It was determined that the Japanese resistance consisted of about two infantry battalions. The enemy had no more than two small mortars, at least two machine guns and no artillery.

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At dawn on the morning of January 4, U.S. artillery concentrated on the enemy positions. The 1st and 2nd battalions of the 136th Infantry Regiment moved out to the north, but before they had advanced 40 yards, harassing fire from snipers in trees and the familiar crackle of the Japanese Nambu light machine gun began plucking at the underbrush. Fortunately, the Japanese fire was mostly inaccurate.

The fighting quickly degenerated into skirmishing at squad level. The close proximity of the opposing forces precluded the use of artillery. It was the soldiers’ individual weapons that would decide the outcome of the battle. The snipers were searched out and shot. Individual enemy soldiers who were dug in were flanked and destroyed with hand grenades. Progress was slow. The 136th Infantry Regiment fought the rest of the day before nearing the main enemy position.

With night coming, Cavenee had an important decision to make. Should he pull back his troops to a safer position, or should he hold on where he was through the night? The Japanese defensive positions were mainly standing holes with log fronts and no overhead cover. They would be extremely vulnerable to artillery, but an effective barrage would require a pullback. Cavenee decided to pull back and let the artillery go to work.

The two battalions of the 136th had barely completed their shallow, two-man foxholes 100 yards south of the Japanese positions when the 105mm howitzers of the 210th Field Artillery opened up. Fragments flew over the heads of 136th troops all night. During lulls in artillery fire, the enemy returned to the treetops and poured down small-arms fire.

Holding a light under his poncho, the colonel studied his map and messages. Fortunately, the supply situation was much improved. The airdrop had been effective, with a 95 percent recovery, and the heavy-weapons troops had overcome formidable obstacles in moving supplies forward.

Resupply was not without its problems, however. Only medical supplies had been dropped by parachute the rest had been pushed out of the hatches of Douglas C-47 transports as they made a pass at 200 feet. All of the communication-wire spools were damaged beyond use. Two men had been killed and several more injured because they had not stayed clear of the drop area.

Ingenuity aided in the evacuation efforts. Bamboo rafts were devised to float the wounded down the Pilowo River to the coastal area. Bamboo poles, 8 feet long and 3 inches in diameter, were lashed together in a single layer to make rafts 5 feet wide. The flotation was just right for a wounded man, yet the rafts were light enough to permit the bearers to lift them over shallow spots. The carriers guided the rafts by wading or swimming alongside as the wounded men floated downstream. The trip downriver now took one day instead of two and required only four litter bearers per man instead of eight.

The troops were weary, but Cavenee knew that no more than two enemy battalions of reduced strength opposed his men. The Japanese regiment’s 3rd Battalion had been identified as the unit in the path of his own 3rd Battalion’s column, which was now only 2,000 yards to the north, approaching Hill 40. The colonel ascertained that with reasonable progress his 3rd Battalion could join the fight on the afternoon of January 5. On further consideration, he determined he didn’t want to wait for this battalion to join in a coordinated attack. He decided to launch his strike the morning of January 5 with the 1st and 2nd battalions. The 3rd would join the fight from the north as quickly as it could.

Two thousand yards to the north, the 3rd Battalion was digging in for the night. Its march from Radja had started badly. From the outset, the unit had been harried by the enemy. From December 26 to 28, it had been viciously attacked each night by an enemy force. Intelligence revealed it was the Japanese 211th Infantry’s 3rd Battalion which had been detached from the regiment for a special mission to Radja to await and guide reinforcements coming from Halmahera on barges. The Japanese barges, however, were ambushed after slipping through the Navy PT-boat screen and were destroyed along with 50 tons of food and supplies.

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