General Mack
As if he was a pinch of tabac./blockquote> But where were the Russians? In a staggering display of administrative ineptitude, the Allied staffs had failed to recognize that while the Austrians followed the Gregorian calendar, the Russians still employed the older Julian calendar. In 1805 the difference was 12 days. So while the Austrians expected the Russian army to arrive on October 20, the Russians did not expect to join the Austrians until November 1.
With the coalition Danube army eliminated, Napoleon was free to turn against Kutuzov’s Russian army, now approaching from the east. The French emperor’s strategy was to try to force it south to cut its communications with Russia, but his attempts failed. Although Murat’s cavalry seized the Danube bridges at Vienna on November 13, the wily Kutuzov managed to evade the French advance and escape.
Napoleon was forced to pursue. On November 20, he arrived at Brünn, a small town 80 miles north of Vienna and 125 miles east of Prague. To the west of the town, he found Kutuzov, who had now been joined by Büxhowden and a scratch Austrian force under Field Marshal Jean-Joseph, Prince of Liechtenstein. Napoleon, with 60,000 men at hand now faced Kutuzov with 73,000. Moreover, Kutuzov expected another Russian force under Lt. Gen. Magnus Gustav Essen to arrive from Poland shortly, and Archduke Ferdinand, having gathered up 10,000 Austrian troops in Bohemia, was ready to push eastward to support Kutuzov. What was worse for the French, on October 30, Archduke Charles had attacked Masséna at Caldiero, then skillfully extricated his powerful army from Italy and disappeared into the Alps. There, he had combined his army with Archduke John’s, and the two brothers were now moving north.
Napoleon was in trouble, and he knew it. The Grande Armée was deep in enemy territory, his immediate force was heavily outnumbered and huge coalition reinforcements were on the way. Moreover, Prussia, impressed by Third Coalition successes, was showing great interest in joining it. To win the war, all Kutuzov had to do was avoid battle.
Napoleon calculated, however, that even if Prussia decided to join the coalition against him, it would not be able to put an army into the field for at least a month. The same was true for Archduke Charles’ army, whose progress from Italy would be slowed by the forces of Masséna, Ney and Marmont. All Napoleon had to do was to crush Kutuzov’s army before those coalition reinforcements arrived. And if Kutuzov was unwilling to engage him, he would have to trick Kutuzov into attacking him.
Napoleon’s plan would be aided considerably by the arrival at Kutuzov’s headquarters of Austrian Emperor Francis II and Russian Tsar Alexander I. The inexperienced tsar was accompanied by a retinue of young officers eager to show their contempt for the French army. While Kutuzov counseled waiting until overwhelming reinforcements arrived, Alexander capitulated to the pressure of his aides and the vision of becoming the ‘new St. George of Europe crushing the dragon.’ Now without influence, a chagrined Kutuzov mentally abdicated his command.
Napoleon was confident that the Allies, with their numerical superiority, would be tempted to attack him. To encourage their belief in the weakness of the Grande Armée, on November 21, he ordered Soult and Lannes to occupy the Pratzen heights and the village of Austerlitz, which was temptingly close to the Allied positions, and then to retire in feigned confusion, to simulate the beginning of a retreat. He followed this up with diplomatic action. On November 28 and again on the 29th, he sent a message to the tsar to ask for an armistice and a personal interview.
Alexander ignored napoleon’s request, sending only his chief aide-de-camp, General-Adjutant Prince Piotr Dolgorukov. If the French emperor wanted peace, Dolgorukov demanded, he must give up Italy immediately; if he continued the war, Belgium, Savoy and Piedmont would be added to the price. Général de Division Anne-Jean-Marie-Rene Savary, one of Napoleon’s aides-de-camp, recorded that ‘The conversation began immediately and quickly became animated; it appeared that Dolgorukov had failed to display the tact required for his mission, for the Emperor addressed him brusquely: `If that is what you would have me concede, go and report to your Emperor Alexander that I would not have counted on his good disposition; that I would not have compromised my army; that I would not have depended on his sense of justice to obtain terms; if he wishes it, we will fight, I wash my hands of it.’ ‘
Dolgorukov reported that the French army was on the verge of dissolution and Napoleon would do anything to avoid a battle. A jubilant Austro-Russian army made ready to attack.
Napoleon concentrated the Grande Armée in a triangle formed by the villages of Puntowitz, Bosenitz and Lattein between the village of Austerlitz, occupied by the Austro-Russians, and the town of Brünn, occupied by the French. His front formed the arc of a circle, facing southeast toward the enemy. From north to south stood Lannes’ V Corps, the Imperial Guard, Général de Division Nicholas-Charles Oudinot’s Combined Grenadier Division, Murat’s Cavalry Reserve and Soult’s IV Corps — 60,000 soldiers in all.
Anchoring the north end of the French position was a prominent hill that rose 900 feet above the plain, named the Santon. From the Santon the French line extended about four miles south along the Goldbach stream, which flowed through a valley of marshes, stagnant watercourses and ponds. From north to south the Goldbach was lined by a series of hamlets with wide, muddy streets and single-story thatched houses. The most important of these were Sokolnitz and, 900 yards to the south, Telnitz, which marked the extreme left of the French line. Beyond Telnitz the Goldbach terminated in a series of wide, shallow ponds. The Goldbach and ponds were covered with melting ice, and their muddy banks were slippery. The Allies occupied a line east of the French positions, running north to south to the east of the Goldbach and centered on the Pratzen plateau, which the French had abandoned to them.
General-Feldwachtmeister Franz Ritter von Weyrother, chief of staff for the Austro-Russian army, and another favorite of the tsar’s, drew up the battle plan. Weyrother announced his plan to general officers at a staff meeting held at a house near Austerlitz early on December 2. Lieutenant General Count Alexandre-Louis Andrault de Langéron described the scene:
At one o’clock in the morning, when we were all assembled, General Weyrother arrived, and on a large table spread out an immense map, very precise and detailed, showing the area of Brünn and Austerlitz, then read out his dispositions in a loud voice and with an air that announced a conviction of his self-importance and our incapacity. He resembled a professor reading a lesson to young scholars: perhaps we were scholars, but he was far from being a good professor. Kutuzov, who was sitting in a chair half asleep when we arrived at his house, was completely asleep by the time we departed. Büxhowden stood listening but certainly understood nothing. Miloradovich said nothing. Przhebishevsky kept in the background, and only Dokhturov examined the map with interest.
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Weyrother’s grandiose plan envisioned five columns of coalition soldiers, 41,000 men, sweeping down on the French right flank to cut their communications with Vienna and roll up Napoleon’s army from south to north. The columns, numbered I to V, would be respectively commanded by: General Dmitry S. Dokhturov, 13,000 (including an advance guard of 5,000 under Feldmarschall-Leutnant Michael Freiherr von Kienmayer); General Langéron, 10,000; Lt. Gen. Ignaty Y. Przhebishevsky, 6,000; Lt. Gen. Mikhail A. Miloradovich, 12,000; and Feldmarschall-Leutnant Liechtenstein, 5,000. Meanwhile, Maj. Gen. Prince Piotr Bagration, with 12,000 men, would draw the attention of the French left wing. Finally, Grand Duke Constantin Pavlovich, Tsar Alexander’s brother, with 8,500, would remain in reserve with the Russian Imperial Guard. Weyrother was confident that his plan would destroy Napoleon’s army to win the battle, the campaign and the war.
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