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Operation Market Garden ReconsideredBy Lloyd Clark | World War II | 11 comments | Print This Post | Email This Post “I told my staff that General Eisenhower wants the airborne army used in mass,” Brereton later said. “He believes that if it is used that way the effect on morale of the Germans would be devastating.” But that vision proved impossible to fulfill. Although fifteen hundred transports and five hundred tug-glider combinations were available, that was less than half the number required to move all the troops in one operation. Maj. Gen. Paul Williams, head of the American IX Troop Carrier Command, quickly determined that the airborne divisions would have to be inserted in three lifts spread over three days. Subscribe Today
This decision had massive ramifications for Browning’s lightly armed troops because it meant it would dilute the attacking forces, a situation exacerbated by the need for some of the first arriving troops to defend the drop zones and landing zones for subsequent lifts. To make matters worse, with so much air traffic rumbling over the battlefield on both resupply missions and ongoing airlifts, no ground-attack missions could be flown during these times for fear of aerial collision. Williams also vetoed any drop zones or landing zones that he believed would put his aircraft in “unnecessary” danger of being engaged by enemy antiaircraft fire. This led, in the worst case, to the British 1st Airborne Division’s being forced to land between six and eight miles from its main objective. The unintended net result of the air plan, therefore, was the destruction of the primary advantage of speed and surprise an airborne operation offered, while giving the Germans and the weather greater opportunity to undermine it. (Indeed, the situation would worsen two days into the operation, when inclement weather spread the airlifts from three days to five.) “They used to make a beautiful airborne plan,” Brigadier John “Shan” Hackett, commander of the British 4th Parachute Brigade, sardonically observed after the war, “and then add the fighting-the-Germans bit afterwards.” Browning’s divisional commanders had concerns about the plan from the outset. But they recognized that airborne warfare was inherently risky and felt confident their superiors would not let them down. Even so, they could not help ruminating on the potential for a strong German reaction to the landings. The bridge at Arnhem spanned what was to Germany a psychological as well as a physical barrier—the Rhine. Sosabowski in particular feared a flexible, speedy, and strong response, saying, “The British are not only grossly underestimating German strength in the Arnhem area, but they seem ignorant of the significance Arnhem has for the Fatherland.” The mission planners consistently put the best possible interpretation on disturbing intelligence coming from both the Dutch underground and Ultra decrypts of German communications. When Maj. Brian Urquhart, chief intelligence officer at Browning’s headquarters, presented photographic evidence of enemy armor in the Arnhem area, Browning reassured Urquhart that he “should not worry unduly, that the reports were probably wrong, and that in any case the Germans troops were refitting and not up to much fighting.” Even so, divisional commanders were aware of the quantity of German troops and armored vehicles they were likely to face on landing, contrary to conventional historical views. But they were not told vital details about the quality of those troops, nor were they told to expect their rapid reinforcement. Maj. Gen. Roy Urquhart, for example, was accurately told that in his sector it was unlikely that “any [enemy] mobile force larger than a brigade group with very few tanks and guns could be concentrated against the airborne troops before relief by the ground forces.” But because he was not entitled to receive detailed Ultra intelligence, he was not told what his superiors did know: that a significant part of this force was from Lt. Gen. Willi Bittrich’s professional and experienced II SS Panzer Corps. Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Tags: 20th - 21st Century, Airborne Operations, Historical Conflicts, World War II
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11 Comments to “Operation Market Garden Reconsidered”
Sir, To say that Market Garden had positive results would be like blaming gravity for all the plane crashes in history. Or to say that Stalins cannon fodder POW’s were effective against the Wermacht. NOT Useless use of combat infantrymen.
By Cliff Spicer on Jul 2, 2008 at 3:12 pm
The requirment for a harbor to support the massive flow of supplies needed for a march into Germany probably seduced Eisenhower into accepting Montgomery’s plan. When first formulated the plan was probably good but anybody with good judgement would not permit a massive air drop without a rehersal where glitches like incompatable radios could be discovered. As time passed the reconnaisance showed larger German forces than anticipated, including armor. Only a fool general does not believe his own intelligence. Montgomery was so enchanted with the idea of command of such a large force he quickly dismissed this intelligence.
I also think that Gavin should have been believed. It is better to take higher casualaties and drop nearer to the objective bridges. This is particualrly compelling considering that only one third of the parachute force could be deployed at a time.
That it was a defeat is clear when one observes that it was indeed a German victory because they were able to delay the use of the Harbor for many valuable months.
By Tracy Wichmann on Jul 22, 2008 at 4:57 pm
?There were so many blatant problems with this operation the allies faced before
the first Airborne troupe jumped out of an airplane that someone in charge of the
various sections should have raised a red flag. Everyone in command was
convinced that the Germans were done, that they chose to ignore the fact that the
Germany Army still had more than two million me in uniform, their armor was still
superior, and their best Commands were in charge of the western front.
