In the end, the outcome was decided at sea. The Romans initially had been no match for the Carthaginians in naval warfare, but with typical Roman ingenuity they overcame their deficiency by the invention of the corvu (crow), a long plank with a heavy spike protruding from the end that, when dropped, effectively pinned two warships together. This transformed a sea battle into a land battle, and Roman soldiers — in essence the world's first marines — could rush over the plank and fight the enemy hand to hand. The First Punic War came to an end at the naval battle of Aegusa in 241 bc. The Roman navy won a decisive victory over the Carthaginians, and the remaining Punic strongholds on Sicily could now be blockaded.

Subscribe Today

• Did you enjoy our article?
• Read more in Military History magazine
• Subscribe online and save nearly 40%!!!
 

Both sides were exhausted. Rome took Sicily, and Carthage was compelled to pay a largely symbolic tribute of 320 talents of silver per year for 10 years. The island of Sicily remained utterly devastated, and there are those who believe it still has not fully recovered even today.

For nearly another quarter century an uneasy peace prevailed between the two adversaries. Rome had been too drained to finish off Carthage. Carthage, on the other hand, recovered its fortunes in Spain, more than making up for its loss of Sicily. Both knew that another test of strength was only a matter of time.

During the interregnum, Hamilcar Barca died, leaving behind three sons, Hannibal, Hasdrubal and Mago, 'the sons of the thunderbolt.' Never in history has a single family produced generals of such genius and charisma.

Hamilcar, possessing a clear, penetrating eye, knew that one day Rome and Carthage would be locked in a second contest from which, this time, only one could survive. Before he died he made his sons take a solemn oath before the gods of Carthage that they would bear implacable, eternal enmity toward Rome, an oath that all his sons would faithfully keep.

In 218 bc, the Second Punic War commenced. Historians disagree over which side was in the right regarding the casus belli, Hannibal's siege of the Spanish city of Saguntum. It scarcely matters — had war not broken out over this issue, there would have been another.

Hannibal had a plan, a brilliant one. He knew that Roman manpower outweighed his own by an appalling preponderance. He also knew that once a Roman army landed in strength in Africa, the Punic subject allies would gladly defect. His only hope was to get his army to Italy before the Romans reached Africa. Once in Italy, if he could win a few major battles, it was Hannibal's hope that Rome's Italian allies, remembering their former proud independence and being too far from Africa to be oppressed by the Carthaginians, would break from Rome and either stand neutral or actively assist him.

The story of Hannibal's epic crossing of the Alps with his elephants is well known. Rome had remained master of the sea, so the land route was the only one open to him. Uncharacteristically, the Roman Senate panicked upon hearing that Hannibal had reached Italy, and called back the legions that had been on the verge of sailing for Africa. Hannibal had achieved his first goal before a single battle had been fought.

In an amazing series of campaigns, Hannibal crushed, one after another, the finest armies in the world. Each time they were beaten, Rome raised new, larger armies, and each in turn met the same fate. At the Ticinus River, at Trebbia and at Lake Trasimene, Hannibal won annihilating victories over the Romans. Then, in June 216 bc at Cannae, outnumbered and with his back to the Aufidus River, Hannibal surrounded the largest army Rome had ever put in the field and wiped it out. At least 50,000 Romans, the flower of Roman youth, perished at Cannae. Rome was bled white.

As Hannibal had hoped, many of Rome's allies defected to the Punic cause, and others stood aside from the conflict. But after Cannae, Hannibal had been unable to capture Rome. He lacked siege engines, and mercenaries are not the sort who take prolonged siege warfare well, since spoils are too long in coming. Nonetheless, he was able to inflict terrible damage to the Italian countryside, and no Roman general was willing to risk facing him in open combat.

Help HistoryNet by bookmarking to