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Mongolia 1939 – Stalin’s Shrewd Opening ActBy Stuart D. Goldman | World War II | 6 comments | Print This Post | Email This Post To bring this force and the equipment and supplies necessary for a large-scale offensive to the combat zone, the Trans-Baikal military district in eastern Siberia amassed a fleet of more than 4,200 trucks, which transported some 55,000 tons of materiel 400 miles from the closest railhead to the combat zone. Subscribe Today
Japan’s intelligence, while weak, was not blind. The Japanese knew reinforcements were moving east along the Trans-Siberian Railroad. But they had no idea of the volume. They were also lulled by the assumption, gospel in the Japanese Imperial Army, that the maximum range for large-scale military operations was 125 to 175 miles from a rail line. Anything beyond 200 miles was considered logistically impossible. Kwantung Army had only 800 trucks in all of Manchukuo, so a logistical operation the size of the Soviets’ was almost unimaginable. No major attack was expected. Also, because the Kwantung Army’s 7th Division was based on a main rail line, it could be transported to any trouble spot in a few days. Some at Kwantung Army headquarters wanted to deploy the 7th Division to Nomonhan in case the Soviets did attack, but it was the army’s sole strategic reserve and the operations section was reluctant to commit it to the far western frontier. Instead, the division’s 28th Regiment was dispatched to Nomonhan, as was a battalion from the distant Mukden garrison in eastern Manchukuo. These reinforcements did little more than make up the losses already suffered by Komatsubara’s forces, however. As Zhukov’s 1st Army Group prepared to strike, the effective Japanese strength at Nomonhan was only slightly more than one division. Zhukov needed detailed information on Komatsubara’s deployment, but the latter’s tight perimeter security, and the lack of Japanese deserters, made that difficult. Finally, Maj. I. M. Remizov, commander of a regiment that had been in the thick of the fighting since May 28, succeeded in penetrating Japanese lines and brought back the information Zhukov needed (for which Remizov was later decorated a Hero of the Soviet Union): The Japanese 23rd Division’s main strength was concentrated a few miles east of the Khalkha River. The infantry lacked mobility and strong armor support. And the Manchukuoan cavalry held their northern and southern flanks. Zhukov devised an uncomplicated attack plan. He would divide his 1st Army Group into three strike forces. The central group, under his personal command, would launch a frontal assault behind maximum artillery and air support and tie down Komatsubara’s main strength there. The northern and southern strike forces, which were allotted the bulk of the armor, were to turn in the Japanese flanks and force them into a pocket that the three combined forces would then reduce and destroy. To ensure tactical surprise, Zhukov and his staff devised an elaborate deception program intended to reduce Japanese expectation of an attack, with dummy radio and field telephone messages about constructing defensive fortifications, leaflets ostensibly for Soviet troops titled “What the Infantryman Should Know About Defense,” and huge loudspeakers blaring the sounds of tanks and aircraft engines each night. At first, Japanese frontline troops mistook the sound effects for an attack and fired toward the loudspeakers, but after a few days they became accustomed to the nightly “serenade” and tried to ignore it. On the night of the attack, the sounds of Soviet troop concentration and preattack staging drew little attention from the Japanese. On August 19, when Stalin was confident he had an agreement with Hitler in the bag, he gave Zhukov the final green light to launch his offensive. At 5:45 a.m. on August 20, as German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop was preparing to fly to Moscow to sign the Nonaggression Pact, 200 Soviet bombers appeared over the Khalkha and began pounding the Japanese positions. When the bombers withdrew, a thunderous artillery barrage began that lasted for 2 hours and 45 minutes—precisely the time the bombers needed to rearm, refuel, and return for a second run. Finally, all the Soviet artillery hurled an intensive 15-minute barrage at the Japanese forward positions. Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Help HistoryNet by bookmarking to
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6 Comments to “Mongolia 1939 – Stalin’s Shrewd Opening Act”
I am some knower over Japanese-Soviet Clashes in 1938 and 93 among the Japanese-Chinese Conflict in 1937-45.
