North Vietnamese Army’s 1972 Eastertide Offensive
By James K. Moore

Vietnam  | 2 comments  |  Print This Post  |  Email This Post

The untested 3rd Division units, trained only for dealing with enemy infiltration, were not psychologically prepared to handle the massed-artillery fire upon their positions, let alone to face the waves of enemy tanks. Key units, particularly the command and logistical units in the rear, panicked and broke at the first explosions of enemy artillery. Especially painful was the poor performance of the ARVN artillery batteries located along the series of hilltops and firebases south of the DMZ. Given the task of providing critically needed fire support and counterbattery missions, the Vietnamese gunners took shelter against the NVA artillery instead of remaining at their guns. The low overcast weather initially precluded any effective South Vietnamese or American air support, so the only fire support came from a U.S. destroyer located a few miles off the coast in the Gulf of Tonkin.

By the second day of Nguyen Hue, the situation along the DMZ was critical. The general confusion and the tendency of the ARVN field commanders to downplay their bad fortune led both South Vietnamese and U.S. senior military officials in Saigon initially to dismiss the invasion across the DMZ as a diversionary attack and to believe that the real thrust of the anticipated North Vietnamese offensive would occur in the Central Highlands farther south.

By April 2, the NVA had overrun all of the DMZ firebases and turned their sights next toward the provincial capital of Quang Tri. With South Vietnamese forces in full retreat, critical intelligence on the route and disposition of NVA forces was lost, forcing the U.S. Air Force to maintain continuous air coverage over the 3rd Division’s entire area of operation. Following a series of small clashes on the outskirts of Quang Tri on April 27, the North Vietnamese launched a multi-pronged drive against the Dong Ha-Quang Tri area.

The lack of South Vietnamese aggressiveness up to this point produced a lull on the battlefield, allowing the NVA to reorganize their forces and replace the heavy losses they had sustained from U.S. airstrikes. The NVA took advantage of the bad flying weather to strike when tactical air power would be least effective. Following an artillery and mortar barrage, the North Vietnamese took Dong Ha on April 28, forcing the South Vietnamese defenders to retreat into the Quang Tri citadel. There, the ARVN continued their defensive actions while airmen took advantage of clearing skies to mount concentrated airstrikes — as many as 200 sorties per day.

The next day, the equivalent of four NVA divisions mounted their final advance on Quang Tri. In the face of massive artillery attacks (over 4,500 rounds fell on the city in one day) and tank-supported infantry attacks, the South Vietnamese defenders broke and ran, leaving substantial quantities of weapons and supplies intact. The green 56th Regiment surrendered to the Communists, forcing its two American advisers to make their escape by helicopter.

On May 1, in the face of the NVA onslaught, all South Vietnamese military forces abandoned Quang Tri. Communist troops then continued to move farther south, putting themselves in a position to threaten Hue from the west and southwest. The contingent of South Vietnamese Marines sharing the defense of Quang Tri had withdrawn in an orderly fashion, but the 3rd ARVN Division completely fell apart during the retreat.

While allied tactical air pounded the NVA positions to great effect, the South Vietnamese forces, led by a proven commander, General Ngo Quang Troung, reorganized around Hue and launched several successful spoiling attacks against Communist forces poised to move on the old capital city. The North Vietnamese did make several drives on Hue in later May, the most notable taking place on May 29, but it failed when the South Vietnamese, though outnumbered, pushed the North Vietnamese back across the Perfume River. Unable to take Hue, and reeling under the destructive weight of U.S. B-52 strikes, the North Vietnamese withdrew from their position in northern South Vietnam. On June 28, Troung’s forces advanced north and fought to take Quang Tri.

Tags: 20th - 21st Century, Historical Conflicts, Vietnam War

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