After 1965, air power was deployed in South Vietnam to increase the effectiveness of field artillery. Although the 26th Marines possessed 30 artillery pieces as well as tanks and recoilless rifles, the fact that the base could only be supplied by air limited Marine ability to saturate the Khe Sanh area with artillery-delivered munitions. It was air power that would raise the flood of firepower to Niagara-sized dimensions.

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Khe Sanh had top-priority claim on all U.S. air assets in Southeast Asia. B-52s, personally directed by Westmoreland from the Saigon MACV combat operations center, came from Guam, Thailand and Okinawa. Marine and Air Force fighter-bombers provided support from bases in South Vietnam, and Navy aviators from Task Force 77 flew sorties from aircraft carriers in the South China Sea. The VNAF and U.S. Army aviation also provided aerial support. From B-52s, originally designed for high-altitude strategic delivery of nuclear weapons, to propeller-driven Douglas A-1 Skyraiders, aircraft from the entire spectrum of American aircraft were deployed to support the 26th Marines at Khe Sanh.

Air representatives worked with their artillery counterparts in the FSCC. Requests for air support were channeled through the Tactical Air Direction Center of the 1st Marine Air Wing (MAW) at Da Nang. If the 1st MAW could not fill a quota, liaison teams from other services were called upon for their support. At times the sky over Khe Sanh was said to resemble a giant beehive. Upon arrival, aircraft were normally directed into a holding pattern until a ground controller or ground radar operator was free to direct the strike. Often holding patterns extended upward to 35,000 feet, with dozens of aircraft corkscrewing their way downward as each flight delivered its ordnance and departed the Khe Sanh airspace. A pilot might be directed to a succession of holding points, only to end up with his fuel expended and his full load of ordnance still on board. If the pilot ran out of fuel before his turn came to deliver a strike, he was forced to jettison his bombs and return to base.

In February 1968, about 77 percent of the Navy carrier sorties planned against North Vietnam were redirected against targets around Khe Sanh due to clouds that enveloped the North Vietnam airspace. One naval aviator who attacked the NVA trench system said the detonation of his 1,000-pound delayed-action bomb resembled a volcano eruption. After U.S. air support collapsed 50 meters of trench, the NVA abandoned building assault positions in the area.

Close air support was sometimes employed against targets close to friendly troops. Tactical air controllers in light airplanes or helicopters maintained communications between strike pilots and troops on the ground, and fighter-bombers were over at Khe Sanh around the clock. The controller made a marking run by firing a smoke rocket or throwing a colored smoke grenade at the target to be attacked. When the strike pilot saw the smoke, dummy passes were made until the controller was satisfied the jets were lined up on the proper target. Bombing runs were executed and short corrections were made via radio until all ordnance was expended. The tactical air controller would then fly over the target to record the effectiveness of the strike, and battle damage assessments were relayed to the departing aircraft.

During bad weather, ground-controlled radar bombing was employed. Radar controllers operated from a heavily reinforced bunker that contained fragile computer equipment and the TPQ-10 radar used to guide aircraft to their target. This radar emitted a beam that locked onto the aircraft. Using targeting data acquired from the FSCC, the controller programmed the computer with information on enemy position, ballistic characteristics of the ordnance, wind speed and direction and other relevant data. At a predetermined release point, the controller instructed the pilot to release his bombs. In specially equipped aircraft such as the twin-engine Marine Grumman A-6 Intruder, bombs could be released automatically by the ground controller. Marine controllers routinely directed strikes as close as 500 meters to friendly positions. The Air Force liaison officer felt strikes could be conducted to within 50 meters in case of emergency. Marine pilots flew 7,078 sorties and delivered 17,015 tons of ordnance in defense of Khe Sanh, while U.S. Air Force tactical aircraft made 9,691 sorties and delivered 14,223 tons of munitions.

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