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Sapper Attack in the A Shau During the Vietnam WarBy Michael R. Conroy | Vietnam | 3 comments | Print This Post | Email This Post Pha’s group was organized to function as the extraction force to assist in the withdrawal of the groups assaulting specific objectives. A fifth group of over 100 men would provide the assaulting forces with a base of fire utilizing RPGs, mortars, automatic weapons and small-arms fire. Subscribe Today
The attack forces moved out from their various base camps at 7:30 a.m. Using previously reconned routes, they executed a covered approach to their final assembly areas. Movement as initiated many hours prior to the assault phase as the sappers had deliberately chosen the most difficult avenues of approach to the target in order to avoid observation. By 6 p.m. all the NVA sapper groups were only 100 meters outside the concertina-wire obstacles surrounding FSB Cunningham. The NVA sappers slowly crept to assault positions just outside the defensive wire, aided by reduced visibility. There was little moonlight and a thick blanket of fog enveloped not only the fire support base but all routes of entry to it. Although the approach was slow and cautious, the assault itself would be made with utmost speed. The sappers assumed that the majority of the defenders would be driven into their bunkers by the mortar attack that would precede their assault. The sappers knew that once the defensive obstacles were breached under this covering fire, the bunkers would become death traps for the Marines. In anticipation of the Lunar New Year (or Tet) cease-fire, the roaring of the big artillery pieces on FSB Cunningham fell silent at midnight, although the allied countrywide 24-hour truce went into effect at 6 p.m. on February 16. At precisely 2 a.m., the NVA mortar sections commenced placing accurate supporting fire on previously plotted primary targets, mortar positions, the command bunker, artillery positions and communications bunkers. The Marines could hear the mortar rounds as they were tubed. The devastatingly accurate mortar fire forced the Marines into their bunkers where they felt safe due to a minimum overhead cover of at least four layers of sandbags. In the midst of the noise, damage and confusion, it was immediately obvious that key installations were the target of the intense barrage. The Marines in fighting holes on the perimeter kept their heads down. The Marine defensive positions were manned on the northern slope by the men of Lima Company, 3rd Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment (L/3/9). Defensive positions on the flanks and along the southern edge of the ridge were manned by a combination of Marines from the artillery units and Colonel Barrow’s headquarters group. In addition, a reaction force of 50 Marines from the communications, engineer and staff sections of the headquarters group were on standby as a reserve defensive force. The mortar barrage reached a crescendo at 2:15 a.m. as the NVA assault groups began their efforts to breach the defensive obstacles. The initial assault wave came from the northeast. The sappers made liberal use of bangalore torpedoes fashioned from half-pound blocks of TNT lashed together between bamboo sticks. The ingenious attack route lay through one of the many trash dumps with well-worn paths leading to every major battery facility. Mats, brush and other local materials were thrown across the barbed wire obstacles. As the mortar fire was lifted, rocket-propelled Chicom grenades, satchel charges and the bangalore torpedoes created the impression that the mortars were still firing, serving to keep the defenders on the perimeter positions inside their bunkers. The Marines were suffering from too many head-ringing explosions to notice the difference. For hours before the cease-fire began, the artillery batteries at the fire support bases had been hammering away in direct support of other defensive positions. The cacophony of noise was deafening. The NVA sappers who broke through the defensive wire barriers tossed concussion grenades and satchel charges into every open hole they could find. The RPGs and automatic weapons fire of the NVA base group was concentrated on the firing slits and ports of the bunkers. Although the situation was confusing, the Marines quickly realized that they were under ground attack and responded ferociously, organizing an effort to clear the base in the face of heavy enemy mortar and recoilless rifle fire. Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6Tags: 20th - 21st Century, Historical Conflicts, Vietnam War
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3 Comments to “Sapper Attack in the A Shau During the Vietnam War”
I joined Lima 3/9 in March 1969, at the end of Dewey Canyon. I’m trying to find Milton J. Teixeira, my first platoon commander. If anyone knows his whereabouts, please contact me. Memebers of 2nd platoon has had five reunions since 1994. We plan another one the last of July in Branson.
Fred Carroll 832/876-3103 email: Golf48@aol.com
By Fred Carroll on Jun 27, 2008 at 10:06 am
It’s interesting that the media during the war gave little attention to
the NVA and Viet Congs use of drugs. However they gave a lot of attention to drug use by our own troops. Conroy’s information on the drug’s recovered from the NVA packs, coincides with information
I gathered, while working with DOD contractors, from 1966 to 1973, in Viet Nam.
In 1969 a Vietnamese woman told me that her 15 year old cousin was recruited into the the Viet Cong, from a market place in Saigon.
He was taken to a training camp in the Mekong Delta region. He was
given some training and then ordered to attack a police station in
Can Tho. He was given two hand grenades, along with a Chicom
pistol. She said he was also given a large white pill and told to take it 15 or 20 minutes before he attacked. Instead of following
their orders he became a Chu Hoi and returned to the South Vietnamese cause. He was rewarded with money for his weapons.
In 1968 not long after the Tet Offensive, I was at the roof top bar of a hotel in Saigon. I met an Australian father who was visiting
his son at the 7th Field Hospital in Saigon. His son had been seriously wounded, when there unit was over run at Bear Cat,
near Vung Tao. He conveyed to me the following incident as it
was told to him by his son. In the early morning hours his unit
came under attack by Viet Cong forces. A VC ran up on his position and he pointed his weapon and pulled the trigger. His
weapon was empty. While he pulled out the spent clip and reloaded his weapon, the VC stood over him laughing like a mad
man. He was able to shoot and kill him while he laughed.
These incident’s along with Conroy’s disclosure of the contents of
the Sapper packs in the A Shau are more than a slight indication
of the wide spread use of drugs by NVA and VC forces.
By Jack Johnstone on Apr 12, 2009 at 8:35 pm
This is an excellent recollection of what happened to us that night. I was at FSB Cunningham when this attack occurred. My 15th ITT sub-team was with the 9th Marines on Operation Dewey Canyon. A small personal side story: Also we got an NVA radio from one of the dead sappers(who was wearing a marines helment that he had picked up during the attack. He was killed by a marine about 5 feet behind my position, saving my life). The marine (unknown to me)was wounded in the arm when the sappers’ grenade exploded as he tried to throw it. They used the radio to keep their attack command group informed of the progress. We tried to listen to further communications but they had pulled back. At daylight we searched the jungle around the perimeter and found drag marks where they had hauled away many more dead and wounded. Lt. Joe Wheeler, Sgt. Scott Sibley and our ARVN Interpreter SSgt Thang were with me. Chip Reid (15th Interrogation Translation Team)
By Chip Reid on Jun 24, 2009 at 3:47 pm