The new deliveries would enhance Jerusalem’s military muscle-but January 1974, it would turn out, would be too late. With stunning swiftness, the region erupted into conflict on the eve of Yom Kippur, the traditional Hebrew Day of Atonement-October 6, 1973, with a dramatic assault by Egyptian, Syrian and other Arab forces.

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An official release says that 150 Phantoms made up the fighting spearhead of the IDF/AF defensive effort as the Arabs’ surprise attack was unleashed. In the early hours of the fighting, Egyptian Tupolev Tu-16 bombers carrying AS- 5 air-to-surface standoff missiles pressed their attacks deep into Israeli territory. One Tu-16 approaching Tel Aviv on the first day of the war, October 6, was shot down by an Israeli F-4E Phantom.

Phantoms were thrown into action on both fronts and faced a variety of new threats, including vehicle-mounted SA- 6 and shoulder-mounted SA-7 Strella surface-to-air missiles. The Israelis struck decisively against Syrian SAM sites on October 7, and acknowledged the loss of one Phantom in that fighting.

On the Syrian front, MiG-17s and Sukhoi i Su-7s flew ground attack missions escorted by MiG-21s and Iraqi Hawker Hunters. Israel struck back on October 9 by sending Phantoms to bomb downtown Damascus. Seeking to neutralize the Arabs’ second front by seizing the Golan Heights and blunting Syria’s fighting potential, Israel confirmed yet another Phantom loss on October 11.

There were to be no further acknowledgments of losses despite intensified fighting over October 12-24, but Israeli authorities have consistently stated that no Phantoms were lost in air-to-air combat.

It appears that the F-4E Phantom was used primarily in the long-range strike role, with the Mirage III flying top cover, and most air-to-air engagements appear to have been fought mainly with IR (infrared) heat-seeking missiles rather than at close range with guns.

When they found themselves in closequarters fights with very maneuverable MiGs and less effective Sukhois, Israeli pilots made use of the new notion of ‘energy maneuverability’ in which the battle was fought in three dimensions without regard for the location of the ground or (to put it another way) for ‘up’ and ‘down.’ That emphasis on the importance of specific excess power, the standard of thrust-to-weight ratio reached at various conditions of speed, altitude and maneuver, although devised by Americans rather than Israelis, had arrived too late for the Linebacker campaigns in North Vietnam, and some fighter veterans still viewed it as an impertinence.

In certain maneuvering situations, the level flight .73-to-1 thrust-to-weight ratio of the F-4E Phantom could be increased to a more advantageous .9-to-1 or better and, by careful attention to energy maneuvering, the F-4E could prevail over the MG-21 even in a very close, protracted fight.

Pilot experience helped, too, and while IDF/AF pilots seemed remarkably young they enjoyed an enormous advantage in experience.

Just as Americans in Vietnam found themselves pitted against highly motivated, Soviet-trained pilots of great ability, the Israelis faced Egyptian and Syrian fliers whose talent and aggressiveness warrant mention. A fierce fighting spirit was exhibited by MiG pilots who seemed to be flying ground control intercept (GCI) with orders to engage Israeli Phantoms only when conditions of altitude, possible surprise, and relative fuel advantage favored them. On occasion, a brace of MiG-21s above a Phantom formation might make a single diving, slashing attack-using the technique of the North Vietnamese to catch the ordnance-laden F-4Es at a disadvantage.

Although the IDF/AF’s acknowledged loss of 22 Phantoms to SAMs and ground fire in the Yom Kippur War may seem small, the total, when 45 A-4 Skyhawk losses are added, is a full 20 per cent of the warplanes Israel had received from the United States.

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