They had several mid and junior ranked officers not just tell them, but at
times yelling, “Hey Look at This!”, but they were ignored. Montgomery never
would admit that he was wrong about anything. Most of his subordinates were
too eager to agree with him.
Of all the generals in Europe at that time only Patton objected, but he, as
so often, was ignored and told that Montgomery had priority.
From day one, there were not enough support aircraft. Although with
enough time and coordination with other western operation, these assets could
have been attained. The path chosen was without room to maneuver tanks and
troupes the size of this operation. No one could communicate within their
command nor with other commands, including their Headquarters! Since they
could not communicate with air support, they’re resupply was not going to
happen.
All of the troupes performed their duties without fault. The FAILURE of
Market-Garden rest squarely on the shoulders of Command.
By Wayne Gilliland on Oct 17, 2008 at 7:31 pm
Montgomery told Eisenhower he could do it in the allotted time. Since when did Montgomery EVER hurry. The British stopped for tea! Their infanty advanced in skirmish lines at walking speed! The tanks kept to the main road, ignoring the shoulders…there was enough for 3-vehicles across, but they were afraid the shoulders where mined….a jeep carrying some correspondents were driving on the shoulder overtaking the traffic…no mines anywhere. At the end of the day, they shut down…no patrols sent out to see up the road.
Meanwhile, Montgomery was miles back, not issuing orders, but getting ready for the Rhine crossings.
Pah!
By Terry M on Nov 21, 2008 at 7:21 pm
The overall responsibility for the failure of Market Garden falls on Montgomery. His lack of detailed planing and active leadership allowed others to make poor decisions to cause the failure of this operation.
These included:
Allowing the drop zones in Arnhem to be placed so far from the town. Ignoring the reorts of armor in the Arnhem area. Allowing Brereton to make the dicision to have only one drop on day one (he thought it would be too taxing on the fly boys to make two drops the first day) all contributed the the failure of the operation. Montgomery had a great idea, but failed to follow though as a leader.
By Jim C on Dec 27, 2008 at 5:28 am
Good for you, Terry & Jim!
I never thought Montgomery was worth much except to brew tea. It is good for history to point out what a dud he reallly was.
By Charles Dishno on Jan 2, 2009 at 2:29 pm
In my opinion Market Garden failed for a multitude of reasons, The operation seemed to be based upon the assumption that the Germans were incapable of fighting back. Critics in the book a Bridge Too Far pointed out several flaws with the plan, including Paratroops were dropped too far from the bridges to have the element of surprise. At Arnhem one British officer had volunteered to land a glider force on the south bank of the Rhine (similar to Pegusus Bridge in Normandy). At Arnhem the British failed to make use of the ferry that crossed the Rhine at Osterbrook and refused to accept the help of the Dutch underground.
Before Market Garden the allies had allowed several thousand German troops trapped West of Antwerp to escape and reinforce the troops available to oppose initial British drive to Eindhoven. The Dutch also discussed how they had war gamed attacking along the highway between Nimagen and Arnhem with the British and how difficult this was. The British had made up their minds already, the Dutch underground also warned the British that the German Tank Units were in the Arnhem area, all of this crucial information was ignored and dismissed.
The performance of the Allied Airborne Forces was beyond heroic, they were unable to overcome the fatal flaws and assumptions made by the military leaders who proposed Market Garden.
By Jeff Williamson on Feb 14, 2009 at 3:31 pm
I wonder what veterans of the operation have to say about the performance of their superior officers. I worked with a man from the 82nd and he refused to talk about it. He would only say that they used us as canon fodder for someone’s pipe dream.
By Cole Stone on Mar 7, 2009 at 10:51 pm
Market Garden , if succesful, could have been a serious blow to the Germans. But to be succesful it needed so much to go right that taken overall it was bound that something would go wrong and make a mess of it.
Viewing things in retrospect is always easy, its much harder to be on the spot and make these live and death decisions.
By J Kenneday on Mar 8, 2009 at 3:21 am
Of course the British XXX Corps tankers stopped for tea. The attitude of any large organization is always set by the leaders at the top, and when did Monty every do anything in a hurry.
Personally I think the resources squandered here would have been better used to secure the approaches to Antwerp. They were almost completely unguarded at the time, and Antwerp – the second largest port in Europe – had been captured almost intact at the time. It wasn’t until Monty decided to give his troops a 7-week rest after Market-Garden that the Wehrmacht managed to filter troops back into the approaches to the port, on Hitler’s orders. Obviously in a strategic sense, Hitler had more sense than Montgomery or Eisenhower.
By Gerald Upton on Mar 31, 2009 at 7:21 pm
The many colors are distracting, so hintedy hint hint…
By Zack Taylor on May 5, 2009 at 1:04 pm