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Persian Gulf War: U.S. Marines’ Minefield Assault

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Initially, the marine general had planned to have Myatt’s division clear paths through the minefields, then allow Keys’ more powerful Second Division to pass through their lines and lead the attack. But neither Boomer nor his commanders liked that idea. ‘Any passing of lines under combat conditions is a horribly complicated evolution. And the thought of a division-size passage — with troops and vehicles strung out for miles, vulnerable to artillery — really made me uneasy,’ the First MEF commander recalled. With more mine-clearing equipment provided by Israel and the Tiger Brigade available, Boomer accepted Keys’ proposal for his division to make its own breach of the Iraqi barriers. Schwarzkopf, who had allowed Boomer great freedom in planning his attack, also approved the new plan.

The leeway Schwarzkopf gave Boomer was a reflection of the Desert Shield commander’s view that the marines’ assault was intended to fix the Iraqi army’s attention on the Kuwaiti border, not to be the main battle. The main attack, in northern Kuwait and southern Iraq, would be by the U.S. Army’s Seventh Corps far to the west. It was set to start twenty-four hours after the marines’ assault began.

The two marine division commanders devised different plans for breaching the minefields, but with similar goals. The First Division would use Task Forces Grizzly and Taro to protect the main assault forces — Ripper and Papa Bear — which would conduct their own breaches. The Second Division would rely on artillery and air cover to defend against counterattacks and assigned only one regiment — the Sixth Marines — to make their breaches. Each of the regiment’s three battalions would cut a single lane. The desire in both cases was to move through the minefields quickly. ‘We were concerned about speed, and building momentum going north, to get through those two obstacle belts, because the worst thing that could happen was to get trapped between them,’ Myatt said.

Moving closer to the Kuwaiti border, most of the Marines left behind their tents and sleeping bags, only to suffer through surprisingly wet and frigid nights. The ground war initially was set to start on February 22, but Boomer asked for a delay in the hope of getting better weather to allow full use of the vital marine air support. The weather, however, did not improve, and in a situation similar to what General Dwight D. Eisenhower had faced on the eve of D-Day in 1944, Schwarzkopf decided to attack despite the poor conditions. ‘We fought the ground campaign over the worst four flying days of the whole war,’ Moore, the marine air commander, later complained. ‘General Schwarzkopf and every weather guy in Southwest Asia promised 72 hours of good weather, but we probably didn’t get 72 minutes.’

Corporal David Jackson, a radio operator with Grizzly, recalled that the task force’s marines felt ‘a lot of excitement and some confusion’ but ‘not a lot of fear’ about their mission: ‘People asked me if I was afraid. The honest answer was `no.’ Our battalion had trained so hard….By the time we got to the Gulf, we really were family.’

Corporal Eroshevich recollected a more fatalistic reaction among the marines of Task Force Taro. ‘We all looked at each other and said, `Well, it was nice knowing you,” he recalled. ‘This was pretty much a Nintendo war. But we were going to walk 30 miles and go through a minefield on hands and knees.’ And Taro’s commander, Admire, knew his unit faced a daunting task: ‘It would be clandestine, with no armor, no tractors, or artillery. We were literally going to walk across that minefield.’

The First Division began its move into Kuwait on February 18, when Myatt sent reconnaissance teams across the border to look for paths through the first minefield for Taro and Grizzly. The scouts located a clear route in Taro’s sector, but could not find one for Grizzly. Even so, Fulks marched Grizzly into Kuwait shortly after midnight on the twenty-second, stopping most of the regiment just south of the mines, where they could see the minefield but could not be observed by anyone on the other side of the barriers. The marines dug two-man fighting holes and used slight depressions in the desert and camouflage nets to mask their vehicles. Meanwhile, Fulks’ scouts resumed the search for an opening through the mines.

After daylight, the Iraqis apparently became aware of the marines’ presence and fired poorly aimed artillery at them. Return fire from the marines’ 155mm howitzers back at the border, however, quickly silenced the enemy guns. Iraqi tanks then approached Grizzly’s position, and Fulks had to withdraw, covering his movement with artillery and air attacks.

Taro began its long walk into enemy-held territory that evening. Both task forces had a number of vehicles loaded with radios or carrying TOW missiles or other heavy weapons. And in a throwback to pre-mechanized times, some marines pulled four-wheel handcarts loaded with equipment. Most of the marines marched into Kuwait, carrying heavy loads of their personal gear and extra ammunition.

