Brigadier General Cuvier Grover’s brigade spearheaded Hooker’s assault. Grover advanced with three regiments in the front and two in support. The Federals drove gamely toward the wooded embankment, which soon exploded in sheets of musketry. The men from Massachusetts and New Hampshire kept coming, scrambling into the Confederate works. At several points the foes exchanged fire muzzle to muzzle and engaged in hand-to-hand combat. At length, Grover’s men wavered and broke. They had lost nearly a third of their numbers.

Two brigades from Starke’s division then counterattacked. The Southerners hurried Grover’s men rearward and routed Hooker’s remaining two brigades deployed in some woods. One of Reno’s IX Corps brigades also got caught in the onslaught and tumbled back in disarray.

The final Union assault came shortly afterward against Hill’s division on Jackson’s left. One of the Federals’ best combat officers, Philip Kearny, led the attack. When his men stepped out, Kearny exclaimed, ‘Fall in here, you sons of bitches and I’ll make major generals of every one of you!’ The force of Kearny’s blow fell upon the South Carolina brigade of Brig. Gen. Maxcy Gregg, positioned at the end of Hill’s front. The fierce combat centered on a rocky knoll. Gregg was in the midst of the fury, shouting, ‘Let us die here, my men!’ Many did, but Confederate reserves saved Gregg’s ranks, repulsing Kearny’s troops. The South Carolinians lost over 600 of their comrades; only two field officers passed through the ordeal unscathed.

Kearny’s withdrawal concluded the day’s fighting along Jackson’s front. One Northerner wrote of the day’s combat, ‘The slope was swept by a hurricane of death, and each minute seemed twenty hours long.’ To Dr. Hunter McGuire, Jackson’s medical director, the battle’s outcome ‘had been won by nothing but stark and stern fighting.’ ‘No,’ replied Jackson. ‘It has been won by nothing but the blessing and protection of Providence.’

To the south and west of the main battlefield, events of this day would result in controversy and court-martial. When Pope redirected the V Corps to Gainesville early in the morning, Porter complied. The command advanced cautiously toward the village, not approaching it until well after noon. Before they reached the Manassas Gap Railroad just east of Gainesville, Longstreet’s Confederates barred the route. Porter stopped, deploying his troops into a defensive position. Pope, however, expected an attack from Porter against Jackson’s right throughout the afternoon. Finally, at 4:30 p.m., the army commander issued a peremptory order for an immediate attack, but the order did not reach Porter’s headquarters until nearly nightfall.

Longstreet, in fact, had secured Jackson’s right flank by noon. Hood’s division led the march on this day, arriving on the field about 10 o’clock. He aligned his brigades north of the turnpike and waited as the divisions of Brig. Gens. James Kemper and D.R. Jones lengthened the front across the roadway toward the railroad, while Brig. Gen. Cadmus Wilcox’s division formed behind Hood. The deployment was completed well before Porter’s column appeared from the southeast.

Shortly after noon, Lee urged Longstreet to strike the Union left, but Longstreet demurred, arguing that he needed to conduct a reconnaissance. The examination of the terrain took an hour, and Longstreet found Federal troops posted well south of the turnpike. He also received reports of Yankee units at Manassas Junction, and Stuart came in with news of the approach of Porter’s command. After shifting Wilcox to the right, Longstreet resurveyed the ground. Lee again suggested an attack, but once more Longstreet convinced the army commander to wait until the strength of the oncoming Yankees could be determined.

Both Lee and Longstreet conducted another reconnaissance. For a third time, Lee ordered an attack, and for a third time, Longstreet disagreed, citing the lateness of the hour–it was now after 4 p.m. Longstreet recommended a reconnaissance in force, and Lee relented. Shortly after 6 o’clock, Hood and Wilcox advanced their divisions. Hood soon became entangled in a nasty fight with Silas King’s division, now under the command of Brig. Gen. John Hatch. (King, an epileptic, had to relinquish command because of his health.)

Both Hood and Wilcox reported to Longstreet before midnight, counseling against any early attack on the 30th. Lee, who had instructed Longstreet to advance at dawn against Pope’s left flank, canceled the order when he received Hood’s and Wilcox’s recommendations from Longstreet. For the aggressive Lee, the day’s developments on the right were disappointing. But Longstreet’s suggested caution was supported by evidence uncovered by Stuart, Hood and Wilcox.

At Union headquarters, meanwhile, Pope learned of Longstreet’s presence on the field. But Pope characteristically misinterpreted the information, believing that Longstreet had not extended Jackson’s line but merely moved into a position of direct support He consequently decided that Jackson’s right flank could still be turned, and directed Porter’s corps to start at once for the battlefield upon receipt of the orders. Porter had his men on the road shortly after 3:30 a.m. on the 30th. Later in the morning, John Reynolds’ division of Pennsylvania reserves moved toward the Groveton area, forming south of the turnpike. With Porter advancing to the battlefield, Reynolds’ solitary command covered Pope’s left before Longstreet’s massed divisions. The situation had all the appearance of an impending disaster.

