Benjamin F. Taylor, last commanding officer of the 2nd Maryland, wrote his own account of events, which makes a case for his regiment providing the information that saved Pope’s army. After telling the story of the raid, Taylor noted that “our Colonel [Duryee] reported to General Reno between seven and eight o’clock a.m. by courier and in person before 10 a.m.” Drawing on Reno’s report of the unit’s action and Pope’s official report of the campaign, Taylor made a case for the importance of the raid. He presented first Reno’s report, then a lengthy portion of Pope’s report, the gist of which is that by the morning of August 18 Pope had become convinced that the newly reinforced Confederate army was assembling nearby.

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Taylor continued with the rest of Pope’s rationale for the withdrawal: “On the 18th of August it became apparent…that this advanced position…was no longer tenable in the face of the overwhelming forces of the enemy. I determined, accordingly, to withdraw behind the Rappahannock….I directed Major General Reno to send back his trains on the morning of the 18th, by the way of Stevensburg, to Kelly’s or Barnette’s [sic] Ford, and…then follow with his whole corps.”

That passage makes it clear that Pope’s decision was made on the morning of the 18th, which is a key point, as it is unlikely that a large cavalry force traveling 13 or more miles deep into Confederate territory would have been able to return to Union lines before 10 a.m. According to Taylor, the captured order did not reach Pope until sometime after 3 p.m. on August 18.

As additional evidence, Taylor included a letter from A.N. Wood, a sergeant in the 6th New York Cavalry. Wood “was present when the report of the 2nd Maryland’s expedition was dictated and written, about ten a.m.,” said Taylor. “Wood says the last sentence ‘The cavalry [Buford's] has not yet returned’ will ring in his ears through life. The clerk became a little mixed and the general had to repeat it. He also says the cavalry returned in the afternoon.

“This statement [Wood's] taken with the reports of Reno and Pope…indicate clearly the information obtained by the Second decided the retrograde movements of the army, the wisdom of which was later confirmed by the cavalry when they returned with J.E.B. Stuart’s adjutant general and General Lee’s order for attack.”

In light of the available information on Harter and his report, Taylor was mistaken in his conclusion, but his account establishes the timing of the decision and the fact that the captured order did not arrive in time.

Another account, written by Jacob Eugene Duryee, provides additional details of the raid. According to Duryee, the detachment left camp at 1 a.m. on the morning of the 18th. “The night was cloudy and very dark,” he wrote. “You could not see objects ten inches from you.” After crossing the Rappahannock at Raccoon Ford, the men climbed over a fence and, avoiding a road near the river, headed up the side of Clark’s Mountain. “By avoiding the road we met with many obstacles, mostly consisting of fences, and it was with difficulty that we made the march up the side of the mountain,” he wrote. The raiders had been ordered to attack the signal post at daylight, but it was sunrise when they captured it. By Duryee’s estimate, the time was 5:23 a.m. They spent about 20 minutes on the summit, and between 5:45 and 6 a.m. they began the march back to camp.

According to Duryee, their return journey went much more quickly than their march to the summit, since it was daylight and they found a ford that cut a mile off their march. “I am positive that the report of the engineer reached General Reno sometime before the detachment returned,” wrote Duryee. “For shortly after leaving the signal station the great importance of the information he had obtained, I knew was being anxiously awaited for by Genl. Reno. I therefore sent him ahead with an escort to make all possible haste to the headquarters of the General….I feel sure that the engineer was present when Gen. Reno dictated this report and the time was about 7:30 a.m.” He mentioned Taylor’s account and said that Taylor was incorrect in saying that he had reported to Reno by 10 a.m. “This should read 8 a.m. for about 10 a.m. the order from Gen. Pope had been issued for the retreat,” wrote Duryee. In another letter he stated that he was sure that “the reports of Topographical Engineer and myself of the skirmish were in Gen. Pope’s hands before 8 a.m.”

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