The likes of Lloyd Clark may chose to dismiss such analysis as "conventional thinking", but one is only left to conclude, "conventional" or not, the idea of giving resources to the commander in the field best poised to exploit opportunity at least a product of "thinking", as opposed to idle revisionism unsupported by a contemporary assessment of the facts on-the-ground then-existing. At its best, Market-Garden a gamble, whereas Third Army, by dent of performance alone, the prudent instrument to achieve the stated Allied global objective– unconditional German surrender, and sooner as opposed to even an hour later. Patton himself observed in August 1944 as Third Army began its final thrust before running out of fuel with the German army collapsing in front of it, "it is such a sure thing that I fear someone will stop it". That "someone" would be Ike and the "something" helping to suck Third Army resource-dry would be Market-Garden.

Having said that there were other reasons for the failure of the operation besides General Montgomery. These are summed up in three books i would regard as essential reading for anyone interested in Market garden.

'The failure of Browning togive the 82nd U.S. Airborne division a greater priority in capturing the bridge at Nijmegen. This comes only just behing the weakness of the airplan in importance. (Martin Middlebrook, "Arnhem 1944 The Airborne battle, P444)

.. The same voice that had so firmly said to Roy Urquhart ' Arnhem Bridge. And hold it' said toJames gavin G.O.C. of the U.S. 82nd Airborne division,' The Groesbeek Heights. Nijmegen Bridge later."
('A drop too many",Major General John Frost, P242)

The whole of Chapter 3 of "The battle for the Rhine", by Robin Neillands (may he rest in peace). The difficulty I have always had is that the delay in taking the Nijmegen bridge was the last straw in the operation – remember that 2Para was tasked to hold the bridge at Arnhem for two days and actually held it for four. Even allowing for any so called delays "to drink tea" XXX Corps arrived in Nijmegen almost on schedule, and had they passed straight over the bridge, they would have been advancing up the Arnhem road which was only lightly held at the time.

I would like to ask whether the German Army, which unleashed the 'Battle of the Bulge" in December 1944 would have just stood by, while the British and Americans developed the salient.. I don't think so.

Personally I think the resources squandered here would have been better used to secure the approaches to Antwerp. They were almost completely unguarded at the time, and Antwerp – the second largest port in Europe – had been captured almost intact at the time. It wasn't until Monty decided to give his troops a 7-week rest after Market-Garden that the Wehrmacht managed to filter troops back into the approaches to the port, on Hitler's orders. Obviously in a strategic sense, Hitler had more sense than Montgomery or Eisenhower.

Viewing things in retrospect is always easy, its much harder to be on the spot and make these live and death decisions.

Before Market Garden the allies had allowed several thousand German troops trapped West of Antwerp to escape and reinforce the troops available to oppose initial British drive to Eindhoven. The Dutch also discussed how they had war gamed attacking along the highway between Nimagen and Arnhem with the British and how difficult this was. The British had made up their minds already, the Dutch underground also warned the British that the German Tank Units were in the Arnhem area, all of this crucial information was ignored and dismissed.

The performance of the Allied Airborne Forces was beyond heroic, they were unable to overcome the fatal flaws and assumptions made by the military leaders who proposed Market Garden.