Comments on: Sideshow II? Origins of the Mediterranean Campaign http://www.historynet.com/sideshow-ii-origins-of-the-mediterranean-campaign.htm?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=sideshow-ii-origins-of-the-mediterranean-campaign From the World's Largest History Magazine Publisher Wed, 15 Feb 2012 04:36:36 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3 By: paul penrod http://www.historynet.com/sideshow-ii-origins-of-the-mediterranean-campaign.htm#comment-153376 paul penrod Wed, 02 Dec 2009 15:29:36 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/sideshow-ii-origins-of-the-mediterranean-campaign.htm#comment-153376 It was the Axis that furnished the opportunity for the Med to be a theatre in the first place. Starting with Mussolini's ill advised foray against Egypt, followed by Rommel's unreinforced intervention and then the ultimate target of opportunity in an impotent Vichy coastal area to hone one's amphbibious landing skills. Marshall, McNair and Eisenhower all probably knew that their large, but green and untried in combat, would have their best chance of sucess there. It gave the US Army the situations where they could put theory and training into practice- logistics, interservice cooperation, airborne operations, amphibious landings, naval bombardment, signals/communications, armor/artillery tactics, ordnance performance and much more could be assessed, developed and improved. It was a learning on the job situation, going side by side with the more experienced UK forces. Actually, the US had bought into the UK's playbook of the indirect approach, i.e. their "Mediterranean strategy" which would reach a dead end in the rugged Appenines. Strategically, much of our commitment there was to placate Churchill as much as to assure Stalin, though by 1944 we had superceded the UK as the senior partner in the relationship with Britain. It was the Axis that furnished the opportunity for the Med to be a theatre in the first place. Starting with Mussolini's ill advised foray against Egypt, followed by Rommel's unreinforced intervention and then the ultimate target of opportunity in an impotent Vichy coastal area to hone one's amphbibious landing skills. Marshall, McNair and Eisenhower all probably knew that their large, but green and untried in combat, would have their best chance of sucess there. It gave the US Army the situations where they could put theory and training into practice- logistics, interservice cooperation, airborne operations, amphibious landings, naval bombardment, signals/communications, armor/artillery tactics, ordnance performance and much more could be assessed, developed and improved. It was a learning on the job situation, going side by side with the more experienced UK forces. Actually, the US had bought into the UK's playbook of the indirect approach, i.e. their "Mediterranean strategy" which would reach a dead end in the rugged Appenines. Strategically, much of our commitment there was to placate Churchill as much as to assure Stalin, though by 1944 we had superceded the UK as the senior partner in the relationship with Britain.

]]> By: Bill Nance http://www.historynet.com/sideshow-ii-origins-of-the-mediterranean-campaign.htm#comment-153293 Bill Nance Wed, 02 Dec 2009 05:36:23 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/sideshow-ii-origins-of-the-mediterranean-campaign.htm#comment-153293 Airborne drops were experimental, especially in divisional size. Really, there are only a handful on the historical record even today. The US had conducted exercises on airborne ops, but Sicily was really the first time it had put it into practice. This is where the friction part of war comes in and the airborne armada got lit up by its own fleet. One of those things that is hard to simulate in training. Should someone have thought of it prior? Possibly, but there are a million and one things going on in an operation like that. The US experience in airborne operations would pay off for them in Market-Garden, where for the most part, US forces met their objectives, whereas the 1st British Airborne did not learn from past experiences, and was cut to pieces despite a heroic performance. Cornelius Ryan's A Bridge too Far is superb in discussing the cumulative allied airborne knowledge gained by that point in the war. Airborne drops were experimental, especially in divisional size. Really, there are only a handful on the historical record even today. The US had conducted exercises on airborne ops, but Sicily was really the first time it had put it into practice. This is where the friction part of war comes in and the airborne armada got lit up by its own fleet. One of those things that is hard to simulate in training. Should someone have thought of it prior? Possibly, but there are a million and one things going on in an operation like that.

The US experience in airborne operations would pay off for them in Market-Garden, where for the most part, US forces met their objectives, whereas the 1st British Airborne did not learn from past experiences, and was cut to pieces despite a heroic performance. Cornelius Ryan's A Bridge too Far is superb in discussing the cumulative allied airborne knowledge gained by that point in the war.

]]> By: Luke Truxal http://www.historynet.com/sideshow-ii-origins-of-the-mediterranean-campaign.htm#comment-153287 Luke Truxal Wed, 02 Dec 2009 04:04:01 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/sideshow-ii-origins-of-the-mediterranean-campaign.htm#comment-153287 Dr. Citino and Mike what was the thought process behind the Allied airborne drops in North Africa and Sicily? Had the Allies attempted an airborne drop prior to North Africa with which they could look back on or were these the first truly experimental combat drops for the Allies. I hate to phrase this question like this but did anybody in the Allied command know how to conduct an airborne drop or were they operating strictly off their experiences in watching the Germans use successful airborne drops? I hope I am not too confusing because I know very little on this topic. Dr. Citino and Mike what was the thought process behind the Allied airborne drops in North Africa and Sicily? Had the Allies attempted an airborne drop prior to North Africa with which they could look back on or were these the first truly experimental combat drops for the Allies. I hate to phrase this question like this but did anybody in the Allied command know how to conduct an airborne drop or were they operating strictly off their experiences in watching the Germans use successful airborne drops? I hope I am not too confusing because I know very little on this topic.

