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Rome’s Craftiest General: Scipio AfricanusBy James Lacey | Military History | 4 comments | Print This Post | Email This Post After consolidating his position at New Carthage, Scipio led his legions against the Carthaginian army under Hannibal’s brother, Hasdrubal, winning a marginal victory at the Battle of Baecula in 208 bc. Either as a result of this battle or according to an earlier plan, Hasdrubal soon left Spain and marched his army into Italy to reinforce his brother. The Carthaginians arrived in Italy only to be destroyed by a Roman force led by the consul Nero. Hannibal learned his reinforcements had been wiped out when his brother’s head was thrown over the wall of his camp. Subscribe Today
Back in Spain, Scipio had only two armies to contend with, though by now they had combined forces. In 206 bc, with about 45,000 men—less than half of them well-disciplined legionnaires—Scipio marched against a Punic army nearly double that size, led by a different Hasdrubal and another of Hannibal’s brothers, Mago. The armies met near Ilipa, north of Seville. For the next few days the opponents sized each other up. For each of these demonstrations, Scipio put his best troops, his two legions and Latin allies, in the center, while his Spanish allies held the flanks. To match the Romans, the Carthaginian commanders put their best African troops in the center and their own Spanish allies on the flank. After several days of such preliminary moves, Scipio suddenly reversed his formation, putting a legion on each flank and the Spaniards in the center. Before Hasdrubal and Mago could adjust their own lines, the legions began to advance, while Scipio held his Spanish allies back. Instead of moving in the more typical line formation, Scipio advanced in columns, which allowed him to close the distance with the Carthaginians at an unheard-of speed. Then, at the last moment, the legions wheeled into line and smashed the Carthaginian flank. The Spaniards soon broke and ran for safety. Throughout this decisive stage of the battle, Hasdrubal was unable to maneuver his center to help his flanks because Scipio’s Spanish allies still menaced his front. Their flanks ultimately routed, the usually reliable African mercenaries in the center also ran for camp. That night, Hasdrubal’s Spanish allies deserted. What was left of the Carthaginian army tried to escape in darkness during a storm, but was pummeled by Roman pursuers. With Spain secured, Scipio returned to Rome. After a bitter political battle with jealous rivals, he secured permission to lead a Roman army into Africa and attack the base of Carthaginian power. Permission was only grudgingly granted, however, and the senate refused to allow him to recruit for the expedition, limiting his force to the two legions already in Sicily. But they couldn’t prevent Scipio from enrolling eager volunteers. According to ancient historians, they came because “to fight under so brave and gallant a captain as Scipio was an adventure all good soldiers welcomed.” That said, one suspects the promise of rich plunder was at least as much of a draw. By allowing him to take Legions V and VI, the senate didn’t think it was doing Scipio a service. These legions comprised survivors of Cannae. Following that rout, the defeated soldiers were sent to serve in exile—a degradation in direct contrast to the praise the senate bestowed on Cannae survivors of noble birth. These men keenly felt the stain of dishonor, and each year they petitioned the senate to allow them to return to Rome and prove their valor in battle against Hannibal. They were ignored. Scipio understood such men and their desire for redemption. To him they were not simply the losers from Cannae. They were the men who by dint of sheer hard fighting had cut their way through an encircling army and re-formed to protect the Republic. He praised them and honored their service, and they in turn gave him utter devotion. Around this core of combat-hardened veterans Scipio spent a year training his volunteers and preparing the logistics required to support an invasion of Carthage’s home territories. Pages: 1 2 3 4 5Tags: Ancient-Medieval, Historical Conflicts, Historical Figures
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4 Comments to “Rome’s Craftiest General: Scipio Africanus”
There’s something I can’t figure after reading the article and another account of Zama: If Scipio went out of his way to cultivate the Numidians just to have superiority in cavalry for that flanking option on which so much depended, did he just leave it to chance that his cavalry would return on time ? Could he have instructed at least his roman cavalry commander that his job was to turn and flank after seeing the enemy horse off the field ?
By WongHoongHooi on Jul 25, 2008 at 12:53 am
Once cavalry had been ‘fired’ at the enemy, commanders in the ancient world had great trouble getting them back for another shot. This would particularly apply to Rome where the cavalry were likely to be auxiliaries from some distant province and not Romans. The normal event saw cavalry charge through their enemy and then, in its rear, lay into the enemy’s baggage train for booty. William the Conqueror could work cavalry so as to regroup them for repeated charges but he was unusually talented, but his cavalry were knights with a stake in the outcome.
By Robert Griffiths on Aug 20, 2008 at 9:25 am
“There’s something I can’t figure after reading the article and another account of Zama: If Scipio went out of his way to cultivate the Numidians just to have superiority in cavalry for that flanking option on which so much depended, did he just leave it to chance that his cavalry would return on time ? Could he have instructed at least his roman cavalry commander that his job was to turn and flank after seeing the enemy horse off the field ?”
There are several answers to that question. One is simply that war is largely about luck and an experienced commander knows that. Another is that the cavalry’s job was in fact not to turn and flank. Rome never had a cavalry tradition and the best that could be hoped for was to chase away the enemy horse. Scipio could count on his infantry to win against enemy infantry one way or another but the enemy cavalry was a wild card that Romans had long found difficult. The Numidians returning and blindsiding the Cartheginians was in fact a bonus. Furthermore for him to tell the Numidian prince how to command cavalry or that his primary mission was to help Romans would go quite a ways against cultivating him. We do not in fact know what he told him along that line but it would have likly had all the awkward compromises involved in coalition warfare. Scipios Numidians in fact likly thought of Hannibals Numidians as their primary enemy and thought of the punic wars as a background for their local power struggles. Furthermore cavalry is notoriously hard to control and there are many instances of it charging to far.
I suspect that Scipio thought of his cavalry primarily as a counter to enemy cavalry which had been so deadly earlier in the war and relied primarily on his infantry which he was familiar with.
By jason taylor on May 4, 2009 at 1:04 pm
this is obly about one problem
By Alan on Oct 29, 2009 at 10:14 pm