August 30 dawned hot, dry and quiet. Pope soon received a string of conflicting reports that indicated either that the Confederates were in retreat or were still in force along the embankment. He summoned his corps commanders to a conference at Union headquarters. The officers agreed reluctantly to renew the offensive. But as the morning wore on, conflicting evidence mounted. Finally, about noon, Pope became convinced that the Rebels were pulling out, and he directed Porter’s corps, supported by Hatch’s division of McDowell’s corps, to pursue and press Jackson.

Lee, like Pope, met with his senior officers, Longstreet and Jackson, during that morning. Lee wanted a renewal of Union attacks but was willing to remain in place throughout the day if Pope did not engage. The three generals agreed that if the Federals remained quiet, the Confederate army would pull out after dark and cross Bull Run, swinging around Pope’s right flank. With this decided, Longstreet and Jackson returned to their commands to await developments.

The Union pursuit rolled forth between 2 and 3 o’clock. Porter’s veterans anchored the lines with Hatch’s and Ricketts’ divisions extending the right. Jackson’s men, who had been pulled back from the embankment, resumed their places. The woods along the grade exploded with a volley of musketry. ‘The first line of the attacking column,’ stated a Rebel, ‘looked as if it had been struck by a blast from a tempest and had been blown away.’

The Yankees leaned into the tempest and drove toward Jackson’s ranks. Confederate artillery and rifle fire raked the attackers. As Grover’s men had done the day before, Federal units penetrated the Southern lines. At one point, the Southerners hurled rocks at their enemies. Major Andrew Barney of the 24th New York urged his horse over the embankment into the works. Several admiring Rebels shouted, ‘Don’t kill him! Don’t kill him!’ Their pleas went unheard, and Barney tumbled to the ground, his body riddled with bullets.

The second and third lines of Federals advanced in support. But Longstreet had prepared for this moment by deploying 18 cannon of Colonel Stephen V. Lee’s battalion on a ridge between the two wings of the Confederate armies. Lee’s gunners had ‘a beautiful position in easy range’ of the Federals, and their fire wrecked the oncoming Union lines. Then, at 4:30 p.m., ‘Old Pete’ unleashed his divisions.

Longstreet’s infantry rolled forward like an avalanche. When Pope saw the attacking Rebels, he gaped in surprise. According to one of his staff officers, for the first time in the campaign the general’showed strong excitement.’ All that stood in the immediate path of Longstreet was the 1,100-man brigade of Colonel Gouverneur Warren and a six-gun battery. McDowell had mistakenly sent Reynolds’ division into the fight against Jackson.

Longstreet’s soldiers crushed Warren’s brave command and overran the battery. Driving across Young’s Branch, the Confederates met stiff Federal resistance along Chinn Ridge. Altogether, five Union infantry brigades, supported by artillery, fought stubbornly at the position, inflicting heavy casualties on Longstreet’s units. The Federals held the position for the better part of an hour, buying time for their comrades to retire toward Centreville.

Jackson finally advanced about 6 o’clock, pushing the Federals before him. Another valiant defense by Union units on Henry House Hill ended the action. The defeated Northerners retired in order from Second Manassas; it was not a rout like First Manassas. The rain began falling about 8 o’clock.

Pope’s Army of Virginia, a thrown-together collection of troops, had suffered a decisive, humiliating defeat. Their casualties amounted to 1,716 killed, 8,215 wounded and 3,893 missing, a total of 13,824.

Blame for the disaster fell squarely upon the boastful John Pope. He had promised much and delivered nothing. He, in turn, attributed the defeat to a conspiracy among the officers of the Army of the Potomac, particularly Fitz-John Porter. On November 12, 1862, a court-martial convened to weigh the evidence against Porter. The members of the board were handpicked by Secretary of War Stanton, who loathed McClellan and his supporters. The court found Porter guilty as charged, and he was cashiered from the army on January 21, 1863. Fifteen years later, he was exonerated of all charges.

As for Pope, he was removed from command within a week and his army absorbed into the Army of the Potomac. Lincoln did come somewhat to the discredited general’s defense, stating, ‘Pope did well, but there was an army prejudice against him.’ One salient fact remained, however: ‘the miscreant’ Pope was no match for Robert E. Lee.

For Lee and his victorious troops, Second Manassas marked a passage. Gone were the mistakes of the Seven Days. The men in the ranks had fought magnificently, and Longstreet, Jackson and their subordinate officers had performed brilliantly. Casualties amounted to 1,305 killed and 7,048 wounded. The 8,353 fallen comrades would be missed as the Army of Northern Virginia turned northward from Second Manassas. But as they marched toward Maryland and Sharpsburg, they went forth confidently, an army tempered and trued by the second struggle along Bull Run creek.

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This article was written by Jeffry Wert and originally appeared in the November 1997 issue of America’s Civil War magazine. For more great articles be sure to subscribe to America’s Civil War magazine today!

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