selective use of some eye-witness testimony and quotes taken out of context and simply ignoring other eye-witness testimony, quotes and sources that don't support the authors desired outcome makes this article just another bunch of opinion and revisionist history packaged as a study of the battle.
Mr Murphy:
Custer didn't disobey anything !
You omitted the part of Terry's order that said he desired for Custer to conform to the orders "unless you shall see sufficient reason for departing from them". Evidently, he saw "sufficient reason" to depart from the orders (which didn't say anything about waiting til he was within 20 miles of the village).
As a result, he was FOLLOWING Terry's order.!
On Page 6, Para 1, Gregory Michno states that: ""North to most Indians is East to white observers" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . HUH ?
Never heard that before and could not understand it, so I asked five different Indians, 2 Crow, 2 Cheyenne and 1 Lakota – all "old timers", about it at the Battlefield Reenactment last week. 3 of em said they didn't have a clue what it meant, 1 just shook his head & walked away, and 1 just stared at me as if to say "whatcha been drinkin', wasichu ?"
Anyone know what it's supposed to mean ?
Myth 11: Giovanni Martini was really named Giovanni Martino. And his life involved much more than simply being Custer's bugler and the last white man to see him alive. A most excellent piece has been written about him and it's a page turner! See link:
http://shutuptheblog.blogspot.com/2010/07/life-of-giovanni-martino-john-martin.html
Hello…
I am curious to know if ANYONE HERE might happen to know if anyone is interested in purchasing John Mulvany's masterpiece "Custer's Last Rally"?
I have on good authority that the current owner is looking to monetize some pieces from his private collection.
If so, please contact me here via this post:
Many have asked, "If Custer's tactical decisions were right, why did he lose?" When the tactical decision to divide his force (which was normal and successful on many occasions), he could only command the other elements via messenger. He sent messages with strict orders. "Come up. BE QUICK". No one ever "came up". To begin the battle Custer ordered Reno to attack the village. This was the first order given in the battle. Reno never attacked the village. He galloped close to the village then broke off the attack. This action allowed the villagers to divert and attack Custer.
His tactical decisions were sound. The implementation of his orders was avoided. Benteen and Reno combined had MORE men than Custer. Had Custer's orders been obeyed, there might have been a different result. We will never know. But, why is it so hard to agree that "if" something different happened…there might have been a different result?
The author said, "Deal with it". Oh my! Let's ignore all he said because he offended someone. Truth be told, the truth was told. Never did the author claim Custer WOULD have won. Rather, he MIGHT have. Fine article.
I liked the article. It provides a thumbnail sketch of opinions Michno has published before. Those who fault this article for being not detailed enough should remember that it is a magazine article, not a book. If one wants to see Michno’s documentation, there are many pieces available.
I suggest one start by reading “Lakota Noon” and “The Mystery of E Troop.” Among contemporary Custer scholars, the bulk of Michno’s points here are well accepted. Probably the most controversial is his opinion that there are not 28 missing bodies buried in Deep Ravine.
Michno makes a strong point that archeological surveys have not yet found a single piece of human remains there. There are 206 bones in the human body; multiply that by 28 supposed bodies in Deep Ravine and that makes 5,768 bones. It is huge that not a single bone or fragment thereof has been found in test holes drilled in likely parts of Deep Ravine.
Is this fact conclusive? No, because not all of the ravine has been surveyed. Many would like to see the ground surveyed below refuse that was piled at one point in the past. So the entire ravine has not yet been eliminated as a burial site. But the absence of any remains from multiple test holes drilled in likely places of the ravine is certainly supportive of Michno’s argument. As far as testimony from soldiers in the burial party, it is contradictory. Michno points to statements that would support his theory. Those who argue with him can point to other testimony that seems to indicate the burials could not be any place other than Deep Ravine. As far as Deep Ravine is concerned, Michno’s is a minority view, but still worthy of consideration.
Let me address the argument of whether Custer did or did not blunder in this battle. There seems to be a common argument out there that holds that since his immediate command was annihilated, that Custer must have blundered. Earlier posts have argued that “if Custer did everything right” (as they seem to think Michno is saying) then how come he lost?
