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Mongolia 1939 – Stalin’s Shrewd Opening ActBy Stuart D. Goldman | World War II | 6 comments | Print This Post | Email This Post Gen. Kenkichi Ueda, Kwantung Army commander, approved Tsuji’s basic plan—with one caveat. He insisted that the 23rd Division be given the lead. He agreed with his staff’s assessment of the “unreliable combat effectiveness” of the 23rd Division, but reminded them that the Nomonhan area was Komatsubara’s direct responsibility. “To assign another division commander to handle the incident…would imply a loss of confidence in the 23rd Division Commander. If I were in Komatsubara’s place,” Ueda told his staff, “I would commit suicide.” The staff officers could not budge their commanding general on this point. Subscribe Today
Tsuji’s attack plan called for reinforcing the 23rd Division with a powerful strike force commanded by Lt. Gen. Masaomi Yasuoka, built around two tank regiments, a motorized artillery regiment, and the 7th Division’s outstanding 26th Infantry Regiment. With the addition of the 2nd Air Group, the total attack force consisted of approximately 15,000 men, 116 artillery and antitank guns, 87 tanks, and 180 aircraft. Having estimated enemy strength in the area at one to two infantry regiments, two small armored units, and two to three air squadrons, plus Mongolian cavalry, Kwantung Army headquarters was confident their attack force would strike the enemy “like a butcher’s cleaver dismembering a chicken.” Their main concern was that their preparations might tip off the enemy to the impending attack. Consequently, they curtailed air reconnaissance west of the Khalkha so as not to alarm or alert the enemy. That was a deadly error. The forces the Japanese would soon encounter were far more powerful than they had envisioned. And they were commanded by a dangerous new foe, Gen. Georgi Zhukov. On June 1, the burly 42-year-old Zhukov, then deputy commander of the Belorussian military district, received an urgent phone call to hurry to Moscow. With Stalin’s bloody purge of the Soviet officer corps a very fresh memory, such a summons was most unwelcome. But the rising cavalry and tank commander was not destined for a bullet in a secret police execution cellar. Instead, he was briefed on the recent fighting at Nomonhan. He was instructed to fly there immediately, assess the situation, and if he deemed it necessary, take command. “Please,” the deputy chief of the general staff urged him. “The moment you arrive, see what’s going on out there and report to us, without pulling any punches.” On June 5, Zhukov arrived in Tamsag Bulak, the Soviet 57th Corps’ headquarters in Mongolia, about 100 miles west of Nomonhan. He quickly concluded that corps commander N. V. Feklenko and most of his staff were out of touch with the situation. Only one senior staff officer had visited the combat zone; Zhukov took that officer with him on a tour of the front. Zhukov reported to Moscow that the battle at Nomonhan did not appear to be a mere border clash, that the Japanese were likely to escalate their aggression soon, and that 57th Corps and its leadership would not be adequate to stop the aggression. Zhukov recommended a temporary holding action to safeguard the bridgehead east of the Khalkha River until major reinforcements could be brought up for a counteroffensive. Feklenko was promptly relieved of his command and Zhukov named to replace him. Zhukov’s force was strengthened with powerful reinforcements—the 36th Mechanized Infantry Division; the 7th, 8th, and 9th Mechanized Infantry Brigades; the 11th Tank Brigade; a heavy artillery unit equipped with 150mm guns; the 8th Mongolian People’s Republic Cavalry Division; and a tactical air wing with more than 100 aircraft—and designated 1st Army Group. Major Tsuji’s plan for the next offensive was essentially a more ambitious version of the battle plan Colonel Yamagata had employed on May 28. It called for the main body of the 23rd Division to seize a group of hills called Fui Heights on the east bank of the river, about 11 miles north of the Soviet bridge. This force would then cross the Khalkha River and strike southward along its west bank toward the bridge. General Yasuoka’s detachment, also concentrated near Fui Heights, would simultaneously loop southward on the east side of the river. Komatsubara and Yasuoka would trap the enemy between them near the bridge and destroy them. Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Help HistoryNet by bookmarking to
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6 Comments to “Mongolia 1939 – Stalin’s Shrewd Opening Act”
I am some knower over Japanese-Soviet Clashes in 1938 and 93 among the Japanese-Chinese Conflict in 1937-45.
