I believe that is not an accurate description.

The offensive kicked off on 23 June 1944. HM Smith had this telegram from VAC HQ to Ralph Smith on the morning of 24 June 1944. Within hours of sending the telegram, HM Smith was telling Richmond Kelly Turner and Raymond Spruance that Ralph Smith should be relieved.

The relief did not come after several days of fighting. It happened just about 24 hours after the fighting started.

Major Edward McCarthy commanded 2/105th Infantry when it faced off against a numerically superior Japanese force which was holding good defensive terrain in Nafutan. Major McCarthy commanded 2/105th Infantry on July 7, 1944, during the Gyokusai.

Maybe Holland Smith should not have been given command of V Amphibious Corps for Saipan, under those circumstances.

In his article distorting the story of the 27th ID, Robert Sherrod said that two Army Generals had been relieved in the Pacific. Sherrod claimed that General John Hester had been relieved by two Admirals during the fight for New Georgia. That claim is false.

Admiral RIchmond Kelly Turner was overall commander for the invasion of New Georgia. He set up an awkward, unworkable command scheme for the ground fighting. General Hester commanded the 43rd Infantry DIvision. He was also the overall ground commander. In addition to commanding his own DIvision, he was responsible for the actions of other units committed to the campaign.

William Halsey put MG Millard Harmon in charge of the New Georgia operation. MG Harmon, over the objection of RK Turner, brought MG Oscar Griswold and XIV Corps to command ground operations. MG Hester WAS NOT relieved as commander of the 43rd Infantry DIvision.

My source is Professor Harry Gailey's Bouganville 1943-1945 pages 26-30.

The two Marine Divisions were advancing against heavy resistance. The 27th ID was not. HM Smith exhorted Ralph Smith to get his division moving. He did not. Because the 27th ID continued to lag, HM Smith relieved Ralph Smith.

The situation was a bit more complex. First, the 27th ID went into line on the evening of 22 June 1944. 27th ID took over positions held by the 4th Marine Division. 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions had been in line a number of days prior to 22 June 1944. Marine commentators do not mention that neither Marine Division had been doing much advancing until after 27th ID went into line. While they complain that 27th ID's failure to advance left Japanese troops on the Marines' flanks and rear, they seem unaware that the two Marine Divisions were on the flanks and rear of the Japanese.

Holland Smith repeatedly underestimated Japanese strength on Saipan. He estimated that 27th ID was facing an area lightly defended by the Japanese. HM Smith sent a telegram to 27th ID on the morning of 24 June 1944 saying the Division was not pushing its attack against minimal resistance. An image of the telegram appears in Edmond Love's history of the 27th ID. The text is quoted in Professor Harry Gailey's Howling Mad Versus the Army(page 180).

HM Smith said the Army division faced only "small arms and mortar fire". The 27th ID was facing the main Japanese defense position in central Saipan. The area, which became known as Death Valley, was the most difficult terrain in central Saipan, domonated by a series oh hills an heights in the East which was named Purple Hearyt Ridge. The Japanese had constructed multiple defensive positions. They had manned those positions with 4000 front line combat troops. They had placed numerous heavy weapons to support them, machine guns, mortars, artillery pieces. After Death Valley was cleared, Harry Schmidt looked at the area, nothing HM Smith ever did. His remark about the 27th ID was, No one had a tougher job to do.

No full strength Marine Division ever found it easy to take a fortified position from the Japanese, e.g. Betio, Peleliu, Iwo Jima. 27th ID was not at full strength when it was tasked with rapidly overrunning Death Valley and Purple Heart Ridge. Two of its nine battalions had been detached and retained by V Amphibious Corps Headquarters as its reserve.

When 27th ID failed to overrun this heavily defended Japanese position as rapidly as HM Smith expected, he relieved Ralph quite summarily. The only exhortation he ever made was the above mentioned telegram. Soon after the telegram, HM Smith was telling his superior, Richmond Kelly Turner, that Ralph Smith should be relieved. The offensive jumped off on 23 June, 1944. HM Smith relieved Ralph Smith on 24 June.

The situation with the 27th ID lagging behind the Two Marine Divisions developed from 24-27 June 1944, AFTER HM Smith relieved Ralph Smith. HM Smith had pulled a regiment of the 4th Marine Division into reserve while retaining the two battalions of the 105th Infantry. He then detached 3 more battalions from the 27th ID and attached them to the 4th Marine Division.

So, on the left, 2nd Marine Division controlled 10 battalions, 9 of its own and 1 attached battalion.4th Marine Division on the right controlled 9 battalions, 6 of its own and 3 from the 27th ID. Whatever resistance they faced, they were at full strength. 27th ID, facing off against the main Japanese Defense position, had been reduced to less than half strength. The supporters of the "brilliant" Holland Smith can not figure out why 27th ID was not advancing.

