Walker focused squarely on the security of Pusan as he continually shifted his reserves among danger points within the shrinking perimeter. He attached the 1st Marine Bde. to the 2nd ID and used the combined force to clear the Naktong Bulge for the second time. Simultaneously, he deployed the 24th ID’s 21st Inf. Regt. to a central position, from which it could move quickly to reinforce the 25th ID, the 2nd ID or even the ROKA units up north. By September 7, Walker had committed the entire 24th ID to support the ROKA divisions.

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Walker’s defenses held on grimly, and the North Korean offensive peaked by September 12. The NKPA still had some 70,000 effectives in the field, but they had stalled all around the Pusan Perimeter. The North Koreans were off balance and dangerously overextended, their lines of communication under relentless attack by U.S. naval and air forces. Within the perimeter, the Eighth Army now fielded 84,500 troops and the ROKA some 72,000. Thanks to the massive logistics infusion through Pusan, the Americans now had more than 500 medium tanks in Korea, giving them a greater than 5-to-1 advantage in armor.

Walker, of course, knew of Mac-Arthur’s plan to conduct a large-scale turning movement by landing an Army division and a Marine division deep in the enemy’s rear at Inchon. While Walker was conducting his frantic holding actions along the perimeter, his EUSAK staff was working equally hard on the plans to break out, drive north and link up with the Inchon landing force, which was designated X Corps. By the end of August, Eighth Army had finally received subordinate corps headquarters—I Corps and IX Corps. The necessary support organizations were still en route, but that alone did much to ease Walker’s command burden.

X Corps landed at Inchon on September 15, and the Eighth Army launched its breakout the following day. While other units of EUSAK held the perimeter and pinned the North Koreans in place, I Corps broke out just north of Taegu. The plan called for the 5th RCT and the 1st Cav. Div. to seize a bridgehead over the Naktong near Waegwan. The 24th ID would cross the river, followed by the ROKA 1st Div. and the British 27th Inf. Bde., and the combined force would then drive up the Kimch’on-Taejon-Suwon axis to link up with X Corps.

Walker’s forces had a tough go of it at first. After nearly two months of brutal combat, they were exhausted, ammunition was short and they lacked the necessary river-crossing gear. The North Korean resistance finally broke on September 22 and started withdrawing the next day. Task Force Lynch—centered on the 3rd Battalion, 7th Cav. Regt., 1st Cav. Div.—finally linked up with the 31st Inf. Regt. of X Corps’ 7th ID just north of Osan early on September 27.

The Battle of the Pusan Perimeter was over. Fourteen NKPA divisions had been all but annihilated. Only 20,000 to 30,000 of the NKPA troops that besieged Pusan returned to North Korea. But the defenders also paid a high price. Between July 5 and September 16, Eighth Army casualties totaled 4,280 killed in action, 12,377 wounded, 2,107 missing and 401 confirmed captured.

The Korean War was far from over, of course. After the linkup, the Allies crossed into North Korea and pushed toward the Yalu. In late October, the Chinese intervened, crossing the river and pushing the Eighth Army back below the 38th parallel. The war then settled down into a bloody stalemate that dragged on until the July 1953 armistice.

Despite Walker’s brilliant defense at Pusan, many of his subsequent actions in Korea have come under heavy criticism. According to some military analysts, after the breakout Walker put too much emphasis on driving north to achieve a quick linkup and too little on destroying the NKPA forces deep inside South Korea. As the Allies moved into North Korea, coordination among his two corps and X Corps was poor. And, like all other Allied commanders, Walker was caught flatfooted by the Chinese intervention.

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