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Mongolia 1939 – Stalin’s Shrewd Opening ActBy Stuart D. Goldman | World War II | 6 comments | Print This Post | Email This Post Tsuji personally conducted a deep air reconnaissance mission and discovered the Soviet air force buildup. He concluded that a preemptive air strike was necessary. Kwantung Army command quickly adopted the proposal, and the Japanese launched an air raid on June 27. One hundred thirty attacking planes caught the newly arrived Soviet squadrons on the ground. Tsuji, in one of the bombers, estimated 25 Soviet planes destroyed on the ground and nearly 100 more shot down as they tried to take off and give combat. Even allowing for considerable exaggeration, the Japanese fliers had won temporary air superiority. Subscribe Today
The Kwantung Army successes continued. On the night of July 1, the 23rd Division occupied Fui Heights without a fight. The next night, July 2, Komatsubara made a brilliant tactical gain. A battalion of his 71st Regiment rowed across the Khalkha and landed unopposed on the west bank. Combat engineers constructed a pontoon bridge across the river in darkness. By dawn, the main strength of the 23rd Division—led by Komatsubara, and accompanied by Tsuji—had crossed the river undetected. Although the pontoon bridge could not support the weight of tanks, the troops were able to cross with their full complement of artillery. The first inkling the Soviets had that a major Japanese assault was under way came in the predawn hours when General Yasu-oka attacked southward from Fui Heights on the east bank of the river. Lightning from a passing thunderstorm lit the sky just as Yasuoka’s 87 tanks, their guns blazing, descended on the Soviet 149th Infantry Regiment. The stunned defenders scattered. When Zhukov finally realized that a large Japanese force had crossed the river and threatened his entire position, he hurled the remainder of his forces against Komatsubara’s infantry to prevent them from capturing the Soviet bridge. The result was a series of uncoordinated attacks which the Japanese infantry, with artillery and some air support, was able to beat off while inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy. Japanese infantry discovered that the gasoline engines of the Soviet tanks and armored cars could be easily ignited by shellfire or handmade gasoline bombs, a precursor to the Molotov cocktail. “Dozens of chunks of iron from tanks were strewn around the area and smoke from blazing vehicles clouded the sun,” a Japanese infantryman recalled. Komatsubara’s offensive, however, was checked. Soviet counterattacks forced the 23rd Division to dig defensive positions in the loose sand west of the Khalkha, not far south of Bain Tsagan. With his attack stalled, Komatsubara’s best hope rode with Yasuoka’s detachment. If Yasuoka could seize the Soviet bridge and link up with Komatsubara, the offensive might yet succeed. The west bank of the Khalkha River is about 200 feet higher than the east side, which gave the men of the 23rd Division a fine view of the progress of Yasuoka’s men on the far shore. It was not a heartening sight. After his initial success, Yasuoka encountered ferocious resistance from Soviet artillery, tanks, and infantry. The Type 89 Japanese medium tank had a high profile and thin armor skin, which the high-velocity Soviet 45mm tank gun could easily penetrate. The Type 89’s short-barreled, low-velocity cannon, in contrast, proved almost utterly ineffective against the sloping armor of the Soviet BT-7 tank—a precursor to the famed T-34. In one short engagement, the Soviet 9th Mechanized Brigade destroyed 20 Type 89 tanks. The more agile but even more poorly armored Japanese light tanks had to be withdrawn from the vanguard. By late afternoon, Yasuoka’s advance had been halted and his force also resorted to digging in for protection against Soviet bombardment. Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Help HistoryNet by bookmarking to
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6 Comments to “Mongolia 1939 – Stalin’s Shrewd Opening Act”
I am some knower over Japanese-Soviet Clashes in 1938 and 93 among the Japanese-Chinese Conflict in 1937-45.
based in own experience in Nomonhan Japanese developed a some type of 47mm AT infantry guns and Self-propelled vehicles, Armored carriers and Tanks with 47mm cannons
I considered why for Japanese having to chosen figthing against Chinese are erroneous and theirs poses some potential triumph charts in your hands for created needed base of war against Soviets in Siberia:
*Japanese a set up some anticomunist puppet states in Northern China:
-Chinese East Hebei Autonomous Council (1935 – 1938)
-Chinese Provisional Government of the Republic of China (1937-1940)
-Mongolian Mengkiang (1936 – 1945)
-Manchurian Empire of Manchoukou (1932 – 1945)
*Among Japanese poses some Siberian and Central asian nationalities disconformed with Soviets living in such territoires:
-White Russians and East Jews
-Exiled Yakutians and Buriats
-Tibetans,Uiguirs,Dungans and Central Asians
*Japanese during your failed campaing in mainlad China accumulated a force between 1 to 3 million of Japanese and Korean soldiers a half of total of Japanese land forces in Pacific war period.