Eroshevich called the trek ‘the most grueling physical experience of my life. Each of us carried over 100 pounds of equipment and our ammo for 30 kilometers.’ The fire team leader’s load consisted of his own gear, including chemical protective suit and gas mask, his M-16 rifle, and three bandoliers of ammunition. In addition, Eroshevich carried a vest with ten 40mm grenades for his M-203 gunner, a two-hundred-round magazine for his team’s M249 squad automatic weapon (SAW), and two 60mm mortar rounds. Some men also carried night vision goggles, telephones, and extra barrels for the machine guns. ‘The guys I really felt sorry for were the Dragon [anti-tank rocket] gunners and the machine-gunners,’ Eroshevich said. (Each Dragon weighed fifty pounds, while an SAW weighed fifteen and an M-60 light machine gun twenty-six.) When the marines started to march from the border, Eroshevich recalled that ‘we had to help each other stand up. I thought: `There’s no way in hell I’m going to make this.”

The unusually cold and damp weather may have prevented the heavily burdened marines from overheating during the strenuous march. But when they stopped, the cold cut through their sweaty clothes and chilled them. The only casualty of the potentially dangerous movement was a young marine killed by an accidental hand-grenade blast. By midnight, Taro had reached the edge of the minefield and then hurried to get into defensive cover before daylight. Most of the marines then dug fighting holes into which they squeezed, knees against their chests. They remained in the tight foxholes all day.

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  1. 16 Comments to “Persian Gulf War: U.S. Marines’ Minefield Assault”

  2. I was a gunner on gun 1 for A 1/11. I’m finding it hard to find any detailed facts on our unit. I do know that my gun was the only Gun to direct fire while in Kuwait. I think it was about 1300 meters. I was on the site and our battery commander I think Cpt. Hughes was giving me the directive while looking through binos and he and the rest of the gun section fired 5 HE Shells ducking in between shots because the small force was firing at us. I beleive they were using M60’s and 50 cals. Where is the best place to find more info on this. Also I was honorably discharged when we returned and I heard my gun section recieved bronze stars. I was the one on the site and wondered if they were rewarded a bronze star would I be entitled to one as well? Thanks for your time, Semper Fi

    By Ken Adams on Jul 22, 2008 at 4:11 pm

  3. I was a member of the 1st “Tiger” Brigade of the might “Hell on Wheels” division. I consider it a privilege to have served with the Marines(2nd Marine Division), and our accomplishments are now taught at military schools and have created a standard of how to integrate the services in modern warfare. I am proud to have served my country, and would do it again it. Semper Fi+Hell on Wheels=Swift victory. Huah!

    By Patrick Devolder on Jul 23, 2008 at 3:16 pm

  4. Nice article about TF Taro. TF X-Ray A/1/3 was part of Taro but was issued a FRAGO to conduct the only Helicopter Borne Assault Operation of the Gulf War for the Marine Corps. Twice conducting assaults into oilfields with CAT Teams and inflicting destruction on die-hard Iraqi vehicles and receiving small arms fire at the second oil field. Storming Kuwait International Airport with Close Air Support from Cobras and French Gazelles.

    It was an amazing experience as a LCPL and M249 SAW gunner with the burden of lugging over 150lbs worth of combat gear, to include an extra crate of grenades for the squad.

    CPT Rodriguez
    US Army
    Semper Fi and Rangers Lead The Way!

    By Rod on Jul 28, 2008 at 2:57 am

  5. I was a member of 2nd Reconnaissance Bn. during the first Gulf War. We deployed numerous teams into Kuwait days before the ground assault began. We would walk all night then dig holes and stay in them all day. We remained inside Kuwait for six days and then humped all the way back to the Saudi border in one night.

    By David Clark on Aug 23, 2008 at 11:33 pm

  6. I was part of the Marine Team that planned the mine field clearing. They left out that we had to designe saddels on the AAV’s to carry all the pvc pipe to fill the Huge tank ditches in front of both mine fields all well carrying 1500lbs of C4 plus all the other explosives we had to use to clear obsticals on the way to the airport. All in an AAV the a 22cal. can penitrate. Semper Fi.

    By Tony Warren on Aug 24, 2008 at 1:39 pm

  7. I was a member of Task Force Ripper, o341. C Co 1st Bttln 7th MAR DIV wpns plt. Semper Fi brothers.

    By Brent Imker on Sep 19, 2008 at 10:30 am

  8. I was a member of Task Force Grizzly.

    3/7 – We lost 2 Marines (KIA)
    Lcpl. Brian Lane
    Lcpl. Christian Porter.
    14 wounded(WIA).