This seems to come from a common holding in the white man’s view that Indians should not have been able to wipe out five companies of cavalry in the field. Therefore it could only result from one of two things, or both; Custer blundered, or there were way too many Indians. Too many people do not want to give the Indians credit for the victory on their own merits. So to these folks, The Lakota and Cheyenne only won because Custer gave the game away.
Michno points out that Custer’s tactics, a charge to divert and fix Indian fighters in one direction while employing a flank attack, is not strange or foolhardy on its face. While we don’t know what exactly Custer was thinking, that much is obvious from what we do know. We also know that he did not attempt his flank attack. What little skirmishing was done at MTC, does not indicate a serious attempt to ford the river there.
We also know that Custer eventually wound up in the high ridge that forms the battleground; that’s where the bodies were found. We also can surmise that whatever Custer intended to do from that point, he thought he needed Benteen’s three companies and additional ammo to do it. He sent two messengers to hurry Benteen and the packs. We know exactly what the last message said; Benteen saved it for us. And we know that neither Benteen’s battalion nor any extra ammo made it to Custer.
So it’s a safe assumption or educated guess that Custer deployed along the ridge to wait for Benteen and the ammo. Should he have been waiting there? It’s easy to judge in hindsight. He and his command wound up dead, therefore anything else he might have done could hardly have come out worse.
But we have to judge Custer by what he knew at the time he made his decisions. What he did “know“ killed him.
He and every other officer who planned that campaign knew one thing: Indians, contested by a significant force of the US Army would flee, fighting only a rear guard action while the village escaped. All you need to do is read the diaries and letters of all the other officers and men who participated in the planning and execution of the 1876 campaign.
They all thought the problem would be to fix the Indians in one place to bring them to battle. That’s what was on Custer’s mind when he planned first to approach the village by stealth at night and attack the morning of the 26th. At that same time, Gibbon’s command would be waking up nearby on the Little Big Horn, for those that think that Custer’s driving reason for the attack was to cut Gibbon out of the action. Fleeing Indians was what was also on his mind when belief that the command had been discovered caused him to push up the attack to as soon as he could get there on the 25th.
But something funny happened on the way to catch fleeing Indians. They didn’t flee. They fought an offensive action instead of a defensive action. Custer had every reason to think he could pause and be only slightly molested on that ridge. His experience and the experience of every other officer on that 1876 campaign told him so. But he and every other officer were wrong. Crook and his officers had only learned this lesson one week before, but could not or did not pass this information to the other columns.
The Indians did everything right. They improvised on the spot. As individual fighters that didn’t answer to a central command, this battle was tailor-made for them. They had individual flexibility on their side at precisely the time the soldiers' inflexible combat doctrine had failed. The lucky accident of the terrain allowed them to move very close by stealth. Moving in close took away the advantage Custer had with his Springfields. Without the ability to sneak close, Custer’s men could have held the warriors at bay and out of range of their less powerful weapons. Those much-vaunted repeaters held by some 200 of the Indians had far less range than Custer’s rifles and were less accurate at long distance. Moving in close changed the advantage to the rapid fire of the repeaters.
Custer’s men had no effective weapons for hand-to-hand fighting. When the warriors closed with the soldiers, the advantage was all to the Indians. And they had the superior motivation. They were fighting for their homes and families, who would have been in direct peril had they failed
.
Did Custer get his men killed? I could make a stronger argument that Grant and railroad barons, along with mining interests got Custer and his men killed, by their unprovoked drive to chase the winter-roaming Indians from ground they were legally living on, all to make way for illegal mining of the Black Hills and the building of a transcontinental railroad along the Yellowstone River.
There is that old saying, and it works here. "It's rough to remember your goal was to drain the swamp, when you're up to you ass in aligators.'
I feel that Custer and crew jumped in over their heads, but he led the jump.
Simper fi, dog face.
We must all remember that the Indians picked-up the spent cartridges. Just because no cartridges were found on Last Stand Hill, doesn't mean that no stand was made at this point. Many men died on this hill and many Indian women were stripping and hacking up the bodies. It onlt stands ro reason that they would have picked-up most of the cartridges.
If Benteen would have followed the order, "bring packs, be quick", Custer might have made it. One can only assume that Custer meant, bring ammo and get here fast. Benteen, who was jealous of Custer and hated him, choose to believe that the message was meant for the officer in charge of the pack train and not him. So he continued slowly and even stopped to water his horses. After reading the Reno Inquiry, I blame Benteen for not following orders. Custer's trail, by Reno's report, was next to where Reno retreated to and Benteen would have easily found it. By being quick, he would have seen Reno in the woods, BEFORE the retreat, and would have been able to follow Custer's trail. They should have hung Benteen for not following orders and causing the death of the commanding officer.