]]> By: Luke Truxal http://www.historynet.com/sideshow-ii-origins-of-the-mediterranean-campaign.htm#comment-153090 Luke Truxal Tue, 01 Dec 2009 06:00:23 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/sideshow-ii-origins-of-the-mediterranean-campaign.htm#comment-153090 A lot of points have been made about gaining experience in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy. I believe these are all side effects of these campaigns and I don't think Allied planners intended to launch a campaign with the purpose of gaining experience. I think like the airfields in Italy the experience argument is a justification. I am more inclined to believe what was written in the blog that the Allies were simply attempting to "do something" with limited resources at the time and picked the two easiest Axis countries they could target. The strategic gains were minimal, but the morale implications for these first operations amongst the military planners, soldiers, and civilians were very much at stake. All this has been repeated throughout the last two blogs but I felt like emphasizing the point. Now I pose the question was Citadel more do or die than Torch? A lot of points have been made about gaining experience in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy. I believe these are all side effects of these campaigns and I don't think Allied planners intended to launch a campaign with the purpose of gaining experience. I think like the airfields in Italy the experience argument is a justification. I am more inclined to believe what was written in the blog that the Allies were simply attempting to "do something" with limited resources at the time and picked the two easiest Axis countries they could target. The strategic gains were minimal, but the morale implications for these first operations amongst the military planners, soldiers, and civilians were very much at stake. All this has been repeated throughout the last two blogs but I felt like emphasizing the point. Now I pose the question was Citadel more do or die than Torch?

]]> By: Rob Citino http://www.historynet.com/sideshow-ii-origins-of-the-mediterranean-campaign.htm#comment-153086 Rob Citino Tue, 01 Dec 2009 04:50:20 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/sideshow-ii-origins-of-the-mediterranean-campaign.htm#comment-153086 Good point, Mike! All the talk about "amphibious" ops sometimes obscures the fact that they had a key airborne component, as well, and that lessons had to be learned here, too. And Patrick, hello again! Good points regarding the British. Certainly, the dynamic of coalition warfare was at work in the Med. Good point, Mike! All the talk about "amphibious" ops sometimes obscures the fact that they had a key airborne component, as well, and that lessons had to be learned here, too.

And Patrick, hello again! Good points regarding the British. Certainly, the dynamic of coalition warfare was at work in the Med.

]]> By: Mike Hegarty http://www.historynet.com/sideshow-ii-origins-of-the-mediterranean-campaign.htm#comment-153081 Mike Hegarty Tue, 01 Dec 2009 03:54:47 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/sideshow-ii-origins-of-the-mediterranean-campaign.htm#comment-153081 Along with Dieppe, several lessons were learned by the US Army. First and foremost the amphibious assault. While the Marines were learning first hand in the Pacific, the Army had to pave its own way across North Africa through Sicily and onto the Boot. Also, the Airborne branch was gaining vital experience that proved significant come DDay. C47's weren't routed over the fleet on DDay thanks to Sicily. Along with Dieppe, several lessons were learned by the US Army. First and foremost the amphibious assault. While the Marines were learning first hand in the Pacific, the Army had to pave its own way across North Africa through Sicily and onto the Boot. Also, the Airborne branch was gaining vital experience that proved significant come DDay. C47's weren't routed over the fleet on DDay thanks to Sicily.

]]> By: Luke Truxal http://www.historynet.com/sideshow-ii-origins-of-the-mediterranean-campaign.htm#comment-153079 Luke Truxal Tue, 01 Dec 2009 03:51:58 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/sideshow-ii-origins-of-the-mediterranean-campaign.htm#comment-153079 So is Italy what you would call taking the knee after cutting the lead in half at the end of the second quarter and Normandy the start of the second half? So is Italy what you would call taking the knee after cutting the lead in half at the end of the second quarter and Normandy the start of the second half?

]]> By: Rob Citino http://www.historynet.com/sideshow-ii-origins-of-the-mediterranean-campaign.htm#comment-153075 Rob Citino Tue, 01 Dec 2009 03:07:29 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/sideshow-ii-origins-of-the-mediterranean-campaign.htm#comment-153075 The Germans managed a couple of first downs at the Kasserine Pass, but not a sustained drive. Sorry, I'm just trying to get into the spirit here. --RC The Germans managed a couple of first downs at the Kasserine Pass, but not a sustained drive.

Sorry, I'm just trying to get into the spirit here.

–RC

]]> By: Bill Nance http://www.historynet.com/sideshow-ii-origins-of-the-mediterranean-campaign.htm#comment-152991 Bill Nance Mon, 30 Nov 2009 23:29:35 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/sideshow-ii-origins-of-the-mediterranean-campaign.htm#comment-152991 Very true, but remember, the US showed up late in the 2nd quarter. As neither the US or UK had the combat power (land, air, or sea) to go off o their own hook here, so they had to find a place where they could both cooperate and win. Very true, but remember, the US showed up late in the 2nd quarter. As neither the US or UK had the combat power (land, air, or sea) to go off o their own hook here, so they had to find a place where they could both cooperate and win.

]]> By: Cap'n Dave http://www.historynet.com/sideshow-ii-origins-of-the-mediterranean-campaign.htm#comment-152867 Cap'n Dave Mon, 30 Nov 2009 15:44:35 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/sideshow-ii-origins-of-the-mediterranean-campaign.htm#comment-152867 Good points Bill - pun intended - but I think it can be argued that TORCH was the first real US entry into the war, everything else was noncommittal. Had TORCH failed, it was going to be hard, if not impossible, to overlook or 'spin' it into anything other than a loss. Good points Bill – pun intended – but I think it can be argued that TORCH was the first real US entry into the war, everything else was noncommittal. Had TORCH failed, it was going to be hard, if not impossible, to overlook or 'spin' it into anything other than a loss.

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