    Semper Fi Brothers

    http://www.taskforcegrizzly.org

    By Kauffman on Oct 9, 2008 at 11:07 pm

  9. As a gunner on Capt. A. Hart’s M1A1 the Crusader, we were fortuneate enough the fire the first shotin the “Reveille Engagement”. I wish that we could have ended things then.
    Semper Fi,
    Lee Fowble
    Co. B 2ndPlt. 4th Tk.Bn.

    By Lee Fowble on Nov 25, 2008 at 12:25 am

  10. It was my pleasure to be amongst the distinguished company of such Marine heros. I miss you all; RIP LCpl’s Lane and Porter, you will forever be remembered.

    I will always cherish and miss my days as a Marine grunt (0311) with Kilo Company, 3rd Battalion 7th Marines.

    God Bless you all and Semper Fidelis

    By James Flores on Jan 9, 2009 at 1:27 am

  11. I was with 3/7 Wpns Co Dragons attached to L Co. I stayed in upon our return (88-01) but never served with a finer group of Marines and friends “brothers”

    Semper Fi
    MAGTF 4-90

    By Scott Kerrick on Jan 14, 2009 at 10:03 pm

  12. I was with Charlie Co., 2nd LAI Bn. We were four days in country and battle hard by the time the “ground offensive” started.

    I could not have served under a better commanding officer: Captain James Amidon! There couldn’t be a finer set of military men than those that I was able to serve with.

    Semper Fi!

    Mark Reece
    Sergeant

    By Mark Reece on Jan 28, 2009 at 12:05 am

  13. I was the Company Commander of Co I, 3/7 the lead element into Kuwait. LCpl Brian Lane was a member of our company and well respected. LCpl Christian Porter was carrying our gear in his 5 ton. We miss you Marines. You will never be forgotten!
    Semper fi
    John Foldberg
    LtCol USMC (ret)

    By John Foldberg on Feb 22, 2009 at 8:38 pm

  14. I was on a TOW hummer originally a part of TOW Co, 1st Tank Battalion, 1st MarDiv. Our platton was put on the berm with 3d Marines hours before the berm crossing. I distinctly recall a Captain asking for any NCO’s on our vehicle. There were none…just two LCpl’s…JP Wilson and myself. He instructed us to us to keep in touch with a bunch of 0351’s that would be following us in a vehicle with no radio. We were on the far left flank of the wedge and were to bound out 500 meters, scan for enemy, and signal back to our rear with a red lens…..maintaining radio silence. It was such a cluster…..I recall looking back across the movement through our thermal and seeing nothing but red…all Marines marching. We decided we weren’t flashing a damn thing at a locked and loaded USMC infantry battalion.
    Lots more to the story….but I am glad I found this recap..I was less than 5o0 yards away when the hummer got hit by the HARM. We were in front of it and over a rise…saw the flash and heard the explosion.

    By Rich Wright on Feb 26, 2009 at 11:21 pm

  15. I served with the 1st Tiger Brigade (B Company, 3/41 Infantry) during Operations Desert Shield / Storm. I’m proud to have served with my unit and with the 2nd Mar Div. No other Army unit worked side by side with another branch like we did. I have since caught up with some of the Marines that conducted the breech going into Kuwait and met one Marine that helped clear the lane that I went through. It was both an honor and a privelage to have served with my Marine brothers. “Straight and Stalwart”, “Hell on Wheels” and “Semper Fi”.

    By Kevin Williams on Mar 18, 2009 at 10:08 pm

  16. Came to 3/7 H & S as the Religious Program Specialist right before we went over the burm. Was only with the battalion for less than a month, but will always be a part of the unit. Was Chaplain Mark Gefaller’s bodyguard and have the utmost respect for everyone from 3/7. We went through alot in only a short amount of time. Have never forgotten LCPL Christian Porter or LCPL Brian Lane! Brothers forever!

    Semper Fi
    RPSN Mike Parsons

    By Mike Parsons on May 4, 2009 at 9:07 pm

  17. I served in Alpha Battery, 1st Div. 11th Marines (A1/11). I was suprised to see the above post by Ken Adams on Jul 22, 2008 at 4:11 pm asking about the direct fire our unit was involved in. I to have been looking for more information about this. Ken, If you ever see this, I hope that you get the same credit your gun mates got. I was right there with John Maher making a drop for the guns when this all went down and we returned fire. From the historical point I wonder why this part of history has gone unspoken of? Last, our CO was Cpt. McCarthy, who was followed by Cpt. Hughes after the war. Both are good men and even better Marines. Semper Fi to the Marines of 1991’s A 1/11 and all Marines to follow…

    By David Oaks on May 6, 2009 at 5:41 pm

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