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Mongolia 1939 – Stalin’s Shrewd Opening ActBy Stuart D. Goldman | World War II | 6 comments | Print This Post | Email This Post Komatsubara’s men huddled in their trenches under the heaviest bombardment to which they or any other Japanese unit had ever been subjected. The effect, physically and psychologically, was shattering. A Japanese artillery commander described the incessant bombardment as reverberating like “the gongs of hell.” Subscribe Today
At 9 a.m., Soviet armor and infantry moved out all along the line. A dense morning fog near the river shrouded their approach at some points, allowing them to get within small-arms range of the defenders. The surprise and disarray on the Japanese side was so great that Japanese artillery did not begin firing in support of their frontline troops until about 10:15. By then, some of the frontline positions were already overrun. Japanese resistance soon stiffened, however, and fierce combat raged along the front some 40 miles from end to end. In the first day’s fighting, the tank-heavy Soviet southern force under Col. M. I. Potapov routed the Manchukuoan cavalry holding General Komatsubara’s southern flank, and bent that segment of the line inward about eight miles. Zhukov’s central force advanced only about half a mile against furious resistance, but his frontal assault fixed Komatsubara’s infantry in place, preventing him from reinforcing his flanks. Col. I. P. Alekseenko’s northern force easily overran the Manchukuoan cavalry on the northern flank, about two miles north of Fui Heights. But the heights themselves were a natural strongpoint and became the northern anchor of the Japanese line. Kwantung Army headquarters did not at first realize the scope of Zhukov’s offensive and believed Komatsubara’s defensive position was stable. The 7th Division remained held in reserve. Over August 21 and 22, Potapov’s southern force pushed ahead, bending the Japanese southern flank further in toward the center. Elements of Potapov’s force disengaged and took up a blocking position some 11 miles east of the river, athwart the likely escape route of the Japanese units in the south. The Japanese center grudgingly gave up a little more ground. The northern flank remained anchored at the key strongpoint of Fui Heights—having, Zhukov acknowledged, “put up more obstinate resistance than we thought it could.” On August 23, Kwantung Army headquarters became alarmed enough to order the 7th Division to Nomonhan. But the order came too late. That day, Komatsubara ordered a counterattack by his 72nd Regiment and the 7th Division’s 28th Regiment. Heavy morning fog obscured visibility as the troops moved forward the next morning. When the fog cleared, the 72nd Regiment discovered that it had moved into the path of a powerful Soviet tank attack. The Japanese infantry took a terrible beating. Nearly every company and battalion commander was killed, as well as the regiment’s commanding general and most of his staff. The 28th Regiment fared little better. Intense artillery fire had pinned it down 500 yards from the Soviet lines. Unable to advance but unauthorized to retreat, the troops dug in against the withering bombardment. A postwar Japanese army history recounts that when Komatsubara received combat reports from his two regiments, he “evinced deep anxiety,” while his divisional chief of staff “appeared bewildered.” After sunset, the attack force was ordered to withdraw—but by then both Japanese regi-ments had been shattered. At about the same time, news of the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact reached Tokyo, and Japan’s hope of a military alliance with Germany was shattered as well. Japan realized it would face the Soviets alone. The army leadership in Tokyo, which had been pressing for a German alliance, was humiliated. Their forces at Nomonhan faced a cruel fate. Colonel Alekseenko’s northern force had been hammering the Japanese at Fui Heights for three days without success. Although the attacking forces were much more powerful than the relatively small force of 800 men—under the command of Lt. Col. Eiichi Ioki—that held the heights, the strongpoint had defensive fortifications on all sides and barbed wire overlaying deep bunkers connected by trenches. The Japanese defenders inflicted heavy casualties on the attackers. Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Help HistoryNet by bookmarking to
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6 Comments to “Mongolia 1939 – Stalin’s Shrewd Opening Act”
I am some knower over Japanese-Soviet Clashes in 1938 and 93 among the Japanese-Chinese Conflict in 1937-45.
