Comments on: Same Army, Different War http://www.historynet.com/same-army-different-war.htm From the World's Largest History Magazine Publisher Wed, 22 May 2013 15:23:56 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.2 By: Bob Harbula http://www.historynet.com/same-army-different-war.htm#comment-785175 Bob Harbula Fri, 23 Dec 2011 22:11:13 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/?p=13682887#comment-785175 Hey guys; I read your comments and hope to clarify some of them. I was a machinegun squad leader with the 1st. Marine Division and fought in 5 campaigns from Inchon 9/15/50 to the Hwachon Reservoir 6/15/1951. We had little or no training for what we faced in Korea. No seawall amphibious training for the landing at Inchon, no house to house training for Seoul and no coldweather mountain training for the -30% weather at the Chosin Reservoir. What we did have was leadership and esprit de corps. Another plus was our combat tactics against the Chinese that was much different than the Army's. Our perimeters were always tied in tight. We were very hard to dissect or penitrate and we always had a floating force to block any breaches. Until Ridgway took over the Army was always in this type of trouble and found themselves surrounded and dissected. This caused there bugout fever. MacArthur was the main problem. He knew the North Korean's had the T-34 tanks and that the 2.36 inch rocket launcher wouldn't stop it. Why he didn't insist on the 3.5 inch being delivered immediately is strange. Remember at this point in time he was the commanding officer on the frontlines of Democracy in the Far-East during a heated cold war. Hey guys;

I read your comments and hope to clarify some of them. I was a machinegun squad leader with the 1st. Marine Division and fought in 5 campaigns from Inchon 9/15/50 to the Hwachon Reservoir 6/15/1951.
We had little or no training for what we faced in Korea. No seawall amphibious training for the landing at Inchon, no house to house training for Seoul and no coldweather mountain training for the -30% weather at the Chosin Reservoir.
What we did have was leadership and esprit de corps. Another plus was our combat tactics against the Chinese that was much different than the Army's. Our perimeters were always tied in tight. We were very hard to dissect or penitrate and we always had a floating force to block any breaches. Until Ridgway took over the Army was always in this type of trouble and found themselves surrounded and dissected. This caused there bugout fever.
MacArthur was the main problem. He knew the North Korean's had the T-34 tanks and that the 2.36 inch rocket launcher wouldn't stop it. Why he didn't insist on the 3.5 inch being delivered immediately is strange. Remember at this point in time he was the commanding officer on the frontlines of Democracy in the Far-East during a heated cold war.

]]> By: B Soto http://www.historynet.com/same-army-different-war.htm#comment-353655 B Soto Fri, 22 Oct 2010 16:37:09 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/?p=13682887#comment-353655 All of you have identified the serious problems with the US Army at the beginning of the Korean War. It all falls back to the main problem, bad leadership, both Civilian and Military. It reminds me of the phrase I heard when I was a Cadet at the beginning of my Army career. "There are no bad units only bad leaders." All of you have identified the serious problems with the US Army at the beginning of the Korean War. It all falls back to the main problem, bad leadership, both Civilian and Military. It reminds me of the phrase I heard when I was a Cadet at the beginning of my Army career. "There are no bad units only bad leaders."

]]> By: KoMerican http://www.historynet.com/same-army-different-war.htm#comment-346881 KoMerican Fri, 08 Oct 2010 08:03:06 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/?p=13682887#comment-346881 Let's face it American Soldiers were not soft and it was not the Civilian Government's fault for the poor performance of the US Army in Korea. The poor performance of US Forces is due to US Army leadership from MacArthur down. The German General Staff proved that armies can improve under extreme restrictions when properly motivated. Poor intelligence from "Yes Men" on staff, and poor training of Soldiers by leaders in the US Army led to the poor performance in 1950. I hate blaming MacArthur for problems well below 4/5 Star general level, but the "American Emporer of Japan" was not focused on the Korean War and did not allow a commander to put proper attention to the problem until GEN Ridgeway show up in the Far East. Let's face it American Soldiers were not soft and it was not the Civilian Government's fault for the poor performance of the US Army in Korea. The poor performance of US Forces is due to US Army leadership from MacArthur down. The German General Staff proved that armies can improve under extreme restrictions when properly motivated. Poor intelligence from "Yes Men" on staff, and poor training of Soldiers by leaders in the US Army led to the poor performance in 1950. I hate blaming MacArthur for problems well below 4/5 Star general level, but the "American Emporer of Japan" was not focused on the Korean War and did not allow a commander to put proper attention to the problem until GEN Ridgeway show up in the Far East.

