The jungle trails were more difficult to negotiate than U.S. forces had anticipated. Men carrying packboard loads of heavy mortars, machine guns and ammunition quickly became exhausted, and loads had to be transferred to fresh carriers every 15 minutes. When the troops were a mile inland, the radio blanked out, cutting communication between the two columns. An artillery liaison plane took up the job of intercolumn communications, flying overhead from one column to another and relaying messages.

Subscribe Today

• Did you enjoy our article?
• Read more in World War II magazine
• Subscribe online and save nearly 40%!!!
 

The Pilowo column did not meet the enemy until December 30, when a reconnaissance patrol operating on the left (north) flank encountered a small group of Japanese in the vicinity of the Pilowo River, south of Hill 40. The patrol was then directed to the left flank, where it pushed north of the Pilowo on January 1 and discovered an entrenched enemy force.

The 1st Battalion, commanded by Major Lewis L. Hawk, had already swung to the north and was ordered to attack. Early on January 2, the battalion reconnoitered prior to the assault and discovered that the Japanese position reached farther east than they had realized.

Colonel Cavenee, who maintained his regimental command with the 1st Battalion, realized that the enemy force was strongly fortified and decided to launch a coordinated attack on the morning of January 3. The 2nd Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Arthur T. Sauser, was ordered west of the Japanese position to facilitate an envelopment of the enemy force, while the 1st Battalion was ordered to attack from the south. An artillery concentration from Ngelengele provided support prior to the order to move out. At 10 a.m., the battalions attacked simultaneously.

Two hundred yards from the enemy positions, where patrols had roamed at will a day earlier, the attackers came under fire from snipers in the trees. To add to the problem, many of the Japanese flung short-fused charges of TNT from camouflaged positions under the roots of trees. Despite this harassment, both battalions managed to gain ground. When sniper fire became in tense, an effort was made to bypass it. This meant moving off the trails through the stifling jungle, where visibility was 20 feet at best and every foot of it hard going.

The 1st Battalion, attacking toward high ground under devastating small-arms fire, was stopped 80 yards short of the enemy position. At that distance, the Japanese were difficult to pinpoint, but the broad front of enemy fire and the sound of automatic weapons gave some indication of their positions. As the 1st Battalion evacuated its wounded, the 2nd Battalion to the west was engaged in a desperate firefight. Its attack had started toward the enemy flank, but the impenetrable jungle growth, coupled with sniper fire, forced the 2nd to move its attack southward. The 2nd Battalion overran the two forward enemy positions and wiped them out. Late afternoon found the 2nd Battalion on the west flank of the 1st Battalion. The 2nd fumed to face north and dug in for the night.

Cavenee pondered the many problems that confronted him. Supplies were a major concern–his regiment had used up ammunition beyond the capacity of resupply and hand-carry, and K rations were short. The 100 native bearers attached to the regiment could transport only a fraction of what was needed. Air supply appeared to be the only solution. Cavenee ordered an area 500 yards to the rear of the regiment cleared to receive an airdrop.

The evacuation of wounded seemed an almost impossible task. The call for a stretcher promptly brought an aid man with a litter, but it took three more men to carry the wounded soldier to an aid station. Evacuation to the coast from the aid station was a two-day trip one way and took eight men for each casualty. The demands of supply and evacuation were cutting appreciably into combat strength. To conserve troops, the decision was made to bury the dead nearby, to be disinterred and removed to the coast later.

The closeness of the terrain prevented the use of heavy machine guns and mortars. Cannon and anti-tank companies also had to be held in coastal areas. Every attempt to use mortars had resulted in tree bursts that imperiled friendly troops. Lack of fields of fire–with visibility of 20 feet at best–made the heavy machine guns useless. Heavy weapons companies were withdrawn from combat and became responsible for receiving airdrops, resupplying front-line troops and evacuating casualties.

Help HistoryNet by bookmarking to