based in own experience in Nomonhan Japanese developed a some type of 47mm AT infantry guns and Self-propelled vehicles, Armored carriers and Tanks with 47mm cannons
I considered why for Japanese having to chosen figthing against Chinese are erroneous and theirs poses some potential triumph charts in your hands for created needed base of war against Soviets in Siberia:
*Japanese a set up some anticomunist puppet states in Northern China:
-Chinese East Hebei Autonomous Council (1935 – 1938)
-Chinese Provisional Government of the Republic of China (1937-1940)
-Mongolian Mengkiang (1936 – 1945)
-Manchurian Empire of Manchoukou (1932 – 1945)
*Among Japanese poses some Siberian and Central asian nationalities disconformed with Soviets living in such territoires:
-White Russians and East Jews
-Exiled Yakutians and Buriats
-Tibetans,Uiguirs,Dungans and Central Asians
*Japanese during your failed campaing in mainlad China accumulated a force between 1 to 3 million of Japanese and Korean soldiers a half of total of Japanese land forces in Pacific war period.
*Japanese poses a important defector and expert in Soviets topics
the NKVD officer Genrikh Samoilovich Lyushkov why advised the needed of accumulated a 4,000 tanks for invading siberian lands
If Japanese Army have a decided to use such elements in adequate form for:
- created a combined force conformed by Japanese,white russians,mongol,chinese and Manchu units less between 2 to 3 millions of men
-the use of modified tanks and self-propelled vehicles armed with 75mm cannons
-joining with any type of aerial “Blitz” bombardments
for used an sort distracted strikes to Argun and Amur frontier fortifications and Japan sea fortifications for launched the main stream “lance point” land attack for main Mongolian territoire in route to Irkusts preceded with aerial landings and some undercover strikes for cutting Transiberian line along Irkust also.
such plan as results to “cut the neck” of the Soviet Far East and causing the isolation of such territoire of rest of European Soviet Union,and Japanese easy entering to Blagoveschensk and Khabarovsk without or scarcy resistance
Among this exists some reports from Siberia were one a Communist Serbian why making a interviews with diffrents siberian citizens (students,konsomolsk members,office workers, mining and factory workers,teaches and Communists Party officers,etc) why related stay agreed with seeking the entering of Japanese tanks and soldiers in disacord with Stalininst regimen among some inclusive as disposes to support a Japanese forces if enter in Siberian lands if aiding to a local rebellion against European Stalinists in local government also.
with these points i thinked why Japanese a poses some potential posibilities to defeated soviet forces in Siberia if proposed a making such campaing inclusive with Imperial Navy enter to war with United States in Pearl Harbor.
By Wladimir on Apr 8, 2009 at 10:17 pm
Wow, that’s some history I didn’t know, with gigantic implications.
Of course, Stalin, by buddying up with Hitler, set the Soviet Union up for horrendous casualties–in the range of 20 million-plus deaths. And *he’s* responsible for the eventual death of the marxist ideology(cept in liberal arts department in college), for he purged the party of anybody more charismatic, innovative, intelligent, talented, and inspriing than himself, and this eventually led to stagnation and the fall of the Soviet Union due to a paucity of actual ideas, combined with dizzying cynicism.
By Charles Laster on Apr 14, 2009 at 2:59 pm
Notice the parallel with Guadalcanal-The Japanese committed forces in a very piecemeal and indecisive fashion against an unfamiliar enemy and on both occasions got burned for it.
Excellent research-I enjoyed Zhukov’s ploys to lull the Japanese into not expecting an attack. The Germans pulled the same stunts on the Russians preceding Barbarossa
By paul penrod on May 5, 2009 at 1:14 pm
Paul Penrod’s comment about similar Japanese errors at Khalkhin Gol and Guadalcanal has a surprising basis. TSUJI Masanobu, who bears so much of the responsibility for the disaster at Khalkhin Gol, was in the thick of the ighting on Guadalcanal, where he again caused a military disaster.
By Stuart Goldman on May 9, 2009 at 6:46 am
Where these Soviets units from khalkhin Gol to same units that came to the rescue at Moscow and Stalingrad?
What was the predominant ethnic makeup of the units from Khalkhin Gol?
By Chic Lurch on May 25, 2009 at 8:40 pm
Many of the units that Zhukov commanded at Khalkhin Gol were transfered to the Moscow front in late 1941. But These Khalkhin Gol vetrans were only a fraction of the total forces transfered from the Far East to the Moscow front at that time. I’m not sure what percentage were Russian and slavic. I haven’t followed them after the Battle of Moscow, so I don’t know to what extent these same units were involved in the Stalingrad campaign.
By Stuart Goldman on May 27, 2009 at 1:13 pm