based in own experience in Nomonhan Japanese developed a some type of 47mm AT infantry guns and Self-propelled vehicles, Armored carriers and Tanks with 47mm cannons
I considered why for Japanese having to chosen figthing against Chinese are erroneous and theirs poses some potential triumph charts in your hands for created needed base of war against Soviets in Siberia:
*Japanese a set up some anticomunist puppet states in Northern China:
-Chinese East Hebei Autonomous Council (1935 – 1938)
-Chinese Provisional Government of the Republic of China (1937-1940)
-Mongolian Mengkiang (1936 – 1945)
-Manchurian Empire of Manchoukou (1932 – 1945)
*Among Japanese poses some Siberian and Central asian nationalities disconformed with Soviets living in such territoires:
-White Russians and East Jews
-Exiled Yakutians and Buriats
-Tibetans,Uiguirs,Dungans and Central Asians
*Japanese during your failed campaing in mainlad China accumulated a force between 1 to 3 million of Japanese and Korean soldiers a half of total of Japanese land forces in Pacific war period.
*Japanese poses a important defector and expert in Soviets topics
the NKVD officer Genrikh Samoilovich Lyushkov why advised the needed of accumulated a 4,000 tanks for invading siberian lands
If Japanese Army have a decided to use such elements in adequate form for:
- created a combined force conformed by Japanese,white russians,mongol,chinese and Manchu units less between 2 to 3 millions of men
-the use of modified tanks and self-propelled vehicles armed with 75mm cannons
-joining with any type of aerial “Blitz” bombardments
for used an sort distracted strikes to Argun and Amur frontier fortifications and Japan sea fortifications for launched the main stream “lance point” land attack for main Mongolian territoire in route to Irkusts preceded with aerial landings and some undercover strikes for cutting Transiberian line along Irkust also.
such plan as results to “cut the neck” of the Soviet Far East and causing the isolation of such territoire of rest of European Soviet Union,and Japanese easy entering to Blagoveschensk and Khabarovsk without or scarcy resistance
Among this exists some reports from Siberia were one a Communist Serbian why making a interviews with diffrents siberian citizens (students,konsomolsk members,office workers, mining and factory workers,teaches and Communists Party officers,etc) why related stay agreed with seeking the entering of Japanese tanks and soldiers in disacord with Stalininst regimen among some inclusive as disposes to support a Japanese forces if enter in Siberian lands if aiding to a local rebellion against European Stalinists in local government also.
with these points i thinked why Japanese a poses some potential posibilities to defeated soviet forces in Siberia if proposed a making such campaing inclusive with Imperial Navy enter to war with United States in Pearl Harbor.
By Wladimir on Apr 8, 2009 at 10:17 pm
Wow, that’s some history I didn’t know, with gigantic implications.
Of course, Stalin, by buddying up with Hitler, set the Soviet Union up for horrendous casualties–in the range of 20 million-plus deaths. And *he’s* responsible for the eventual death of the marxist ideology(cept in liberal arts department in college), for he purged the party of anybody more charismatic, innovative, intelligent, talented, and inspriing than himself, and this eventually led to stagnation and the fall of the Soviet Union due to a paucity of actual ideas, combined with dizzying cynicism.
By Charles Laster on Apr 14, 2009 at 2:59 pm
Notice the parallel with Guadalcanal-The Japanese committed forces in a very piecemeal and indecisive fashion against an unfamiliar enemy and on both occasions got burned for it.
Excellent research-I enjoyed Zhukov’s ploys to lull the Japanese into not expecting an attack. The Germans pulled the same stunts on the Russians preceding Barbarossa
By paul penrod on May 5, 2009 at 1:14 pm
Paul Penrod’s comment about similar Japanese errors at Khalkhin Gol and Guadalcanal has a surprising basis. TSUJI Masanobu, who bears so much of the responsibility for the disaster at Khalkhin Gol, was in the thick of the ighting on Guadalcanal, where he again caused a military disaster.
By Stuart Goldman on May 9, 2009 at 6:46 am
Where these Soviets units from khalkhin Gol to same units that came to the rescue at Moscow and Stalingrad?
What was the predominant ethnic makeup of the units from Khalkhin Gol?
By Chic Lurch on May 25, 2009 at 8:40 pm
Many of the units that Zhukov commanded at Khalkhin Gol were transfered to the Moscow front in late 1941. But These Khalkhin Gol vetrans were only a fraction of the total forces transfered from the Far East to the Moscow front at that time. I’m not sure what percentage were Russian and slavic. I haven’t followed them after the Battle of Moscow, so I don’t know to what extent these same units were involved in the Stalingrad campaign.
By Stuart Goldman on May 27, 2009 at 1:13 pm