The Maginot Line supplemented existing fortifications opposite Germany and was particularly strong in the Saarbrücken-Metz corridor, the most direct route to Paris. In Alsace-Lorraine the Maginot Line took 10 years to build at a cost of $323 million. The main fortifications were completed in 1935, and 300,000 soldiers garrisoned them.

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As with most defensive contingencies, the Maginot mentality focused on the concrete barrier as a security blanket. Much of the line’s firepower, however, was negated because operations in Germany placed targets outside the effective range of the heavy artillery. To be of any use at all, the Maginot guns would have to be moved forward. With World War I experiences like the bloody defense at Verdun fresh in their minds, the French were reluctant to vacate the fortifications in favor of headlong attacks against Germany’s Siegfried Line.

Construction of the Westwall, or Siegfried Line as it was popularly named by the Allies, began in 1936 following Germany’s uncontested military occupation of the Rhineland. Forts and pillboxes extended from the Swiss frontier to the Netherlands. The heaviest fortifications were constructed around Saarbrücken, where some French Maginot outposts sat only 100 meters from the German border. As the hub of the defense, industrial Saarbrücken was militarily significant because it was the gate to the Kaiserslautern Gap, a traditional invasion route.

The Kaiserslautern Gap led directly to the city of Worms, on the Rhine River. Realizing the importance of this route through the Saar, the Germans arrayed their Westwall defenses three belts deep. The first line was scattered on both sides of the Saar River and consisted of anti-tank obstacles and scattered bunkers, pillboxes and irregular patterns of minefields. Wherever possible, fortifications were built into existing factories and smelting facilities. The heaviest concentration of mines and booby traps was found in this line.

The second belt of defenses dotted the Hunsrück, a series of highlands extending eastward almost to the Rhine, forming a natural barrier to the heart of Germany. In this rugged terrain, the second belt required fewer anti-tank obstacles. The greatest concentration of individual defenses was clustered around roads, railroads and trails leading into the hills. The Hünsruck belt contained more positions for heavy artillery and held more command bunkers.

The third Westwall defensive band was 20 kilometers farther east and consisted of scattered bunkers and concrete emplacements around existing military installations at Landstuhl and Ramstein. This band constituted the last defense before Kaiserslautern.

Unlike its expensive French neighbor, the Siegfried Line was not a continuous line of forts. Although it was designed to provide mutually supporting fire, there were far too many gaps in the defensive positions. By 1939, only 30 percent of the planned defenses were complete. Further complicating completion was the transfer of responsibility for the Siegfried Line from the army to the highway ministry. Much of the Siegfried Line was built in such haste that many bunkers and pillboxes were placed improperly. National Socialist Labor Corps units constructed bunkers and tank traps with abandon. Most consideration was given to areas closer to main roads, where they were afforded easy access. In a 1938 tour of the frontier forts, Hitler was impressed by the number of pillboxes visibly dotting the hills. The truth, however, was that dozens of other natural corridors were overlooked in favor of those that could be viewed by high-ranking Nazi officials.

Prior to the invasion of Poland, the German army had little difficulty providing soldiers for the Siegfried Line since the defense of the German western frontier was a priority during Hitler’s acquisition of Austria and Czechoslovakia. Operations in Poland, however, required a substantial effort, and Westwall fortress units were absorbed into regular army units. The hollow Westwall left the Kaiserslautern Gap virtually defenseless.

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