The resolution was sent to Communist leaders in the South. In August the fighting-while-negotiating strategy was discussed at the NLF’s Third Congress, which espoused a new political program, ‘the creation of a coalition government’ to use as a negotiating chip during the next phase. In October Hanoi spelled out its objectives for the planned offensive in the ‘Quang Trung Resolution’ (Resolution 14): ‘The upcoming General Offensive/General Uprising will be a period, a process, of intensive and complicated strategic offensives by the military, political, and diplomatic means…a process in which we will attack and advance on the enemy continuously both militarily and politically.’

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Documents from Hanoi translated by Captain Ronnie E. Ford, an Army intelligence officer, revealed for the first time the precise details of the three phases of the Tet Offensive. In the February 1995 issue of Vietnam, Ford summarized the phases. In Phase I, October to December 1967, the NVA/VC would mass forces and conduct battles along the border regions of the Central Highlands to attract U.S. units and allow VC units to infiltrate into the cities to prepare themselves and South Vietnam’s population for the General Uprising. Dur-ing Phase II, January to March 1968, the General Offensive/General Uprising would begin. The VC would launch attacks on the cities and military bases and appeal to South Vietnam’s population to join the General Uprising. Concurrently, diplomatic efforts would be underway calling for both negotiations and the recognition of a Southern coalition government. In Phase III, the NVA would cross the DMZ to assault American units surrounded by the uprising. A second wave of troops would move into the lowland areas, creating the conditions necessary for victory. Hanoi would hold all the negotiating chips as they headed into the fighting-while-negotiating phase.

Phase III was dependent upon the results of Phase II and the purpose and positioning of the NVA in Phase II, because all would have an impact on the situation at Khe Sanh. Without having the advantage of seeing the declassified Vietnamese documents at the time, General Davidson interpreted the first two phases correctly in Vietnam at War, but he believed that the third phase would include a set-piece battle as the grand finale. The Americans predicted this would occur at Khe Sanh and believed that an all-out single attack would put final victory before talks.

The Route 9 Front (equal to a U.S. Army corps) was the most important force in North Vietnam’s plan. Giap wanted to test America’s strategic intentions one final time before the green light was given for the Tet Offensive (Phase II). Giap decided to place the front at the juncture of Laos and North and South Vietnam. If a corps-size presence did not trigger a U.S. invasion of North Vietnam or Laos, then the command could be given for the offensive. In its position near Khe Sanh, the front could launch a counterattack against an American seaborne invasion north of the DMZ, or be the blocking force against an invasion of Laos.

The Route 9 Front would also be used to start the second wave of Phase III. Documents translated by Captain Ford indicate that Hanoi wanted to use the Route 9 Front to open a gap in the American defenses south of the DMZ so that NVA Regulars could pour into South Vietnam. An NVA official summed up the Route 9 Front’s role: ‘The tasks of the Route 9 Front were to attract and annihilate enemy forces to enable the entire South Vietnamese (VC/NLF) to launch a general offensive and uprising, and when conditions permitted, to breach a section of the enemy defensive line, thus paving the way for us to advance south.’

The Route 9 Front would first play the role of tester and then convert to its role as part of the second wave. If the breakthrough occurred at Con Thien, Gio Linh or Quang Tri city, or even at Khe Sanh during the Tet Offensive, the front would advance through the gap. Thus the Route 9 Front was not created to capture Khe Sanh, nor did Khe Sanh figure into the plans as a diversion or as the climactic battle of the war. Those who believed the front was a diversion made the mistake of linking together the border attacks with Giap’s last assault on Khe Sanh in January 1968. Some also misunderstood Westmoreland’s movement and placement of his forces into I Corps. They saw it as positioning for Khe Sanh and as the result of his fear of losing the two provinces.

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