By allowing a subordinate the freedom to alter their orders in line with conditions on the ground, they were recognising the likelihood of the unexpected, of friction. However, by insisting that what an Officer decided to do instead (when unilaterally amending his orders) was in line with his Superior's intent (which is just another way of saying his Superior's plan) they were trying to ensure that friction was, if not reduced, at least overcome and the progression of the plan maintained.

In other words, German Command style was designed to recognise that the plan (which is merely how something will be done) would generally need to change after collision with the Enemy's main body (to paraphrase the way von Moltke put it). However, if such changes were broadly in line with the plan's objective, then the end result might still be achieved even if friction (and often the enemy) had tried to throw a spanner in the works along the way.

Ultimately, a plan is a means to an end, not an end in itself. It doesn't matter how many changes you make provided the ultimate objective is achieved.

Just a thought.

Regards,
ID

“There is a time-honoured military adage that no plan survives first contact with the enemy. In August 1944 Lieutenant General Guy Simonds could be faulted for believing that no enemy would survive first contact with his plan, and not the other way round. His precise, scientific mind could not accept that human frailties or shortcomings in equipment or doctrine, let alone any action the enemy might take, could possibly interfere with the execution of his plans. (Unlike his patron Montgomery, Simonds never learned to simply keep repeating that his plans always worked exactly as designed.) When things went awry, as they invariably do in war, it was always the fault of others for not being able to execute his plan exactly as written. That is not to suggest that he was a knave or a fool, far from it. Guy Simonds was an intense man who was intellectually superior to most of his contemporaries; unfortunately his military education and experience had been largely theoretical, at least until he landed in Sicily in command of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division on 10 July 1943. It is often forgotten that his total experience of command in battle until his corps became operational on 11 July 1944 totalled less than three months. Still, for his faults, real and imagined, Simonds clearly was by far the best Canadian senior commander of the war, and one whose performance does not suffer when compared to the best of his Allied contemporaries.”

From p.363-364 of the epilogue in the Robin Brass Studio 2005 edition of “No Holding Back.”

As an aside, given the theme of your blog post was partly related to military planning, it’s worth pointing out that NHB is largely about exactly that – planning. How the TOTALIZE plan was developed, and how it unfolded in action.

And now we return to the Ardennes, in mid-1941 …

Reid has a cute paraphrase in his book "No Holding Back". When discussing Simmonds' plan for TOTALISE, he opines that "Simmonds intended to turn conventional military wisdom on it's head, and ensure that no enemy would survive contact with his plan."

Jon