HM Smith as a ground commander was more of a Lloyd Fredendall then a George Patton or an Irwin Rommel. The problem on Saipan was HM Smith, not the Army Division, not its commander MG Ralph Smith.

Marine partisans, like their idol, blame the Army to camouflage their idol's obvious shortcomings.

The decision that HM Smith would not command troops in the field again was not the Army's. After HM Smith's performance on Saipan, the Army decided with justification not to place Army units under his command ever again. The decision to put HM Smith in a largely administrative position rested with Chester Nimitz, Admiral Ernest King and General Alexander Vandegrift.

Other commanders in WWII made big public mistakes, MacArthur, Patton, Halsey.None of them was withdrawn from combat. I do not believe Admiral King and General Vandegrift would have beached HM Smith just to gratify the Army.

HM Smith's disillusion with Ralph Smith is expressed in Coral and Brass.

That is kind of a Mark Gottlieb type of document. Mark Gottlieb was an investigator in the Duke Rape Case. He kept the notes he took in the early part of the investigation, or so he said, on a dry erase board which was erased before his notes could be photographed. Then, months later, he produced a lengthy memo which he said was a reconstruction from memory of what notes he took. Those notes just happened to account for all the flaws in the case, such as the accuser's inability to describe her assailants. I use this as a metaphor. It is not intended to start an off topic discussion.

Holland Smith emerged from the so called Smith versus Smith affair with a damaged reputation. He published Coral and Brass as an attempt to rebuild his reputation. His dissatisfaction with Ralph Smith is mostly, if not all, from Coral and Brass.

HM Smith fabricated not one but two incidents regarding the 27th ID in his memoir. One is mentioned in Ms. Lacey's article. HM Smith fabricated the story of how he had to orders soldiers of the 165th Infantry to recover the body of its commander, Colonel Gardiner Conroy.

The other was about the 2nd Battalion 105th Infantry which was facing off against Nafutan. HM Smith alleged the Japanese escaped from Nafutan by forming up in a column of twos and marching through the position held by 2/105th Infantry. HM smith alleged the Army infantry battalion made no attempt to stop the Japanese.

2/105th Infantry was understrength and tasked with holding a 4 battalion front. According to a Marine Corps History, Saipan: The Beginning of the End, the Japanese infiltrated around the main position of 2/105th Infantry. The Battalion simply did not have the strength to seal off this 4 battalion front.

According to Professor Harry Gailey's Howling Mad versus the Army, Army generals did not have a high impression of General Smith before Saipan. Professor Gailey quotes SLA Marshall as saying General Smith was a sadist, a bully and tactically a chowderhead.

Also, there was the issue of who should command large scale ground operations in the Central Pacific. The Navy favored Marine Corps Generals. The Army contended that Marine Corps Generals did not have much experience commanding at the Corps or higher level.

Saipan was the first time in history that the Marine Corps had responsibility for conducting a Corps level operation. General Smith planned a very rapid, spectacular conquest of the Mariannas using only Marine units. V Amphibious Corps was to land on Saipan on 15 June and have the island secured in 10 days. III Amphibious Corps was to land on Guam on 18 June and secure the island by the end of June. 27th ID was not expected to play a role in either of those operations.

As it turned out, Saipan was not secured until July 9, 1944. Guam was not secured until much later. The case could be made that Saipan would not have been secured by July 9 had the 27th ID not been committed to the fight. After two days of fighting on Saipan, V Amphibious Corps had taken thousands of casualties and the Japanese had them stopped on the beach.

It is mentioned that General Holland Smith underestimated Japanese troop strength on Makin. He underestimated Japanese troop strength on Saipan. His estimate was that the Japanese had 11,000 effective troops on Saipan. They had 31,000 effective troops on Saipan.

HM Smith's conquest on Saipan did not go as planned. HM Smith took out his frustration over Betio on the 27th ID. On Saipan he similarly vented his frustration at the slowness of the conquest by unfairly blaming the Army Division under his command.

Inchon, in the Korean War was not an ideal landing site. Inchon succeeded because the North Koreans were surprised. They never expected a landing and had the bulk of their forces committed to taking Pusan.

General Ushijima would not have been surprised by a landing on the Minatoga beaches in April of 1945. Prior to the main invasion, 2nd Marine Division had conducted a feint off the Minatoga beaches. General Ushijima was aware of a possible amphibious end run. He had uncommitted forces in reserve. The Minatoga beaches would have been easy to defend.

In addition, for all their training and aggressive tactics, Marine Divisions had not proven particularly effective in breaking Japanese beach defenses, e.g. Peleliu, Saipan.

A landing at Minatoga beaches in April 1945 might have been attempted. Regardless of what division attempted it, it was not a foregone conclusion that such a landing would have been successful.