Jackson was enthusiastic and wanted to attack as soon as possible. Longstreet, somewhat more cautious, suggested delaying the attack until the 18th. He also wanted to strike the Union right, where his forces would be able to use the foothills of the Blue Ridge Mountains to their advantage. Lee accepted the one-day delay but remained firm in his desire to attack the Union left.

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The orders were cut on August 16, and initial preparations and troop movements began. While Robert E. Lee’s forces began to move into position, Stuart ordered Fitzhugh Lee to have his cavalry in place near Raccoon Ford by Sunday night, August 17. The elder Lee knew that surprise would be the key to success in the attack, but unbeknown to him the secrecy of his movement had been compromised by a Union spy, Sergeant Thomas O. Harter of the 1st Indiana Cavalry, who had infiltrated the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia and marched with it toward Clark’s Mountain. Harter, dressed as a civilian, had been sent out in the direction of Staunton, Va., in late July but was arrested and sent to Richmond, where he gained his release by claiming that he had been looking for railroad work. Harter reached Gordonsville and fell in with the Confederate force on August 16, putting himself in a key position to learn the enemy’s plans.

On the morning of August 17, Stuart left Fitzhugh Lee’s cavalry, returned to Robert E. Lee’s headquarters near Orange Court House and then traveled to Verdiersville to await the cavalry, which would pass by on its way to Raccoon Ford. Meanwhile, Pope, hearing numerous reports that Confederate troops were moving up from Richmond, began worrying about an attack on his exposed left flank and took measures to determine what was occurring there. He temporarily placed Brig. Gen. John Buford’s cavalry brigade under the command of Jesse Reno and ordered him to “push his cavalry forward on the other side of the Rapidan” and to “use spies and scouts, without regard to expense, to keep yourself constantly advised of everything in your front as far as possible.”

In response, Reno dispatched the 1st Michigan and 5th New York Cavalry regiments on a scouting mission in the direction of Raccoon Ford and Louisa Court House. Leaving their camp south of Stevensburg at midday on the 17th, the Union horsemen crossed the Rapidan at Raccoon Ford, which had been left unpicketed, and headed toward Verdiersville.

While awaiting the cavalry’s return (and no doubt spurred on by the skirmishing that had taken place earlier with Confederate cavalrymen along the Rapidan), Reno summoned Lt. Col. Jacob Eugene Duryee of the 2nd Maryland Infantry to his headquarters tent late in the afternoon of the 17th. He ordered Duryee to take 250 of his men and raid a Confederate signal operation atop Clark’s Mountain early the next morning.

“A topographical engineer will accompany you and if possible find out the enemy’s position and strength,” said Reno. As Duryee was leaving, Reno stepped from his tent, pointed to Clark’s Mountain and said: “Young man, when you reach the top you will be a damned sight nearer the rebel army than your own, so look out. The rebel pickets have been exchanging shots with our troops along the Rapidan this afternoon.” Little did Reno realize the full truth of his words, for those Rebel pickets were in fact the cavalry screen for the Confederate army hidden just behind the mountain. Leaving camp at 1 a.m., the detachment from the 2nd Maryland slipped out of camp, crossed the Rapidan at Raccoon Ford and began making its way to the summit of the mountain.

The morning of August 18 dawned with the Union troops at rest in their camps, unaware that almost the entire Confederate army was less than five miles away. In the Confederate camps near Clark’s Mountain, the soldiers anticipated orders at any moment to cross the Rapidan and attack. At Verdiersville, Stuart and his staff waited for Fitzhugh Lee’s cavalry to arrive so that the attack could begin. On Clark’s Mountain, the 2nd Maryland detachment was about to attack the mounted troops manning the Confederate signal station.

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