Pope now found himself in a grave situation. What he and his superiors in Washington most feared had occurred. Freed from the necessity of engaging Maj. Gen. George McClellan on the peninsula, the Confederates had moved swiftly to reinforce Lee’s army. Worse than that, Lee’s force was at that moment less than five miles from Reno’s headquarters, and the attack was set to begin that very day. Pope needed no prodding. Harter’s information was clear. There was no alternative; he must pull back his troops immediately or face destruction. The decision to fall back was probably a hard one for Pope, particularly given his public comments about not turning his back to his enemies. But that was the choice he took, and it was the correct one, as was made abundantly clear by reports from the 2nd Maryland Infantry and Montgomery and by Lee’s captured order.

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At about 10 a.m. on August 18, Pope ordered a full-scale retreat in the face of the enemy. He directed Reno to send his wagon trains toward Stevensburg by way of Kelly’s or Barnett’s fords. His whole corps would follow, and by night only cavalry would be left behind to screen the rear of the army.

At the same time that Pope’s orders for the withdrawal were sent out, Reno, drawing on Harter’s report as well as that of the 2nd Maryland, sent a dispatch to John Buford ordering him to make a cavalry scout: “The enemy are in strong force about 2 miles back of Clark’s Mountain, extending thence towards Raccoon Ford. I wish you to send a squadron of Cavalry near Raccoon Ford, and to scout from thence on the north side of the Rapidan as far as Germanna Ford. Let me hear as soon as your cavalry returns.”

The movement, ordered at 10 a.m., was underway by 1:30 p.m. After the withdrawal had begun, Pope informed his superior, General-in-Chief Henry Halleck, of his moves: “The enemy, heavily reinforced, is advancing on Raccoon Ford from Gordonsville, Louisa Court House and Hanover Junction. All the Richmond force has been thrown in this direction to turn my left….I have accordingly, in compliance with your instructions, started back all my trains to pass the Rappahannock tonight. My whole command will commence to fall back to that line.”

Meanwhile, Lee had been forced to postpone the attack from the 18th to the 20th because several of his units had not arrived at their assigned position. As Lee and his staff watched from atop Clark’s Mountain at midday on August 18, 1862, the Union camps looked quiet. But appearances were deceiving–the Union forces were preparing to withdraw. By midday on August 19 that truth was all too apparent.

Observing again from Clark’s Mountain as the last men and wagons of Pope’s Army of Virginia disappeared in ever shrinking clouds of dust into the Virginia countryside, Lee turned to Longstreet and said disappointedly, “General, we little thought that the enemy would turn his back upon us this early in the campaign.”

As the Union troops faded into the distance, the Confederate command had firm knowledge of only one reason for the withdrawal–the raid on Stuart’s signal station by the 2nd Maryland. J.K. Boswell, Jackson’s chief engineer, said of the raid, “On the morning of the 18th a body of the enemy drove our pickets from Clark Mountain, and found out the position of our troops, and on the 19th they commenced their retreat toward the Rappahannock.”

The race to Second Manassas was on. Clark’s Mountain would soon be forgotten, and the intelligence gathering that had served Pope so well would fail miserably. Nevertheless, the events surrounding Clark’s Mountain are instructive because they bring to light the enormous value of Union intelligence operations when conducted effectively, as well as providing a perfect example of why the writings of Civil War generals are not always to be trusted.

Taking Pope’s report at face value, it is easy to see how a misconception could arise. The report says that “the cavalry expeditions sent out on the 16th in the direction of Louisa Court House captured the adjutant-general of General Stuart, and was very near capturing that officer himself. Among the papers was an autograph letter of General Robert E. Lee to General Stuart, dated Gordonsville, August 13, which made manifest to me the position and force of the enemy and their determination to overwhelm the army under my command….”

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