I could not agree with you more. What part of that message did Benteen not understand? Martini's lack of language skills had nothing to do with it; the short, curt sentences speak for themselves.
The Reno Inquiry was a joke. Men were afraid to come forward and speak about his (Reno's) extreme intoxication for fear of repercussions. In between testimonies, all the big wigs involved joked and drank together-a "good ol' boys' club" if ever there was one.
Even the map presented at the inquiry had been tampered with. Everything was done to exonerate both Reno and Benteen and put the blame on the man who could not defend himself-Custer. That Benteen was not punished for his disobedience is to me one of the biggest injustices in our military history.
Regarding Captain Weir, as mentioned by another poster-it appears that he was extremely distraught by Benteen's refusal to go to Custer's aid and for the rest of his life probably could not live with the thought of what he may have seen as a preventable massacre. He did become a severe alcoholic and was certainly suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress until the end of his life a few months later, a broken shell of a man.
I am not a huge fan of Custer in any way, but that short note speaks volumes. Benteen was no coward, as shown by his subsequent actions, so one is left to ponder his motives in choosing to stay put. Certainly his almost pathological dislike of Custer (and vice-versa) must be factored in.
As an aside, the mental toll this battle took on so many of the survivors is sad indeed and indicates the horror of that day. We will never know the true extent of the psychological damage suffered by those who "survived". A very sad story for everyone concerned.
The outcome of this battle, started over a thousand miles away. A corrupt Pres Grant,and his stalwart cronies, were upset, that Custer had testified against Sec of war Belknap, and got him fired, which he deserved. Grant set out to arrest Custer,and to destroy his character. Why then, did he allow Custer, to go on this excursion? hmm…
Why was Custer refused,his original request for officers, and given Benteen instead? Benteen was slow to come, with his firepower. It wouldnt have mattered? How then, was Benteen able to withstand the concentrated attack for days after the battle, with half the men?
Cavalry not important? Of course it is, and Reno should never have dismounted.But, he didnt have many men, his scout was killed before him, brains splattering on him, and if he was drunk,I can understand his lack of clarity. His retreat up the hill, instead of staying on flat land, was probably the correct one. Benteen, no doubt heard the fight, and his slow response, caused many to die. When he caught up with Reno, had he moved quickly to Custers aid,the story may have ended differently. How long he argued with captain Weir,before Weir left alone with his men, I just dont know. Benteen had the firepower, and was content to stay put. It is certain, that he was very happy to see Custer dead. He had wanted to duel him earlier. Grant was also happy, as Custer had arrested his son, for being drunk. Custer was a democrat,in a republican world. The stalwarts got the revenge they wanted, and continued to plunder the American people. The whistleblower was dead, and the captains of industry,free to carry on, as they do to this day.The legend of Custer, and his deeds, are of a fighter in the civil War, an Indian fighter,but his unknown greatest deed, was his fight against the corruption in the high places,against the powers that be.
As a historian that has read various accounts of the famed Custer event(s), this is a unique and perspective that the author valiantly (no pun intended) attempts to defend. However, the article's premises and arguments have assumptions that, upon examination, reveal that the central defense put forth of Custer's actions does not run counter to the many more historical opinions of Custer as a man, whose weakness, among other things was hubris. As example, the author ostensibly sets out to defend Custer's charge (raid?) as a "good thing" by arguing that Custer did not disobey his superior officer, that he listened to his scouts, and the Indian Village was not immense. The author would like unsuspecting readers to assume that because of these and other "facts", Custer did the right thing. The problem is, however, that even if he, Custer, did not disobey his superior officer and DID listen to his native American scouts for intel, this does not prove that Custer did not also suffer from fatal pride, which–the bulk of established and credentialed historians–attributed to his demise. (I do not care how heavily armed you were in those days, a group of 300 against 1500 IS/WAS an immense village and something that should have given a leader pause–whatever persuation from others). If the author addressed similar issues that I raise here, he would be well on his way to producing a piece of good historical analysis. However, it was an interesting read.