]]> By: Rob Citino http://www.historynet.com/same-army-different-war.htm#comment-346237 Rob Citino Thu, 07 Oct 2010 17:18:56 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/?p=13682887#comment-346237 Thanks, Mike. Bill, I agree: there is human agency along with context. In the early nuclear age, the Army was being treated as a kind of stepchild, and frankly the army (and the Marines, as Mike H points out in an earlier post) were wondering just what their future was. They could/should have been better prepared than they were, but 60 years later, what actually happened in Korea seems rather--unsurprising. Thanks, Mike. Bill, I agree: there is human agency along with context. In the early nuclear age, the Army was being treated as a kind of stepchild, and frankly the army (and the Marines, as Mike H points out in an earlier post) were wondering just what their future was. They could/should have been better prepared than they were, but 60 years later, what actually happened in Korea seems rather–unsurprising.

]]> By: Bill Nance http://www.historynet.com/same-army-different-war.htm#comment-346219 Bill Nance Thu, 07 Oct 2010 16:50:17 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/?p=13682887#comment-346219 Well, let's be careful about blaming it ALL on the civilian leadership. Commanders get paid to keep their units trained and disciplined. While they might not have been serving under the best conditions, there is much that they could have done to mitigate the impending disaster. Again, I'm not exonerating the civilian leadership, just suggesting that the Army made some of its own bed too. Well, let's be careful about blaming it ALL on the civilian leadership. Commanders get paid to keep their units trained and disciplined. While they might not have been serving under the best conditions, there is much that they could have done to mitigate the impending disaster. Again, I'm not exonerating the civilian leadership, just suggesting that the Army made some of its own bed too.

]]> By: Mike H. http://www.historynet.com/same-army-different-war.htm#comment-346196 Mike H. Thu, 07 Oct 2010 16:17:02 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/?p=13682887#comment-346196 My Point exactly, Rob. The Failure of US Forces in June 1950, had far less to do with American military competence and far more to do with the civilian leadership. And remember the sign on Harry Truman's desk: "The Buck Stops Here." I believe he probably had this sort of thing in mind. Harry was an honorable man. My Point exactly, Rob. The Failure of US Forces in June 1950, had far less to do with American military competence and far more to do with the civilian leadership. And remember the sign on Harry Truman's desk: "The Buck Stops Here."
I believe he probably had this sort of thing in mind. Harry was an honorable man.

]]> By: Rob Citino http://www.historynet.com/same-army-different-war.htm#comment-346131 Rob Citino Thu, 07 Oct 2010 14:51:01 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/?p=13682887#comment-346131 Good comments, everyone. Actually, I think you're ALL correct. But I'd broaden it. It seems to me that the real lesson of TF Smith is this: it was the moment in which two graphs intersected--one being the drawdown of US military forces and the other the expanded mission requirements of the Truman Doctrine. Perhaps, as budgets declined and missions increased, it was bound to happen sooner or later. And when things like this DO happen, it is usually the common soldier who pays the price. Good comments, everyone. Actually, I think you're ALL correct. But I'd broaden it. It seems to me that the real lesson of TF Smith is this: it was the moment in which two graphs intersected–one being the drawdown of US military forces and the other the expanded mission requirements of the Truman Doctrine. Perhaps, as budgets declined and missions increased, it was bound to happen sooner or later. And when things like this DO happen, it is usually the common soldier who pays the price.

