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	<title>Comments on: Operation Market Garden Reconsidered</title>
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		<title>By: Zack Taylor</title>
		<link>http://www.historynet.com/operation-market-garden-reconsidered.htm/comment-page-1#comment-58707</link>
		<dc:creator>Zack Taylor</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 05 May 2009 17:04:22 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">#comment-58707</guid>
		<description>The many colors are distracting, so hintedy hint hint...</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The many colors are distracting, so hintedy hint hint&#8230;</p>
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		<title>By: Gerald Upton</title>
		<link>http://www.historynet.com/operation-market-garden-reconsidered.htm/comment-page-1#comment-48147</link>
		<dc:creator>Gerald Upton</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2009 23:21:03 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">#comment-48147</guid>
		<description>Of course the British XXX Corps tankers stopped for tea.  The attitude of any large organization is always set by the leaders at the top, and when did Monty every do anything in a hurry.

Personally I think the resources squandered here would have been better used to secure the approaches to Antwerp.  They were almost completely unguarded at the time, and Antwerp - the second largest port in Europe - had been captured almost intact at the time.  It wasn&#039;t until Monty decided to give his troops a 7-week rest after Market-Garden that the Wehrmacht managed to filter troops back into the approaches to the port, on Hitler&#039;s orders.  Obviously in a strategic sense, Hitler had more sense than Montgomery or Eisenhower.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Of course the British XXX Corps tankers stopped for tea.  The attitude of any large organization is always set by the leaders at the top, and when did Monty every do anything in a hurry.</p>
<p>Personally I think the resources squandered here would have been better used to secure the approaches to Antwerp.  They were almost completely unguarded at the time, and Antwerp &#8211; the second largest port in Europe &#8211; had been captured almost intact at the time.  It wasn&#039;t until Monty decided to give his troops a 7-week rest after Market-Garden that the Wehrmacht managed to filter troops back into the approaches to the port, on Hitler&#039;s orders.  Obviously in a strategic sense, Hitler had more sense than Montgomery or Eisenhower.</p>
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		<title>By: J Kenneday</title>
		<link>http://www.historynet.com/operation-market-garden-reconsidered.htm/comment-page-1#comment-40063</link>
		<dc:creator>J Kenneday</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 08 Mar 2009 06:21:18 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">#comment-40063</guid>
		<description>Market Garden , if succesful, could have been a serious blow to the Germans. But to be succesful it needed so much to go right that taken overall it was bound that something would go wrong and make a mess of it.

Viewing things in retrospect is always easy, its much harder to be on the spot and make these live and death decisions.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Market Garden , if succesful, could have been a serious blow to the Germans. But to be succesful it needed so much to go right that taken overall it was bound that something would go wrong and make a mess of it.</p>
<p>Viewing things in retrospect is always easy, its much harder to be on the spot and make these live and death decisions.</p>
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		<title>By: Cole Stone</title>
		<link>http://www.historynet.com/operation-market-garden-reconsidered.htm/comment-page-1#comment-40021</link>
		<dc:creator>Cole Stone</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 08 Mar 2009 03:51:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">#comment-40021</guid>
		<description>I wonder what veterans of the operation have to say about the performance of their superior officers.  I worked with a man from the 82nd and he refused to talk about it.  He would only say that they used us as canon fodder for someone&#039;s pipe dream.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I wonder what veterans of the operation have to say about the performance of their superior officers.  I worked with a man from the 82nd and he refused to talk about it.  He would only say that they used us as canon fodder for someone&#039;s pipe dream.</p>
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		<title>By: Jeff Williamson</title>
		<link>http://www.historynet.com/operation-market-garden-reconsidered.htm/comment-page-1#comment-33962</link>
		<dc:creator>Jeff Williamson</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 14 Feb 2009 19:31:11 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">#comment-33962</guid>
		<description>In my opinion Market Garden failed for a multitude of reasons,  The operation seemed to be based upon the assumption that the Germans were incapable of fighting back.   Critics in the book a Bridge Too Far pointed out several flaws with the plan, including Paratroops were dropped too far from the bridges to have the element of surprise.   At Arnhem one British officer had volunteered to land a glider force on the south bank of the Rhine (similar to Pegusus Bridge in Normandy).   At Arnhem the British failed to make use of the ferry that crossed the Rhine at Osterbrook and refused to accept the help of the Dutch underground.

Before Market Garden the allies had allowed several thousand German troops trapped West of Antwerp to escape and reinforce the troops available to oppose initial British drive to Eindhoven.   The Dutch also discussed how they had war gamed attacking along the highway between Nimagen and Arnhem with the British and how difficult this was.    The British had made up their minds already, the Dutch underground also warned the British that the German Tank Units were in the Arnhem area, all of this crucial information was ignored and dismissed.   

