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Operation Market Garden ReconsideredBy Lloyd Clark | World War II | 11 comments | Print This Post | Email This Post Obviously the planners did not pay sufficient respect to the enemy; this was what made men like Sosabowski and Urquhart question the wisdom of the operation. Yet, with heavy hitters such as Churchill, Gen. George C. Marshall (the U.S. Army chief of staff), Eisenhower, Montgomery, Brereton, and Browning all behind Market Garden, it attained unstoppable momentum. Subscribe Today
In fact, the Germans were increasingly capable of undermining the Allied plan. One reason for this was the presence of so many extremely able senior commanders in and around the Market Garden area. These included Field Marshal Walther Model, commander of Army Group B, who had recently sited his headquarters in Oosterbeek alongside one of the British 1st Airborne Division’s intended routes to Arnhem. Model had helped to create growing order out of the chaos of early September and was in the process of reinforcing his front. One of his new formations was the First Parachute Army, commanded by the skillful Gen. Kurt Student, which had its headquarters just off the main Eindhoven–Nijmegen highway. Bittrich’s panzer corps was located just twenty-five miles from Arnhem. All three men had developed contingency plans for an Allied attack and ensured that they could counter quickly. The Allied operation began the morning of September 17, with spectacularly successful daylight insertions of the airborne troops accurately hitting their drop zones and landing zones that afternoon. Yet their very success actually assisted the German response from the start. Because the troops weren’t scattered, the Germans could easily pinpoint where they had hit the ground and make a quick deduction of the likely objectives of the Allied operation. Troops from some SS units that were about to board a train back to Germany for reorganization were summarily stopped and turned around. “Now we immediately received weapons,” SS Cpl. Paul Müller remembers. “Everyone got a rifle and ninety rounds of ammunition which was stuffed into our pockets or haversacks, because we no longer had our ammunition pouches, steel helmets, or entrenching tools.” Meanwhile, local field commanders did what they could to stall the Allied airborne forces. SS Maj. Sepp Krafft sent his under-strength SS Panzer Grenadier Training and Reserve Battalion, which had been exercising in the woods near the British drop and landing zones, to immediately block routes into Arnhem. One of the British units they stopped was the reconnaissance squadron, which had sped off by jeep to capture the bridge at Arnhem ahead of the rest of the 1st Parachute Brigade, approaching on foot. Trooper Arthur Barlow recalled what happened when his vehicle came under German machine gun fire: “[We] ran to the road verge on the right hand side of the jeep.…The heavy machine gun fire continued. Minns, being more exposed, had his hip shattered and other wounds, and lay in the road bleeding profusely, calling for help. Thomas was hit in the foot, whilst Hasler was hit in both legs and unable to move.…[McGregor] raised himself up on his hands to have a look around and died immediately, falling flat on his face without making a sound, killed by a burst of machine-gun fire in the face and chest.” The success of Krafft’s defensive enterprise meant that only a small force of 720 airborne soldiers managed to get through to Arnhem bridge (see related story,“They Stood to Their Guns,” p. 62). Urquhart’s prospects never recovered from this early blow, and the majority of his division eventually became isolated and surrounded miles from the bridge. One of the most obvious weaknesses in the Market Garden plan was XXX Corps’s reliance on a single road—“Hell’s Highway,” as the American 101st Airborne Division called it. Indeed, Maj. Freddie Hennessy, the operations officer of the Guards Armoured Division, which was in the vanguard of the push up the road, compared advancing sixty-four miles on a narrow highway over several major water crossings to “threading seven needles with one piece of cotton, and we only have to miss one to be in trouble.” Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Tags: 20th - 21st Century, Airborne Operations, Historical Conflicts, World War II
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11 Comments to “Operation Market Garden Reconsidered”
Sir, To say that Market Garden had positive results would be like blaming gravity for all the plane crashes in history. Or to say that Stalins cannon fodder POW’s were effective against the Wermacht. NOT Useless use of combat infantrymen.
By Cliff Spicer on Jul 2, 2008 at 3:12 pm
The requirment for a harbor to support the massive flow of supplies needed for a march into Germany probably seduced Eisenhower into accepting Montgomery’s plan. When first formulated the plan was probably good but anybody with good judgement would not permit a massive air drop without a rehersal where glitches like incompatable radios could be discovered. As time passed the reconnaisance showed larger German forces than anticipated, including armor. Only a fool general does not believe his own intelligence. Montgomery was so enchanted with the idea of command of such a large force he quickly dismissed this intelligence.
I also think that Gavin should have been believed. It is better to take higher casualaties and drop nearer to the objective bridges. This is particualrly compelling considering that only one third of the parachute force could be deployed at a time.
That it was a defeat is clear when one observes that it was indeed a German victory because they were able to delay the use of the Harbor for many valuable months.