]]> By: Bill Nance http://www.historynet.com/same-army-different-war.htm#comment-346101 Bill Nance Thu, 07 Oct 2010 14:21:09 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/?p=13682887#comment-346101 Guys, I think Mike is on to something, but remember, the "caliber" of men was the same. Americans didn't suddenly become more cowardly or less capable. What happened is that for five years, the US forces in Japan had not trained to standard or held the discipline required for combat formations. Even the best and most experienced soldiers (private to general) can get lazy and lose skills if they are not trained. Additionally, fighting as a cohesive unit requires a long period of collective training, something missing in the Eighth Army in the period 45-50. Think what it would look like asking the Saints to sit out this entire season, not practicing besides the occasional individual drills, then asking them to play in the super bowl. Thus, I don't blame American society or the soldiers for the failures of 1950 (at least mostly), but rather the commanders who allowed their units to deteriorate in collective training and skill. Guys,
I think Mike is on to something, but remember, the "caliber" of men was the same. Americans didn't suddenly become more cowardly or less capable. What happened is that for five years, the US forces in Japan had not trained to standard or held the discipline required for combat formations. Even the best and most experienced soldiers (private to general) can get lazy and lose skills if they are not trained.

Additionally, fighting as a cohesive unit requires a long period of collective training, something missing in the Eighth Army in the period 45-50. Think what it would look like asking the Saints to sit out this entire season, not practicing besides the occasional individual drills, then asking them to play in the super bowl.

Thus, I don't blame American society or the soldiers for the failures of 1950 (at least mostly), but rather the commanders who allowed their units to deteriorate in collective training and skill.

]]> By: Andrew http://www.historynet.com/same-army-different-war.htm#comment-346036 Andrew Thu, 07 Oct 2010 12:51:04 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/?p=13682887#comment-346036 Mike, I think you're on to something there. You can't fight well if you haven't prepared well, and prepared accurately. I think in WWII physically the American forces were ready, but psychologically I think they went in more than a little naive. When you're naive and under-prepared, events like Korea can happen. You could have all the WWII heroes as leaders as you like, but if they don't have the same caliber of men to fight under their command, nothing good can happen other than a lot of wasted lives and a return to the successful, but expensive blueprint of past wars. Mike, I think you're on to something there. You can't fight well if you haven't prepared well, and prepared accurately. I think in WWII physically the American forces were ready, but psychologically I think they went in more than a little naive.

When you're naive and under-prepared, events like Korea can happen. You could have all the WWII heroes as leaders as you like, but if they don't have the same caliber of men to fight under their command, nothing good can happen other than a lot of wasted lives and a return to the successful, but expensive blueprint of past wars.

]]> By: Mike H. http://www.historynet.com/same-army-different-war.htm#comment-345701 Mike H. Thu, 07 Oct 2010 04:38:25 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/?p=13682887#comment-345701 In order to more fairly assess the US Armed Forces in Korea in 1950, I think that the bugetary cutbacks implemented by the gentleman holding what was a new position in the Cabinet: Secretary of Defense. Prior to that, we had a War Department. The SecDef was the Hon. Louis Johnson, who, throughout 1948-50, had boasted "cutting away the fat from the Defense budget". History will show,he cut away the fat, the meat, and scraped the bone. There was less than a complete brigade of Marines available, and the US Army available was sorely lacking in training (no funds available). Most of the Navy had been mothballed, and the new USAF was reliant solely on the new Atomic Bomb. Perhaps the lesson to be learned from this debacle would be the olsd axiom: The more you sweat in peace, the less you bleed in war. In order to more fairly assess the US Armed Forces in Korea in 1950, I think that the bugetary cutbacks implemented by the gentleman holding what was a new position in the Cabinet: Secretary of Defense. Prior to that, we had a War Department. The SecDef was the Hon. Louis Johnson, who, throughout 1948-50, had boasted "cutting away the fat from the Defense budget". History will show,he cut away the fat, the meat, and scraped the bone. There was less than a complete brigade of Marines available, and the US Army available was sorely lacking in training (no funds available). Most of the Navy had been mothballed, and the new USAF was reliant solely on the new Atomic Bomb. Perhaps the lesson to be learned from this debacle would be the olsd axiom: The more you sweat in peace, the less you bleed in war.

]]>