Immediately after the battle, the Division del Norte commander had announced his retreat was a humanitarian gesture to spare Celaya’s colonial churches and thirty-five thousand inhabitants. In his letter, which was pure propaganda sent also to the French, British, German, and American consuls, he challenged Obregon to leave Celaya and fight in any rural territory he chose, but referred to ‘the general assault which I shall make on the city of Celaya within three days if you fortify yourself there.’ Relieved that Villa remained predictable, Obregon baited him by telling the consuls that Villa, as the party in retreat, would choose where to fight.

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Meanwhile, detachments from the Tula and Queretaro garrisons and reinforcements from Carranza were arriving at Celaya. The 1st Division of the East sent three cavalry regiments and an infantry battalion. Juan Jose Rios, leader of the 1906 Cananea mine strike, brought the 3rd and 4th Red Battalions. Joaquin Amaro’s cavalry brigade–‘los Rayados (the Striped Ones) de Celaya’–arrived wearing prison garb from the ancient fortress of San Juan de Ula, the only uniforms available in Veracruz. With white-collar workers recruited by the Empleados de Comercio of Orizaba, and the La Favorita railway workers’ battalion, Obregon had fifteen thousand effectives, including eight thousand cavalrymen.

The Constitutionalist troops spent the three days improving their entrenchments and stringing barbed wire. Obregon believed the coming battle would be like the first, but as Villa would have enough troops to surround Celaya, the defenses would have to encircle the town.

Because the western defenses, facing Salamanca, had so far borne the severest assaults, Obregon assigned it to his most dependable troops, the Sonoran infantry. Several battalions were composed of taciturn Yaquis. Tall and broad-shouldered, wearing two bandoleers around their waists and two more across their chests, they were born warriors, inured to hardship, frugal with ammunition, and excellent marksmen. They were also devoted to Obregon.

He divided the defended area into three sectors, assigned three liaison officers from his staff to each, and linked them by telephone to his command post on the western outskirts of town at the San Antonio Church. The south side of town and the western defenses south of the railroad made up Sector One, the northern portion of the western front Sector Two, and the northern and eastern fronts Sector Three. As well as infantrymen, dismounted cavalrymen manned the defenses after hiding their horses in town. Of his eighty-six machine guns–M1895 Colts and M1908 Maxims–Obregon allocated thirty-two to the western front, divided thirty-two among the other three fronts, and retained the remainder in reserve. Colonel Kloss deployed his thirteen 75mm Schneider-Canet and St. Chamond-Mondragon fieldpieces behind the infantry positions along the western front, as in the previous battle. For the coming fight, however, each battery commander sketched a battlefield map that included terrain references and probable target areas, especially the likely locations of enemy artillery.

Obregon held Castro’s cavalry division, which was 40 percent of his force, in general reserve. As before, it would conduct the counterattack. This time, however, the troopers would remain well outside of Celaya during the defensive phase of the battle. They were concealed in a large wooded area six miles to the east, along the railway to Queretaro, but would use semaphore, heliograph, and telegraph to stay in communication with headquarters in Celaya. Obregon recognized the risk of deploying so many of his troopers outside of town but believed Villa would become so engrossed in his assault that he would not reconnoiter beyond the immediate battlefield.

Villa, meanwhile, was also receiving reinforcements. Some two thousand cavalrymen arrived from Michoacan. Infantry, cavalry, and artillery units came from Jalisco. Abel Serratos brought in more local contingents, and other regional leaders arrived with their men. Estimates of the size of Villa’s force run between twenty-two and thirty-two thousand soldiers. The Division del Norte commander, who paid little attention to logistics, was probably least likely to know the actual number. Much-needed ammunition arrived from the border town of Ciudad Juarez. In high spirits, Villa was several times heard to say, ‘Now that perfumed Yaqui [Obregon] is going to find out who Francisco Villa is!’

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