Although he also criticized Burnside for proceeding cautiously, Hassler blamed him completely for the surprise attack of Maj. Gen. Ambrose Powell Hill’s Confederate division, which struck a green Connecticut regiment and caved in Burnside’s flank. Hill had driven his men mercilessly all the way from Harpers Ferry, and his was the sort of counterattack Burnside had been preparing against, but Hill came up from a quadrant that no one expected—largely because McClellan had neglected to provide for general reconnaissance. The cavalry would normally have monitored such enemy movements on the outer flanks, but McClellan was holding all his cavalry in reserve for a final grand charge in the Napoleonic tradition.

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McClellan and his contemporary apologists spent the remainder of the 19th century building the case against Burnside with half-truths, sarcasm and outright lies. Similar prejudice among subordinate generals also played a significant part in Burnside’s disastrous tenure at the head of the Army of the Potomac, which seemed to lend substance to that image of ineptitude.

By blaming Burnside for numerous other lapses—including the failure to destroy the Confederate army at Antietam—his detractors created an impression of overall incompetence. Through a combination of sloppy research, amateur analysis and selective presentation, a few 20th-century historians lent that jaundiced image an undeserved air of corroboration.

William Marvel writes from New Hampshire, where he insists it snows until July and starts again in August. He is the author of Burnside and Mr. Lincoln Goes to War, among other Civil War titles.

This article by William Marvel was originally published in the September 2007 issue of America’s Civil War magazine.For more great articles be sure to subscribe to America’s Civil War magazine today!

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