Cromwell then reverted to a military strategy. He would draw Leslie out by moving behind the Scots’ defensive line and threatening their rear. On August 27 and 28, he occupied good defensive positions in the towns of Corstorphine and Gogar. Although Leslie moved out of his trenches, he did not give battle. Frustrated, Cromwell ordered a withdrawal to Musselburgh and held a council of war on the night of August 30. For the third time since the invasion began on July 22, his senior officers decided to retreat to Dunbar, to fortify it and to await reinforcements and supplies.

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At that point, the English situation was grim. The ‘flux’ (dysentery) plagued the army and hunger and bad weather eroded the troops’ morale. The summer was especially rainy but the army did not even have tents until mid-August. ‘Our bodies enfeebled with fluxes,’ one English soldier complained, ‘our strength wasted with watchings; want of drink, wet, and cold, being our continual companions.’ Lieutenant Hodgson described the English at Dunbar as ‘a poor, shattered, hungry, discouraged army.’ By September, Cromwell had lost a quarter of his force.

The sorry state of the English army was common knowledge, emboldening Leslie to leave his trenches in pursuit. While the English rearguard marched through Haddington at night, the Scots attacked. Clouds moved across the moon and gave the English a chance to move off. When the clouds cleared, the Scots resumed their attacks without success.

Leslie arrived at Dunbar before Cromwell on September 1 and took up position on Doon Hill, two miles south of the town. The hill made an excellent defensive position because it commanded the road south into England. The road was on a narrow pass between the hill and the sea. There, as Cromwell described it, ‘ten men to hinder are better than forty to make way.’

Cromwell’s dispirited army had three options. The English could surrender, fight their way south and probably take horrific casualties, or they could sail away on the waiting fleet. If they evacuated by sea, they would have to abandon their baggage train, horses and the rear guard. Cromwell had already embarked 1,400 sick and wounded men for transport south.

Leslie, too, faced major difficulties. He had fielded a mostly Lowland army of 6,000 horse and 16,000 foot soldiers. Of these, about 16,500 men were short-term levies. The Kirk added to his troubles by conducting purges in the army to eliminate possible ‘Malignants,’ their word for Royalists and other political enemies. They filled the army with ministers’ sons, clerks, and other religiously and politically reliable personnel with little or no military experience. In short, the army did not contain many of Scotland’s most capable soldiers.

Leslie also misjudged Cromwell’s intentions. When the Scots spied the English moving some artillery, Leslie concluded that all or most of Cromwell’s guns were aboard the ships, and that he was planning to depart by sea.

Contrary to Leslie’s supposition, Cromwell had no intention of abandoning Dunbar by sea. He recognized that he had few options while the Scots were on Doon Hill, but Leslie’s position there was difficult to resupply. The Scots could only stay there for a few days before they would have to withdraw–unless Cromwell’s own army gave out first. ‘Our lying here daily comsumeth our men, who fall sick beyond imagination,’ he wrote. He didn’t believe that he would be victorious ‘without almost a miracle.’ The miracle arrived the next day.

On September 2, Leslie held a council of war. Assuming that the English were as good as beaten, his officers voted to leave the hill and finish them off. As Leslie redeployed at the base of Doon Hill, Cromwell and Lambert, seeing an opportunity, immediately reconnoitered for weaknesses in Leslie’s new position.

Many historians claim that the Scots’ abandonment of Doon Hill caused their defeat. It seems clear, however, that from a purely tactical point of view Leslie’s crucial mistake was in expecting Cromwell to wait for an attack. In this, he overlooked the possibility that Cromwell might attack first. There has also been historical debate over the extent to which Leslie was solely responsible for the decision. Some have blamed a council of fanatical ministers who traveled with the Scottish army. Leslie never blamed them publicly for this afterward, though he insinuated that their purges diminished the quality of his army. It is clear that the clergy held great sway over the army, and strongly supported Leslie’s plan.

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