The performance of the Allied Airborne Forces was beyond heroic, they were unable to overcome  the fatal flaws and assumptions made by the military leaders who proposed Market Garden.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In my opinion Market Garden failed for a multitude of reasons,  The operation seemed to be based upon the assumption that the Germans were incapable of fighting back.   Critics in the book a Bridge Too Far pointed out several flaws with the plan, including Paratroops were dropped too far from the bridges to have the element of surprise.   At Arnhem one British officer had volunteered to land a glider force on the south bank of the Rhine (similar to Pegusus Bridge in Normandy).   At Arnhem the British failed to make use of the ferry that crossed the Rhine at Osterbrook and refused to accept the help of the Dutch underground.</p>
<p>Before Market Garden the allies had allowed several thousand German troops trapped West of Antwerp to escape and reinforce the troops available to oppose initial British drive to Eindhoven.   The Dutch also discussed how they had war gamed attacking along the highway between Nimagen and Arnhem with the British and how difficult this was.    The British had made up their minds already, the Dutch underground also warned the British that the German Tank Units were in the Arnhem area, all of this crucial information was ignored and dismissed.   </p>
<p>The performance of the Allied Airborne Forces was beyond heroic, they were unable to overcome  the fatal flaws and assumptions made by the military leaders who proposed Market Garden.</p>
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		<title>By: Charles Dishno</title>
		<link>http://www.historynet.com/operation-market-garden-reconsidered.htm/comment-page-1#comment-25202</link>
		<dc:creator>Charles Dishno</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 02 Jan 2009 18:29:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">#comment-25202</guid>
		<description>Good for you, Terry &amp; Jim!
I never thought Montgomery was worth much except to brew tea. It is good for history to point out what a dud he reallly was.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Good for you, Terry &amp; Jim!<br />
I never thought Montgomery was worth much except to brew tea. It is good for history to point out what a dud he reallly was.</p>
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		<title>By: Jim C</title>
		<link>http://www.historynet.com/operation-market-garden-reconsidered.htm/comment-page-1#comment-23939</link>
		<dc:creator>Jim C</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 27 Dec 2008 09:28:51 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">#comment-23939</guid>
		<description>The overall responsibility for the failure of Market Garden falls on Montgomery.  His lack of detailed planing and active leadership allowed others to make poor decisions to cause the failure of this operation.
These included:
Allowing the drop zones in Arnhem to be placed so far from the town.  Ignoring the reorts of armor in the Arnhem area.  Allowing Brereton to make the dicision to have only one drop on day one (he thought it would be too taxing on the fly boys to make two drops the first day) all contributed the the failure of the operation.  Montgomery had a great idea, but failed to follow though as a leader.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The overall responsibility for the failure of Market Garden falls on Montgomery.  His lack of detailed planing and active leadership allowed others to make poor decisions to cause the failure of this operation.<br />
These included:<br />
Allowing the drop zones in Arnhem to be placed so far from the town.  Ignoring the reorts of armor in the Arnhem area.  Allowing Brereton to make the dicision to have only one drop on day one (he thought it would be too taxing on the fly boys to make two drops the first day) all contributed the the failure of the operation.  Montgomery had a great idea, but failed to follow though as a leader.</p>
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		<title>By: Terry M</title>
		<link>http://www.historynet.com/operation-market-garden-reconsidered.htm/comment-page-1#comment-18379</link>
		<dc:creator>Terry M</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 21 Nov 2008 23:21:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">#comment-18379</guid>
		<description>Montgomery told Eisenhower he could do it in the allotted time. Since when did Montgomery EVER hurry. The British stopped for tea! Their infanty advanced in skirmish lines at walking speed! The tanks kept to the main road, ignoring the shoulders...there was enough for 3-vehicles across, but they were afraid the shoulders where mined....a jeep carrying some correspondents were driving on the shoulder overtaking the traffic...no mines anywhere. At the end of the day, they shut down...no patrols sent out to  see up the road.
Meanwhile, Montgomery was miles back, not issuing orders, but getting ready for the Rhine crossings.
Pah!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Montgomery told Eisenhower he could do it in the allotted time. Since when did Montgomery EVER hurry. The British stopped for tea! Their infanty advanced in skirmish lines at walking speed! The tanks kept to the main road, ignoring the shoulders&#8230;there was enough for 3-vehicles across, but they were afraid the shoulders where mined&#8230;.a jeep carrying some correspondents were driving on the shoulder overtaking the traffic&#8230;no mines anywhere. At the end of the day, they shut down&#8230;no patrols sent out to  see up the road.<br />
Meanwhile, Montgomery was miles back, not issuing orders, but getting ready for the Rhine crossings.<br />
Pah!</p>
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		<title>By: Wayne Gilliland</title>
