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Operation Saar A Lost Opportunity - September '99 World War II FeatureWorld War II | Single Page | one comment | Print This Post | Email This Post The French army certainly had the strength to move on Kaiserslautern. Along the entire German border, 85 French divisions stood against 34 Nazi divisions. Of those German divisions, all but 11 were reserve units. The French, however, were unaware of the favorable balance of forces. Furthermore, the French generally were unsupportive of another European war, and the morale of the army was at an all-time low. Subscribe Today
French civilians were not pleased with the prospect of another war so close to France. World War I had nearly destroyed an entire generation and irreparably disrupted French society. There was also the matter of the devastation that would be wrought on French towns near the combat zone. French territory near the Saar had been virtually untouched at the end of World War I because the area was then part of Germany and distant from the Verdun, Somme and Argonne killing grounds. As a result, few of the homes, factories, mines, roads and bridges in the Saar region suffered any damage. Now that France's frontier had moved eastward, it seemed likely that this area was in a position to become devastated by war. The day the French army marched into Germany, the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) landed in France. Although the British military was not quite ready to take on the Wehrmacht, British leaders were eager for some sort of action. Winston Churchill, then head of the British Admiralty, proposed floating mines down the Rhine River. The French, however, protested that the Germans would retaliate and blast the Seine River bridges. In the British House of Commons there was equal hesitancy to aggressively conduct the war. When it was suggested that the Black Forest be bombed to create uncontrollable fires in Germany, British Secretary of State for Air Sir Kingsley Wood protested on the grounds that such attacks would be perpetrated against private property. Additionally, French Premier Eduard Daladier requested that the British Royal Air Force (RAF) refrain from bombing Germany. It was fast becoming a gentlemen's war, with the Germans operating as such out of operational necessity and the French out of timidity. Unlike the mass-produced machines of the Luftwaffe, French aircraft were virtually hand assembled and in short supply, though they were still formidable in the hands of experienced pilots. The French air force was prohibited from flying missions into Germany despite its capabilities. Had French military leaders realized that the Luftwaffe was wholly involved in the east, the Anglo-French air effort might have been more aggressive. In the west, the Luftwaffe was limited to a few antiquated fighters, many of which were biplanes. The bulk of Messerschmitt Me-109 fighters available were based in the north, protecting the industrial Ruhr and naval facilities. The greatest amount of aerial activity during the period, which came to be known as the "Phony War," was conducted by Germans flying reconnaissance missions. Throughout what most of the German high command viewed as a crisis in the Saar, Hitler surprisingly maintained a "wait and see" attitude. Generally appearing unconcerned with the activity in the west, Hitler was actually curious as to French conduct. He wanted to test whether the Siegfried Line could withstand an all-out attack. Additionally, in the event of a French move toward the Ruhr through Luxembourg or Belgium, he had some concern whether a German counterattack by forces returning from Poland could eject the French from German soil. Somewhat gleefully, Hitler saw the Saar incursion as provocation for operations in the west. Hitler's curious attitude toward events was evidenced on September 7, when he appointed General Kurt Freiherr von Hammerstein commander of Army Detachment A, an ad hoc force for the defense of the Siegfried Line. In selecting Hammerstein, who was overdue for retirement and given no real authority over his forces, Hitler ensured that there would be no German initiative in the threatened sectors. Hitler believed that the French had attacked where the Westwall was the strongest, and he realized the French had failed to capture one major German town or do battle with German units despite their territorial gains. So meekly threatened was Saarbrücken, the industrial hinge of the Saar, that the mills and factories continued to operate. The only shots taken at Saarbrücken were made by telephoto camera lenses in Maginot outposts on hills dominating the city. Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6
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