While Walker struggled to rebuild his four divisions in Japan, more than 100,000 troops of the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) launched a surprise attack south of the 38th parallel on June 25, 1950. U.S. President Harry S. Truman decided to intervene, and the first contingent of combat troops from the 24th ID landed in Korea on July 2. Eleven days later Walker established the command post of Eighth U.S. Army in Korea (EUSAK) in Taegu, some 60 miles northwest of Pusan on the southeast corner of the peninsula.

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As American units dribbled into Korea, the NKPA steamroller pushed Walker’s meager forces back down the peninsula. The resulting string of losses started with the crushing defeat of Task Force Smith near Osan on July 5, followed by NKPA successes at Ch’onan on July 7–8, Ch’ongju on July 10, Choch’iwon on July 11–12 and the Kum River on July 15–16. On July 17, Walker assumed operational control of the badly battered and poorly equipped divisions of the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA). Three days later, the NKPA pushed the 24th ID from the key city of Taejon, capturing divisional commander Maj. Gen. William Dean. The newly arrived 1st Cavalry Division (1st Cav. Div.) lost Yongdong on July 25.

Initially, Walker had no choice but to fight a delaying action as he tried to build up sufficient force to mount an offensive. He also had to hold at all costs Pusan, the only deepwater port in South Korea. But by the end of July, Walker was running out of space. If he withdrew any farther, he would lack sufficient depth with which to maneuver the reserves necessary to block enemy thrusts and eventually mass for a counterattack and breakout.

On July 29, the increasingly dire situation prompted Walker to issue to division commanders what has become known as his “Stand or Die” order:

We are fighting a battle against time. There will be no more retreating, withdrawal or readjustment of the lines or any other term you choose. There is no line behind us to which we can retreat.…There will be no Dunkirk, there will be no Bataan. A retreat to Pusan would be one of the greatest butcheries in history. We must fight until the end.…We will fight as a team. If some of us must die, we will die fighting together.…I want everybody to understand we are going to hold this line. We are going to win.

At the time Walker issued his bold order, the forces under his command included five badly mauled ROKA divisions and the still understrength U.S. 24th and 25th infantry divisions and 1st Cav. Div. As the battle progressed, reinforcements arrived through Pusan, including the 5th Regimental Combat Team (5th RCT), the 1st Marine Provisional Brigade (1st Marine Bde.), the 2nd Infantry Division (2nd ID) and the British 27th Infantry Brigade (27th Inf. Bde.).

Walker ordered his beleaguered forces to withdraw behind the natural barrier of the Naktong River. By August 1, the Pusan Perimeter comprised an approximate 100-by-50-mile rectangle in the southeast corner of Korea. To the west, the main line of resistance ran along the Naktong, from the mountain town of Naktong-ni some 80 miles south; at the confluence with the Nam River, the Naktong cut sharply east, but the defensive line continued 20 miles due south to the coast. The northern boundary of the perimeter ran through the mountains from Naktong-ni to the town of Yongdok, on the east coast. The sea bounded the eastern and southern sides of the perimeter, and Walker could rely on U.S. Navy fire support along the perimeter’s two coastal anchor points.

Walker made masterful use of his ability to operate on interior lines. The U.S. Fifth Air Force maintained total air supremacy, which meant Walker could move forces within the perimeter during daylight hours without fear of detection. An excellent rail loop within the perimeter connected Pusan with Miryang, Taegu and P’ohang-dong. The port itself, on the Tsushima Strait, was capable of handling 30 oceangoing ships at a time. Although Pusan had a daily discharge capacity of up to 45,000 tons, personnel and transportation shortfalls during the battle limited the average daily tonnage to about 28,000.

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