By Tracy Wichmann on Jul 22, 2008 at 4:57 pm
?There were so many blatant problems with this operation the allies faced before
the first Airborne troupe jumped out of an airplane that someone in charge of the
various sections should have raised a red flag. Everyone in command was
convinced that the Germans were done, that they chose to ignore the fact that the
Germany Army still had more than two million me in uniform, their armor was still
superior, and their best Commands were in charge of the western front.
They had several mid and junior ranked officers not just tell them, but at
times yelling, “Hey Look at This!”, but they were ignored. Montgomery never
would admit that he was wrong about anything. Most of his subordinates were
too eager to agree with him.
Of all the generals in Europe at that time only Patton objected, but he, as
so often, was ignored and told that Montgomery had priority.
From day one, there were not enough support aircraft. Although with
enough time and coordination with other western operation, these assets could
have been attained. The path chosen was without room to maneuver tanks and
troupes the size of this operation. No one could communicate within their
command nor with other commands, including their Headquarters! Since they
could not communicate with air support, they’re resupply was not going to
happen.
All of the troupes performed their duties without fault. The FAILURE of
Market-Garden rest squarely on the shoulders of Command.
By Wayne Gilliland on Oct 17, 2008 at 7:31 pm
Montgomery told Eisenhower he could do it in the allotted time. Since when did Montgomery EVER hurry. The British stopped for tea! Their infanty advanced in skirmish lines at walking speed! The tanks kept to the main road, ignoring the shoulders…there was enough for 3-vehicles across, but they were afraid the shoulders where mined….a jeep carrying some correspondents were driving on the shoulder overtaking the traffic…no mines anywhere. At the end of the day, they shut down…no patrols sent out to see up the road.
Meanwhile, Montgomery was miles back, not issuing orders, but getting ready for the Rhine crossings.
Pah!
By Terry M on Nov 21, 2008 at 7:21 pm
The overall responsibility for the failure of Market Garden falls on Montgomery. His lack of detailed planing and active leadership allowed others to make poor decisions to cause the failure of this operation.
These included:
Allowing the drop zones in Arnhem to be placed so far from the town. Ignoring the reorts of armor in the Arnhem area. Allowing Brereton to make the dicision to have only one drop on day one (he thought it would be too taxing on the fly boys to make two drops the first day) all contributed the the failure of the operation. Montgomery had a great idea, but failed to follow though as a leader.
By Jim C on Dec 27, 2008 at 5:28 am
Good for you, Terry & Jim!
I never thought Montgomery was worth much except to brew tea. It is good for history to point out what a dud he reallly was.
By Charles Dishno on Jan 2, 2009 at 2:29 pm
In my opinion Market Garden failed for a multitude of reasons, The operation seemed to be based upon the assumption that the Germans were incapable of fighting back. Critics in the book a Bridge Too Far pointed out several flaws with the plan, including Paratroops were dropped too far from the bridges to have the element of surprise. At Arnhem one British officer had volunteered to land a glider force on the south bank of the Rhine (similar to Pegusus Bridge in Normandy). At Arnhem the British failed to make use of the ferry that crossed the Rhine at Osterbrook and refused to accept the help of the Dutch underground.
Before Market Garden the allies had allowed several thousand German troops trapped West of Antwerp to escape and reinforce the troops available to oppose initial British drive to Eindhoven. The Dutch also discussed how they had war gamed attacking along the highway between Nimagen and Arnhem with the British and how difficult this was. The British had made up their minds already, the Dutch underground also warned the British that the German Tank Units were in the Arnhem area, all of this crucial information was ignored and dismissed.
The performance of the Allied Airborne Forces was beyond heroic, they were unable to overcome the fatal flaws and assumptions made by the military leaders who proposed Market Garden.
By Jeff Williamson on Feb 14, 2009 at 3:31 pm
I wonder what veterans of the operation have to say about the performance of their superior officers. I worked with a man from the 82nd and he refused to talk about it. He would only say that they used us as canon fodder for someone’s pipe dream.
By Cole Stone on Mar 7, 2009 at 10:51 pm
Market Garden , if succesful, could have been a serious blow to the Germans. But to be succesful it needed so much to go right that taken overall it was bound that something would go wrong and make a mess of it.
Viewing things in retrospect is always easy, its much harder to be on the spot and make these live and death decisions.
By J Kenneday on Mar 8, 2009 at 3:21 am
Of course the British XXX Corps tankers stopped for tea. The attitude of any large organization is always set by the leaders at the top, and when did Monty every do anything in a hurry.
Personally I think the resources squandered here would have been better used to secure the approaches to Antwerp. They were almost completely unguarded at the time, and Antwerp – the second largest port in Europe – had been captured almost intact at the time. It wasn’t until Monty decided to give his troops a 7-week rest after Market-Garden that the Wehrmacht managed to filter troops back into the approaches to the port, on Hitler’s orders. Obviously in a strategic sense, Hitler had more sense than Montgomery or Eisenhower.
By Gerald Upton on Mar 31, 2009 at 7:21 pm
The many colors are distracting, so hintedy hint hint…
By Zack Taylor on May 5, 2009 at 1:04 pm