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Operation Market Garden ReconsideredBy Lloyd Clark | World War II | Single Page | 11 comments | Print This Post | Email This Post Numerous ad hoc German battle groups immediately saw the advantage in severing this crucial artery and converged on it in attempts to destroy its bridges. "German machine gun and rifle fire cut through us," recalled Donald R. Burgett of the American Company A, 1st Battalion, 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment, which took part in the storming of the Wilhelmina Canal crossing at Son soon after landing. "Several men were hit but we continued on. We covered the ground quickly. Just a few yards to go and the bridge would be ours.…I was staring at the bridge when it suddenly erupted in a flash of flame and black smoke. The air was shattered by one hell of an explosion and the shock scattered those of us who were close to it like rag dolls." Subscribe Today
XXX Corps had found it difficult to gain any momentum from the outset, and the destruction of the bridge at Son slowed them even further. German pressure on the highway increased as the days passed, undeterred by the British flanking corps, which was struggling to make progress. As one American rifleman from the 101st Airborne who had been wounded trying to keep the corridor open wrote to his parents: "Our combat experience started out very easy, but got worse and worse as it went along, until finally on the day I was hit, the Germans counterattacked with vicious artillery support and raised six kinds of hell with us. I was wounded just in time to escape the worst of it." These attacks stretched the airborne forces dangerously thin at times but they failed to permanently cut the highway. "Apparently the enemy had insufficient troops to force a decisive action," Capt. Robert H. Evans, a company commander in the 327th Glider Infantry, later wrote. "With many small forces, he hit the corridor at several points almost simultaneously. If an action was not almost immediately successful, the units were withdrawn to strike again at another point." This gave the airborne troops some respite, and XXX Corps staggered on toward Arnhem. British armor eventually crossed the Wilhelmina Canal on the morning of September 19 after a Bailey bridge had been constructed, only to find that the American 82nd Airborne Division had been unable at the same time as intended to seize the road and railroad bridges at the town of Nijmegen from men of the 10th SS Panzer Division. The 82nd Airborne had been asked to achieve too much with too little. Its commander, General Gavin, had wanted to storm across the wide Waal River in strength on the opening day, but with other objectives pressing, his one "spare" battalion instead conducted the abortive attack. "I was deeply troubled by the possibility of failing to accomplish some of my objectives," Gavin later admitted. "The perimeter of our endeavors would extend beyond twenty-five miles with the likelihood of major battles being fought at several different points simultaneously." On the afternoon of the next day, September 20, the 3rd Battalion of the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment finally stormed across the Waal and seized the Nijmegen bridges. It was a perilous endeavor. As the Guards Armoured Division aimed a barrage of artillery and mortar fire against the Waal's opposite shore, twenty-six heavily laden small boats took to the river. "German small-arms fire began to intercept the fragile flotilla," Gavin recalled. "Never having rowed together, the troopers sometimes worked against each other, and the boats were spinning in the river. The German firing steadily increased, heavy artillery fire joining the machine-gun and mortar-fire.…There were many individual acts of courage, many casualties." The Anglo-American forces' success that afternoon concluded with the tanks of the Grenadier Guards rolling across the road bridge. However, with night falling, unreconnoitered ground ahead, and a serious lack of fuel and ammunition, the armor was forced to halt—just eight miles from the Lower Rhine. The attack was resumed at dawn, but for the dwindling band of British airborne troops at Arnhem bridge who had gallantly been holding on since September 17, it was too late: within a few hours, German forces overran them. Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Tags: 20th - 21st Century, Airborne Operations, Historical Conflicts, World War II
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11 Comments to “Operation Market Garden Reconsidered”
Sir, To say that Market Garden had positive results would be like blaming gravity for all the plane crashes in history. Or to say that Stalins cannon fodder POW's were effective against the Wermacht. NOT Useless use of combat infantrymen.
By Cliff Spicer on Jul 2, 2008 at 3:12 pm
The requirment for a harbor to support the massive flow of supplies needed for a march into Germany probably seduced Eisenhower into accepting Montgomery's plan. When first formulated the plan was probably good but anybody with good judgement would not permit a massive air drop without a rehersal where glitches like incompatable radios could be discovered. As time passed the reconnaisance showed larger German forces than anticipated, including armor. Only a fool general does not believe his own intelligence. Montgomery was so enchanted with the idea of command of such a large force he quickly dismissed this intelligence.
I also think that Gavin should have been believed. It is better to take higher casualaties and drop nearer to the objective bridges. This is particualrly compelling considering that only one third of the parachute force could be deployed at a time.
That it was a defeat is clear when one observes that it was indeed a German victory because they were able to delay the use of the Harbor for many valuable months.
By Tracy Wichmann on Jul 22, 2008 at 4:57 pm
?There were so many blatant problems with this operation the allies faced before
the first Airborne troupe jumped out of an airplane that someone in charge of the
various sections should have raised a red flag. Everyone in command was
convinced that the Germans were done, that they chose to ignore the fact that the
Germany Army still had more than two million me in uniform, their armor was still
superior, and their best Commands were in charge of the western front.