based in own experience in Nomonhan Japanese developed a some type of 47mm AT infantry guns and Self-propelled vehicles, Armored carriers and Tanks with 47mm cannons
I considered why for Japanese having to chosen figthing against Chinese are erroneous and theirs poses some potential triumph charts in your hands for created needed base of war against Soviets in Siberia:
*Japanese a set up some anticomunist puppet states in Northern China:
-Chinese East Hebei Autonomous Council (1935 – 1938)
-Chinese Provisional Government of the Republic of China (1937-1940)
-Mongolian Mengkiang (1936 – 1945)
-Manchurian Empire of Manchoukou (1932 – 1945)
*Among Japanese poses some Siberian and Central asian nationalities disconformed with Soviets living in such territoires:
-White Russians and East Jews
-Exiled Yakutians and Buriats
-Tibetans,Uiguirs,Dungans and Central Asians
*Japanese during your failed campaing in mainlad China accumulated a force between 1 to 3 million of Japanese and Korean soldiers a half of total of Japanese land forces in Pacific war period.
*Japanese poses a important defector and expert in Soviets topics
the NKVD officer Genrikh Samoilovich Lyushkov why advised the needed of accumulated a 4,000 tanks for invading siberian lands
If Japanese Army have a decided to use such elements in adequate form for:
- created a combined force conformed by Japanese,white russians,mongol,chinese and Manchu units less between 2 to 3 millions of men
-the use of modified tanks and self-propelled vehicles armed with 75mm cannons
-joining with any type of aerial “Blitz” bombardments
for used an sort distracted strikes to Argun and Amur frontier fortifications and Japan sea fortifications for launched the main stream “lance point” land attack for main Mongolian territoire in route to Irkusts preceded with aerial landings and some undercover strikes for cutting Transiberian line along Irkust also.
such plan as results to “cut the neck” of the Soviet Far East and causing the isolation of such territoire of rest of European Soviet Union,and Japanese easy entering to Blagoveschensk and Khabarovsk without or scarcy resistance
Among this exists some reports from Siberia were one a Communist Serbian why making a interviews with diffrents siberian citizens (students,konsomolsk members,office workers, mining and factory workers,teaches and Communists Party officers,etc) why related stay agreed with seeking the entering of Japanese tanks and soldiers in disacord with Stalininst regimen among some inclusive as disposes to support a Japanese forces if enter in Siberian lands if aiding to a local rebellion against European Stalinists in local government also.
with these points i thinked why Japanese a poses some potential posibilities to defeated soviet forces in Siberia if proposed a making such campaing inclusive with Imperial Navy enter to war with United States in Pearl Harbor.
By Wladimir on Apr 8, 2009 at 10:17 pm
Wow, that’s some history I didn’t know, with gigantic implications.
Of course, Stalin, by buddying up with Hitler, set the Soviet Union up for horrendous casualties–in the range of 20 million-plus deaths. And *he’s* responsible for the eventual death of the marxist ideology(cept in liberal arts department in college), for he purged the party of anybody more charismatic, innovative, intelligent, talented, and inspriing than himself, and this eventually led to stagnation and the fall of the Soviet Union due to a paucity of actual ideas, combined with dizzying cynicism.
By Charles Laster on Apr 14, 2009 at 2:59 pm
Notice the parallel with Guadalcanal-The Japanese committed forces in a very piecemeal and indecisive fashion against an unfamiliar enemy and on both occasions got burned for it.
Excellent research-I enjoyed Zhukov’s ploys to lull the Japanese into not expecting an attack. The Germans pulled the same stunts on the Russians preceding Barbarossa
By paul penrod on May 5, 2009 at 1:14 pm
Paul Penrod’s comment about similar Japanese errors at Khalkhin Gol and Guadalcanal has a surprising basis. TSUJI Masanobu, who bears so much of the responsibility for the disaster at Khalkhin Gol, was in the thick of the ighting on Guadalcanal, where he again caused a military disaster.
By Stuart Goldman on May 9, 2009 at 6:46 am
Where these Soviets units from khalkhin Gol to same units that came to the rescue at Moscow and Stalingrad?
What was the predominant ethnic makeup of the units from Khalkhin Gol?
By Chic Lurch on May 25, 2009 at 8:40 pm
Many of the units that Zhukov commanded at Khalkhin Gol were transfered to the Moscow front in late 1941. But These Khalkhin Gol vetrans were only a fraction of the total forces transfered from the Far East to the Moscow front at that time. I’m not sure what percentage were Russian and slavic. I haven’t followed them after the Battle of Moscow, so I don’t know to what extent these same units were involved in the Stalingrad campaign.
By Stuart Goldman on May 27, 2009 at 1:13 pm