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	<title>Comments on: MHQ Reader Comments: Casualty Figures from Ancient Historians</title>
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		<title>By: Scott A Joseph, MD</title>
		<link>http://www.historynet.com/mhq-reader-comments-casualty-figures-from-ancient-historians.htm#comment-812878</link>
		<dc:creator>Scott A Joseph, MD</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 23 Jul 2012 22:24:38 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Wow. I think it&#039;s time to subscribe.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Wow. I think it&#039;s time to subscribe.</p>
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		<title>By: Frank Chadwick</title>
		<link>http://www.historynet.com/mhq-reader-comments-casualty-figures-from-ancient-historians.htm#comment-283305</link>
		<dc:creator>Frank Chadwick</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 24 May 2010 12:57:52 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>With respect, I am always nervous when the testimony of the ancient sources is contested with the phrase, &quot;It only stands to reason that . . .&quot; Since we have only fragmentary records of the events which constrained the recruiting efforts of Rome, I think it is dangerous to think there were no limits to that recruiting effort aside from what stands to reason to us today. 
For example, Roman casualties had been particularly heavy among the cavalry forces leading up to the Cannae campaign. While the army of Gaius Falminius was all but destroyed at Lake Trasimene, the entire cavalry force of the other consular army, that of Gnaeus Servilius Geminus, was surrounded and wiped out shortly afterwards. That one action cost the Romans 4,000 cavalry (1,000 citizen and 3,000 allied). So efforts to raise more cavalry would have been limited by needs to make good disproportunately heavy losses among the existing force.
Beyond that, the precise proportions of Roman to allied foot and horse which Polybius describes as having been arrived at by the end of the 2nd Punic War, and which may have been the norm or target during that period, were not quite so rigidly established at the start, and so could vary from campaign to campaign. As it happens, Livy 
(XXII:36) gives tentative figures for the troops raised and their proportions specifically for the Cannae campaign. &quot;It is also said that the complement of a legion was increased by the addition of 1000 foot and 100 horse, making it consist of 5000 foot and 300 horse. Allied states were required to supply a double number of mounted troops, but the same number of infantry.&quot;
The notation that allied cavalry for the campaign was double, rather than the more comon triple, is significant. Unless there is some compelling reason to dismiss Livy&#039;s statement, that puts the total of Roman and Allied cavalry for the campaign at about 7,000 men, and after allowance for attrition and detachments, close enough to Polybius&#039; number of &quot;a little more than six thousand horse.&quot;</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>With respect, I am always nervous when the testimony of the ancient sources is contested with the phrase, &#034;It only stands to reason that . . .&#034; Since we have only fragmentary records of the events which constrained the recruiting efforts of Rome, I think it is dangerous to think there were no limits to that recruiting effort aside from what stands to reason to us today.<br />
For example, Roman casualties had been particularly heavy among the cavalry forces leading up to the Cannae campaign. While the army of Gaius Falminius was all but destroyed at Lake Trasimene, the entire cavalry force of the other consular army, that of Gnaeus Servilius Geminus, was surrounded and wiped out shortly afterwards. That one action cost the Romans 4,000 cavalry (1,000 citizen and 3,000 allied). So efforts to raise more cavalry would have been limited by needs to make good disproportunately heavy losses among the existing force.<br />
Beyond that, the precise proportions of Roman to allied foot and horse which Polybius describes as having been arrived at by the end of the 2nd Punic War, and which may have been the norm or target during that period, were not quite so rigidly established at the start, and so could vary from campaign to campaign. As it happens, Livy<br />
(XXII:36) gives tentative figures for the troops raised and their proportions specifically for the Cannae campaign. &#034;It is also said that the complement of a legion was increased by the addition of 1000 foot and 100 horse, making it consist of 5000 foot and 300 horse. Allied states were required to supply a double number of mounted troops, but the same number of infantry.&#034;<br />
The notation that allied cavalry for the campaign was double, rather than the more comon triple, is significant. Unless there is some compelling reason to dismiss Livy&#039;s statement, that puts the total of Roman and Allied cavalry for the campaign at about 7,000 men, and after allowance for attrition and detachments, close enough to Polybius&#039; number of &#034;a little more than six thousand horse.&#034;</p>
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