They had several mid and junior ranked officers not just tell them, but at
times yelling, “Hey Look at This!”, but they were ignored. Montgomery never
would admit that he was wrong about anything. Most of his subordinates were
too eager to agree with him.
Of all the generals in Europe at that time only Patton objected, but he, as
so often, was ignored and told that Montgomery had priority.
From day one, there were not enough support aircraft. Although with
enough time and coordination with other western operation, these assets could
have been attained. The path chosen was without room to maneuver tanks and
troupes the size of this operation. No one could communicate within their
command nor with other commands, including their Headquarters! Since they
could not communicate with air support, they’re resupply was not going to
happen.
All of the troupes performed their duties without fault. The FAILURE of
Market-Garden rest squarely on the shoulders of Command.
By Wayne Gilliland on Oct 17, 2008 at 7:31 pm
Montgomery told Eisenhower he could do it in the allotted time. Since when did Montgomery EVER hurry. The British stopped for tea! Their infanty advanced in skirmish lines at walking speed! The tanks kept to the main road, ignoring the shoulders…there was enough for 3-vehicles across, but they were afraid the shoulders where mined….a jeep carrying some correspondents were driving on the shoulder overtaking the traffic…no mines anywhere. At the end of the day, they shut down…no patrols sent out to see up the road.
Meanwhile, Montgomery was miles back, not issuing orders, but getting ready for the Rhine crossings.
Pah!
By Terry M on Nov 21, 2008 at 7:21 pm
The overall responsibility for the failure of Market Garden falls on Montgomery. His lack of detailed planing and active leadership allowed others to make poor decisions to cause the failure of this operation.
These included:
Allowing the drop zones in Arnhem to be placed so far from the town. Ignoring the reorts of armor in the Arnhem area. Allowing Brereton to make the dicision to have only one drop on day one (he thought it would be too taxing on the fly boys to make two drops the first day) all contributed the the failure of the operation. Montgomery had a great idea, but failed to follow though as a leader.
By Jim C on Dec 27, 2008 at 5:28 am
Good for you, Terry & Jim!
I never thought Montgomery was worth much except to brew tea. It is good for history to point out what a dud he reallly was.
By Charles Dishno on Jan 2, 2009 at 2:29 pm
In my opinion Market Garden failed for a multitude of reasons, The operation seemed to be based upon the assumption that the Germans were incapable of fighting back. Critics in the book a Bridge Too Far pointed out several flaws with the plan, including Paratroops were dropped too far from the bridges to have the element of surprise. At Arnhem one British officer had volunteered to land a glider force on the south bank of the Rhine (similar to Pegusus Bridge in Normandy). At Arnhem the British failed to make use of the ferry that crossed the Rhine at Osterbrook and refused to accept the help of the Dutch underground.
Before Market Garden the allies had allowed several thousand German troops trapped West of Antwerp to escape and reinforce the troops available to oppose initial British drive to Eindhoven. The Dutch also discussed how they had war gamed attacking along the highway between Nimagen and Arnhem with the British and how difficult this was. The British had made up their minds already, the Dutch underground also warned the British that the German Tank Units were in the Arnhem area, all of this crucial information was ignored and dismissed.
The performance of the Allied Airborne Forces was beyond heroic, they were unable to overcome the fatal flaws and assumptions made by the military leaders who proposed Market Garden.
By Jeff Williamson on Feb 14, 2009 at 3:31 pm
I wonder what veterans of the operation have to say about the performance of their superior officers. I worked with a man from the 82nd and he refused to talk about it. He would only say that they used us as canon fodder for someone's pipe dream.
By Cole Stone on Mar 7, 2009 at 10:51 pm
Market Garden , if succesful, could have been a serious blow to the Germans. But to be succesful it needed so much to go right that taken overall it was bound that something would go wrong and make a mess of it.
Viewing things in retrospect is always easy, its much harder to be on the spot and make these live and death decisions.
By J Kenneday on Mar 8, 2009 at 3:21 am
Of course the British XXX Corps tankers stopped for tea. The attitude of any large organization is always set by the leaders at the top, and when did Monty every do anything in a hurry.
Personally I think the resources squandered here would have been better used to secure the approaches to Antwerp. They were almost completely unguarded at the time, and Antwerp – the second largest port in Europe – had been captured almost intact at the time. It wasn't until Monty decided to give his troops a 7-week rest after Market-Garden that the Wehrmacht managed to filter troops back into the approaches to the port, on Hitler's orders. Obviously in a strategic sense, Hitler had more sense than Montgomery or Eisenhower.
By Gerald Upton on Mar 31, 2009 at 7:21 pm
The many colors are distracting, so hintedy hint hint…
By Zack Taylor on May 5, 2009 at 1:04 pm