*Japanese poses a important defector and expert in Soviets topics
the NKVD officer Genrikh Samoilovich Lyushkov why advised the needed of accumulated a 4,000 tanks for invading siberian lands
If Japanese Army have a decided to use such elements in adequate form for:
- created a combined force conformed by Japanese,white russians,mongol,chinese and Manchu units less between 2 to 3 millions of men
-the use of modified tanks and self-propelled vehicles armed with 75mm cannons
-joining with any type of aerial “Blitz” bombardments
for used an sort distracted strikes to Argun and Amur frontier fortifications and Japan sea fortifications for launched the main stream “lance point” land attack for main Mongolian territoire in route to Irkusts preceded with aerial landings and some undercover strikes for cutting Transiberian line along Irkust also.
such plan as results to “cut the neck” of the Soviet Far East and causing the isolation of such territoire of rest of European Soviet Union,and Japanese easy entering to Blagoveschensk and Khabarovsk without or scarcy resistance
Among this exists some reports from Siberia were one a Communist Serbian why making a interviews with diffrents siberian citizens (students,konsomolsk members,office workers, mining and factory workers,teaches and Communists Party officers,etc) why related stay agreed with seeking the entering of Japanese tanks and soldiers in disacord with Stalininst regimen among some inclusive as disposes to support a Japanese forces if enter in Siberian lands if aiding to a local rebellion against European Stalinists in local government also.
with these points i thinked why Japanese a poses some potential posibilities to defeated soviet forces in Siberia if proposed a making such campaing inclusive with Imperial Navy enter to war with United States in Pearl Harbor.
By Wladimir on Apr 8, 2009 at 10:17 pm
Wow, that’s some history I didn’t know, with gigantic implications.
Of course, Stalin, by buddying up with Hitler, set the Soviet Union up for horrendous casualties–in the range of 20 million-plus deaths. And *he’s* responsible for the eventual death of the marxist ideology(cept in liberal arts department in college), for he purged the party of anybody more charismatic, innovative, intelligent, talented, and inspriing than himself, and this eventually led to stagnation and the fall of the Soviet Union due to a paucity of actual ideas, combined with dizzying cynicism.
By Charles Laster on Apr 14, 2009 at 2:59 pm
Notice the parallel with Guadalcanal-The Japanese committed forces in a very piecemeal and indecisive fashion against an unfamiliar enemy and on both occasions got burned for it.
Excellent research-I enjoyed Zhukov’s ploys to lull the Japanese into not expecting an attack. The Germans pulled the same stunts on the Russians preceding Barbarossa
By paul penrod on May 5, 2009 at 1:14 pm
Paul Penrod’s comment about similar Japanese errors at Khalkhin Gol and Guadalcanal has a surprising basis. TSUJI Masanobu, who bears so much of the responsibility for the disaster at Khalkhin Gol, was in the thick of the ighting on Guadalcanal, where he again caused a military disaster.
By Stuart Goldman on May 9, 2009 at 6:46 am
Where these Soviets units from khalkhin Gol to same units that came to the rescue at Moscow and Stalingrad?
What was the predominant ethnic makeup of the units from Khalkhin Gol?
By Chic Lurch on May 25, 2009 at 8:40 pm
Many of the units that Zhukov commanded at Khalkhin Gol were transfered to the Moscow front in late 1941. But These Khalkhin Gol vetrans were only a fraction of the total forces transfered from the Far East to the Moscow front at that time. I’m not sure what percentage were Russian and slavic. I haven’t followed them after the Battle of Moscow, so I don’t know to what extent these same units were involved in the Stalingrad campaign.
By Stuart Goldman on May 27, 2009 at 1:13 pm