		<link>http://www.historynet.com/operation-market-garden-reconsidered.htm/comment-page-1#comment-14244</link>
		<dc:creator>Wayne Gilliland</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 17 Oct 2008 23:31:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">#comment-14244</guid>
		<description>?There were so many blatant problems with this operation the allies faced before
the first Airborne troupe jumped out of an airplane that someone in charge of the
various sections should have raised a red flag.  Everyone in command was
convinced that the Germans were done, that they chose to ignore the fact that the
Germany Army still had more than two million me in uniform, their armor was still
superior, and their best Commands were in charge of the western front.
	They had several mid and junior ranked officers not just tell them, but at
times yelling, “Hey Look at This!”, but they were ignored.  Montgomery never
would admit that he was wrong about anything.  Most of his subordinates were
too eager to agree with him.
	Of all the generals in Europe at that time only Patton objected, but he, as
so often, was ignored and told that Montgomery had priority.
	From day one, there were not enough support aircraft.  Although with
enough time and coordination with other western operation, these assets could
have been attained.  The path chosen was without room to maneuver tanks and
troupes the size of this operation.  No one could communicate within their
command nor with other commands, including their Headquarters!  Since they
could not communicate with air support, they’re resupply was not going to
happen.
	All of the troupes performed their duties without fault.  The FAILURE of
Market-Garden rest squarely on the shoulders of Command.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>?There were so many blatant problems with this operation the allies faced before<br />
the first Airborne troupe jumped out of an airplane that someone in charge of the<br />
various sections should have raised a red flag.  Everyone in command was<br />
convinced that the Germans were done, that they chose to ignore the fact that the<br />
Germany Army still had more than two million me in uniform, their armor was still<br />
superior, and their best Commands were in charge of the western front.<br />
	They had several mid and junior ranked officers not just tell them, but at<br />
times yelling, “Hey Look at This!”, but they were ignored.  Montgomery never<br />
would admit that he was wrong about anything.  Most of his subordinates were<br />
too eager to agree with him.<br />
	Of all the generals in Europe at that time only Patton objected, but he, as<br />
so often, was ignored and told that Montgomery had priority.<br />
	From day one, there were not enough support aircraft.  Although with<br />
enough time and coordination with other western operation, these assets could<br />
have been attained.  The path chosen was without room to maneuver tanks and<br />
troupes the size of this operation.  No one could communicate within their<br />
command nor with other commands, including their Headquarters!  Since they<br />
could not communicate with air support, they’re resupply was not going to<br />
happen.<br />
	All of the troupes performed their duties without fault.  The FAILURE of<br />
Market-Garden rest squarely on the shoulders of Command.</p>
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		<title>By: Tracy Wichmann</title>
		<link>http://www.historynet.com/operation-market-garden-reconsidered.htm/comment-page-1#comment-2984</link>
		<dc:creator>Tracy Wichmann</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 22 Jul 2008 20:57:13 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">#comment-2984</guid>
		<description>The requirment for a harbor to support the massive flow of supplies needed for a march into Germany probably seduced Eisenhower into accepting Montgomery&#039;s plan. When first formulated the plan was probably good but anybody with good judgement would not permit a massive air drop without a rehersal where glitches like incompatable radios could be discovered. As time passed the reconnaisance showed larger German forces than anticipated, including armor. Only a fool general does not believe his own intelligence. Montgomery was so enchanted with the idea of command of such a large force he quickly dismissed this intelligence. 

I also think that Gavin should have been believed. It is better to take higher casualaties and drop nearer to the objective bridges. This is particualrly compelling considering that only one third of the parachute force could be deployed at a time. 

That it was a defeat is clear when one observes that it was indeed a German victory because they were able to delay the use of the Harbor for many valuable months.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The requirment for a harbor to support the massive flow of supplies needed for a march into Germany probably seduced Eisenhower into accepting Montgomery&#039;s plan. When first formulated the plan was probably good but anybody with good judgement would not permit a massive air drop without a rehersal where glitches like incompatable radios could be discovered. As time passed the reconnaisance showed larger German forces than anticipated, including armor. Only a fool general does not believe his own intelligence. Montgomery was so enchanted with the idea of command of such a large force he quickly dismissed this intelligence. </p>
<p>I also think that Gavin should have been believed. It is better to take higher casualaties and drop nearer to the objective bridges. This is particualrly compelling considering that only one third of the parachute force could be deployed at a time. </p>
<p>That it was a defeat is clear when one observes that it was indeed a German victory because they were able to delay the use of the Harbor for many valuable months.</p>
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