When Brig. Gen. John Buford, commander of the Army of the Potomac’s 1st Cavalry Division, dictated those words to describe his troopers’ performance on the Gettysburg battlefield in July 1863, he very likely may also have had his division’s feats of the entire campaign in mind. From the cavalry battle at Brandy Station, Va., on June 9, until Lee’s defeated veterans recrossed the Potomac on July 14, Buford’s three brigades suffered just under 1,200 casualties, or nearly one-third of his entire division. His losses were the highest of the three divisions in the Army of the Potomac’s Cavalry Corps for the Gettysburg campaign.

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In late May 1863, Army of the Potomac commander Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker became concerned that Robert E. Lee was planning a march into the North and ordered his cavalry to find and engage the Southern cavalry, led by the legendary and confident Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart. Hooker’s Bureau of Military Information tracked down Stuart’s horsemen near Culpeper, Va., and “Fighting Joe” ordered Brig. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton to take his cavalry across the Rappahannock at Beverly’s and Kelly’s fords, attack Stuart early on the morning of June 9 and “disperse and destroy” his command.

Pleasonton divided his cavalry into two wings, one to cross at each ford. Buford commanded the right wing, which consisted of the 1st Cavalry Division, the Reserve Brigade of Regular Cavalry and a brigade of infantry, and was to cross at Beverly’s Ford. Six miles downstream, the 2nd and 3rd Divisions under Colonel Alfred Duffié and Brig. Gen. David Gregg, respectively—also supported by an infantry brigade—were to cross at Kelly’s Ford. If all went as laid out, Buford’s and Gregg’s wings would link up somewhere near Brandy Station, and the combined force would hit Stuart hard northeast of Culpeper Court House.

Such schemes, however, seldom go as planned. After spending a fitful night a half-mile north of the Beverly’s Ford crossing, Buford’s command saddled up and quietly began marching at 4 a.m. on June 9. The ford’s banks were steep, it was still quite dark and the water was stirrup-high, so the crossing went slowly. It wasn’t long before Buford’s advance force ran into two videttes of the 6th Virginia Cavalry guarding the ford. The videttes—brothers Fleet and Robert James—knew resistance was futile, so they galloped south to their reserve while firing pistols to sound the alarm. The reserve alerted Stuart’s brigade camps, and the great fight was on.

As Buford’s column began appearing on the south side of the river along the road to the ford, the bluecoats were charged by about 150 troopers of the 6th Virginia Cavalry. The Southerners had been so surprised by the attack that some galloped away without saddles and most were still in their underwear. The attack slowed the Federal column’s progress, but only for a moment. As both Buford and Stuart fed more men into the open areas along the Beverly’s Ford Road, the fighting grew intense. Confederate horse artillery was coming up into positions that could easily sweep the field, and it was soon apparent that Stuart’s people were much closer to the river than any of the Federal commanders had thought.

A series of mounted charges, countercharges, dismounted fighting and Southern artillery fire caused casualties to quickly mount. Worse yet, Buford’s support from the Federal left wing didn’t cross at Kelly’s Ford until Buford had been engaged for nearly two hours.

The battle would eventually involve some 20,000 cavalrymen, 3,000 infantrymen, and several hundred horse artillerymen, centered on Stuart’s headquarters on Fleetwood Hill. Mounted cavalry charges during the 14 solid hours of bloodletting left veteran artillerymen watching with their mouths agape. One of Buford’s troopers called the day “a race for life.” Unable to dislodge the Confederate strongholds, and fearing that Southern infantry was being brought upon the field, Pleasonton ordered Buford and Gregg to withdraw their commands. Stuart’s horsemen had not been dispersed or destroyed, and Lee’s planned advance into the North had been delayed only one day. But the Southern cavalrymen gained respect for their Northern counterparts—respect bought at a dear price. Buford’s wing suffered 500 casualties, 10 percent of his force. The 1st Cavalry Division, of which Buford took official command after the battle, suffered nearly 400 of the total losses.

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