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Sapper Attack in the A Shau During the Vietnam WarBy Michael R. Conroy | Vietnam | 3 comments | Print This Post | Email This Post Phase One of the operation, including all pre-D-day activities dealing with getting the artillery support established in the area, began with the opening of three fire support bases (Henderson, Tun Tavern and Shiloh) on January 19. Subscribe Today
After the area had been mostly cleared by aviation ordnance, Company I, 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines (I/3/9), and Company M, 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines (M/3/9), conducted heliborne assaults into landing zones (LZs) India and Mike 1700 meters apart on Co Ca Va Ridge. This is a boomerang-shaped ridge approximately a half-mile long, running linearly east to west, with its southern flank an almost sheer cliff to the valley below. Meeting no resistance, the way was clear for Company K, 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines, and engineers to sweep in and begin construction of the fire support base. There was no secrecy involved in the creation of a fire support base. It was an anthill of activity, a major engineering feat and the scene of massive organized confusion as chain saws bit into the huge jungle hardwoods. Numerous explosions sent rocks, splinters, tree limbs, even whole trees, raining down through clouds of choking, rising dust. The rapid buildup of support facilities at FSB Cunningham was impressive, essentially turning the fire support base into a mini–combat base. When placed atop a dominant terrain feature, the fire support bases were defensible but, as “fixed” forward positions established in the enemy’s territory by forceable entry, they were beacons and targets quickly placed under constant observation by the enemy. From the moment the Marines landed on Co Ca Va Ridge and began their construction efforts they were under constant enemy surveillance. It was soon obvious to the NVA observers that this was the operational command center for all Marine operations in the area. Accordingly, an NVA sapper unit was ordered to do a feasibility study upon which to formulate assault plans against the fire support base. The Marines knew the enemy’s tactics well. Accordingly, the infantry dug their fighting holes, usually two-man positions, no more than 50 feet apart. As much barbed wire as could be obtained was strung in several different configurations all around the outpost, with additional barriers, such as flares, trip-wire booby traps and anti-personnel mines, placed at what were perceived to be the most likely avenues of enemy approach. Interlocking fields of fire for individual and crew-served weapons were established so that the defenders achieved a 360-degree integrated pattern of defensive fire. Outposts with good vantage points were established. Listening posts were also established that would intercept attacks or attempts at infiltration before allowing enemy forces to approach close to the defensive lines. Because of their forward and exposed natures, the location of those outposts was continually changing. Additional protection for the fire support base was provided by constant patrols around the position. The fire support base in no way resembled a secure area with all the trappings of a permanent installation. As operations proceeded, empty ammunition crates were broken down and utilized as footpaths. Garbage disposal, although a problem, was never a high priority. Plastic and cardboard wrappings, expended artillery shells and empty C-ration cans quickly stacked up. Due to the proximity of large stores of ammunition, engineering explosives and powder charges, trash fires were not allowed. The trash pits and bunkers were almost immediately infested with legions of mice and rats. The bunkers were dark and musty. Beds were made of whatever could be scrounged or improvised. There were no windows. Available electricity was reserved for communications and equipment. New men soon learned that peanut butter, when burned, made a dim candle. Inside the bunkers the men attracted hordes of voracious gnats and mosquitoes. Insect bites became ulcerated wounds constantly irritated by salty sweat. Every sore turned into jungle rot. Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6Tags: 20th - 21st Century, Historical Conflicts, Vietnam War
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3 Comments to “Sapper Attack in the A Shau During the Vietnam War”
I joined Lima 3/9 in March 1969, at the end of Dewey Canyon. I’m trying to find Milton J. Teixeira, my first platoon commander. If anyone knows his whereabouts, please contact me. Memebers of 2nd platoon has had five reunions since 1994. We plan another one the last of July in Branson.
Fred Carroll 832/876-3103 email: Golf48@aol.com
By Fred Carroll on Jun 27, 2008 at 10:06 am
It’s interesting that the media during the war gave little attention to
the NVA and Viet Congs use of drugs. However they gave a lot of attention to drug use by our own troops. Conroy’s information on the drug’s recovered from the NVA packs, coincides with information
I gathered, while working with DOD contractors, from 1966 to 1973, in Viet Nam.
In 1969 a Vietnamese woman told me that her 15 year old cousin was recruited into the the Viet Cong, from a market place in Saigon.
He was taken to a training camp in the Mekong Delta region. He was
given some training and then ordered to attack a police station in
Can Tho. He was given two hand grenades, along with a Chicom
pistol. She said he was also given a large white pill and told to take it 15 or 20 minutes before he attacked. Instead of following
their orders he became a Chu Hoi and returned to the South Vietnamese cause. He was rewarded with money for his weapons.
In 1968 not long after the Tet Offensive, I was at the roof top bar of a hotel in Saigon. I met an Australian father who was visiting
his son at the 7th Field Hospital in Saigon. His son had been seriously wounded, when there unit was over run at Bear Cat,
near Vung Tao. He conveyed to me the following incident as it
was told to him by his son. In the early morning hours his unit
came under attack by Viet Cong forces. A VC ran up on his position and he pointed his weapon and pulled the trigger. His
weapon was empty. While he pulled out the spent clip and reloaded his weapon, the VC stood over him laughing like a mad
man. He was able to shoot and kill him while he laughed.
These incident’s along with Conroy’s disclosure of the contents of
the Sapper packs in the A Shau are more than a slight indication
of the wide spread use of drugs by NVA and VC forces.
By Jack Johnstone on Apr 12, 2009 at 8:35 pm
This is an excellent recollection of what happened to us that night. I was at FSB Cunningham when this attack occurred. My 15th ITT sub-team was with the 9th Marines on Operation Dewey Canyon. A small personal side story: Also we got an NVA radio from one of the dead sappers(who was wearing a marines helment that he had picked up during the attack. He was killed by a marine about 5 feet behind my position, saving my life). The marine (unknown to me)was wounded in the arm when the sappers’ grenade exploded as he tried to throw it. They used the radio to keep their attack command group informed of the progress. We tried to listen to further communications but they had pulled back. At daylight we searched the jungle around the perimeter and found drag marks where they had hauled away many more dead and wounded. Lt. Joe Wheeler, Sgt. Scott Sibley and our ARVN Interpreter SSgt Thang were with me. Chip Reid (15th Interrogation Translation Team)
By Chip Reid on Jun 24, 2009 at 3:47 pm