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Mongolia 1939 – Stalin’s Shrewd Opening ActBy Stuart D. Goldman | World War II | 6 comments | Print This Post | Email This Post Fast-forward two years. Japan is still fighting in China, which has vast strategic resources. The oil embargo that Franklin Roosevelt imposed on Japan in July 1941 is threatening to bring the Japanese war machine to a halt and Japan to its knees. Meanwhile, Germany controls most of western and central Europe and has invaded the Soviet Union. In three months, German armies plunge more deeply into the heart of Russia than in the four years from 1914 to 1918. Whole Soviet armies are destroyed or captured en masse. Ukraine lies open. Leningrad is besieged. German armies are on the road to Moscow. Many experts predict the collapse of Soviet military resistance in a matter of weeks. It’s decision time in Tokyo. Subscribe Today
Hitler is urging Japan to join in the war against the Soviet Union: Avenge the defeat at Nomonhan and seize the Soviet Far East. But do it now. If you wait until after I’ve defeated Stalin, I won’t need you. Top Japanese army leaders favor this idea—the northern course. The navy strongly disagrees, preferring a southern course: seizing the Dutch, French, and British colonies in Asia. The Dutch East Indies (present-day Indonesia) is Japan’s only possible source of oil. The Dutch and French colonies are defenseless; Britain is fighting for its life. The only real obstacle to the southern course is the United States Pacific Fleet. The southern course means war with the United States. At a series of Imperial Conferences in Tokyo in mid- to late 1941, these issues were debated and decided. Tsuji, then a lieutenant colonel and a key member of the operations staff at Imperial General Headquarters, was in the thick of it. A senior officer in the Japanese army ministry at the time testified at the Tokyo war crimes trials that Tsuji was “the most determined single protagonist in favor of war with the United States.” The decision, of course, led directly to the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Pacific war. Gen. Eugene Ott, German ambassador to Japan, cabled this explanation to Berlin of Japan’s decision: “In my reports I have repeatedly pointed out that after the experiences at Nomonhan and in view of the Russian resistance to an army such as the German Army, the [army] activists consider participation in the war against the Soviet Union too risky and too unprofitable.” When Japan made the decision to strike south, the Soviet Union’s top spy in Tokyo, Richard Sorge, signaled Moscow that Japan would not attack the Soviet Union. Only after learning this did Stalin make the crucial decision to transfer his Far Eastern forces westward. Fifteen infantry divisions, three cavalry divisions, 1,700 tanks, and 1,500 aircraft moved from the Soviet Far East to the European front. It was these powerful reinforcements, commanded by Zhukov, that turned the tide in the Battle of Moscow in the first week of December—at the same time Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. That was the most decisive week of the war, the week that ultimately doomed the Axis. Zhukov won his spurs at Nomonhan—and won Stalin’s confidence to entrust him with overall command in late 1941 when the war hung in the balance. Zhukov led the Red Army to victory after victory, all the way to Berlin; the much-decorated Hero of the Soviet Union would survive Stalin and be appointed defense minister in 1955. The main architect of Japan’s defeat at Nomonhan fared differently. When war came, Tsuji again was in the thick of it. He masterminded Japan’s brilliant Malay-Singapore campaign—and the slaughter of thousands of pro-British Chinese in Singapore. In the Philippines, he helped instigate the Bataan Death March. He fought—and lost badly—at Guadalcanal. After Japan surrendered, he went into hiding in Thailand, disguised as a Buddhist monk, to avoid prosecution as a war criminal. He later returned home, wrote many books about his exploits, and was elected to Japan’s parliament, where he served for 10 years—until disappearing mysteriously into the jungles of Laos in 1961, just as the American military involvement in Southeast Asia was getting started. Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Help HistoryNet by bookmarking to
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6 Comments to “Mongolia 1939 – Stalin’s Shrewd Opening Act”
I am some knower over Japanese-Soviet Clashes in 1938 and 93 among the Japanese-Chinese Conflict in 1937-45.
based in own experience in Nomonhan Japanese developed a some type of 47mm AT infantry guns and Self-propelled vehicles, Armored carriers and Tanks with 47mm cannons
I considered why for Japanese having to chosen figthing against Chinese are erroneous and theirs poses some potential triumph charts in your hands for created needed base of war against Soviets in Siberia:
*Japanese a set up some anticomunist puppet states in Northern China:
-Chinese East Hebei Autonomous Council (1935 – 1938)
-Chinese Provisional Government of the Republic of China (1937-1940)
-Mongolian Mengkiang (1936 – 1945)
-Manchurian Empire of Manchoukou (1932 – 1945)
*Among Japanese poses some Siberian and Central asian nationalities disconformed with Soviets living in such territoires:
-White Russians and East Jews
-Exiled Yakutians and Buriats
-Tibetans,Uiguirs,Dungans and Central Asians
*Japanese during your failed campaing in mainlad China accumulated a force between 1 to 3 million of Japanese and Korean soldiers a half of total of Japanese land forces in Pacific war period.
*Japanese poses a important defector and expert in Soviets topics
the NKVD officer Genrikh Samoilovich Lyushkov why advised the needed of accumulated a 4,000 tanks for invading siberian lands
If Japanese Army have a decided to use such elements in adequate form for:
- created a combined force conformed by Japanese,white russians,mongol,chinese and Manchu units less between 2 to 3 millions of men
-the use of modified tanks and self-propelled vehicles armed with 75mm cannons
-joining with any type of aerial “Blitz” bombardments
for used an sort distracted strikes to Argun and Amur frontier fortifications and Japan sea fortifications for launched the main stream “lance point” land attack for main Mongolian territoire in route to Irkusts preceded with aerial landings and some undercover strikes for cutting Transiberian line along Irkust also.
such plan as results to “cut the neck” of the Soviet Far East and causing the isolation of such territoire of rest of European Soviet Union,and Japanese easy entering to Blagoveschensk and Khabarovsk without or scarcy resistance
Among this exists some reports from Siberia were one a Communist Serbian why making a interviews with diffrents siberian citizens (students,konsomolsk members,office workers, mining and factory workers,teaches and Communists Party officers,etc) why related stay agreed with seeking the entering of Japanese tanks and soldiers in disacord with Stalininst regimen among some inclusive as disposes to support a Japanese forces if enter in Siberian lands if aiding to a local rebellion against European Stalinists in local government also.
with these points i thinked why Japanese a poses some potential posibilities to defeated soviet forces in Siberia if proposed a making such campaing inclusive with Imperial Navy enter to war with United States in Pearl Harbor.
By Wladimir on Apr 8, 2009 at 10:17 pm
Wow, that’s some history I didn’t know, with gigantic implications.
Of course, Stalin, by buddying up with Hitler, set the Soviet Union up for horrendous casualties–in the range of 20 million-plus deaths. And *he’s* responsible for the eventual death of the marxist ideology(cept in liberal arts department in college), for he purged the party of anybody more charismatic, innovative, intelligent, talented, and inspriing than himself, and this eventually led to stagnation and the fall of the Soviet Union due to a paucity of actual ideas, combined with dizzying cynicism.
By Charles Laster on Apr 14, 2009 at 2:59 pm
Notice the parallel with Guadalcanal-The Japanese committed forces in a very piecemeal and indecisive fashion against an unfamiliar enemy and on both occasions got burned for it.
Excellent research-I enjoyed Zhukov’s ploys to lull the Japanese into not expecting an attack. The Germans pulled the same stunts on the Russians preceding Barbarossa
By paul penrod on May 5, 2009 at 1:14 pm
Paul Penrod’s comment about similar Japanese errors at Khalkhin Gol and Guadalcanal has a surprising basis. TSUJI Masanobu, who bears so much of the responsibility for the disaster at Khalkhin Gol, was in the thick of the ighting on Guadalcanal, where he again caused a military disaster.
By Stuart Goldman on May 9, 2009 at 6:46 am
Where these Soviets units from khalkhin Gol to same units that came to the rescue at Moscow and Stalingrad?
What was the predominant ethnic makeup of the units from Khalkhin Gol?
By Chic Lurch on May 25, 2009 at 8:40 pm
Many of the units that Zhukov commanded at Khalkhin Gol were transfered to the Moscow front in late 1941. But These Khalkhin Gol vetrans were only a fraction of the total forces transfered from the Far East to the Moscow front at that time. I’m not sure what percentage were Russian and slavic. I haven’t followed them after the Battle of Moscow, so I don’t know to what extent these same units were involved in the Stalingrad campaign.
By Stuart Goldman on May 27, 2009 at 1:13 pm