Antony quickly tired of the siege of Samosata and accepted 300 gold talents for ending it. Next he dealt with Antigonus, the Parthian-installed Jewish king in Jeru­salem. Antony had the usurper arrested, flogged and crucified (a harbinger for a future “king of the Jews”). To fill the kingly role in Jerusalem, Antony installed his friend Herod (the Great).

Antony then returned to Rome, where he found that public opinion had turned against him and in favor of Octavian. He was faulted for his dalliance with Cleopatra while the Parthians launched their invasion.

Only the efforts of Antony’s wife, Octavia, were able to restore a tenuous harmony between him and her brother, Octavian. Antony made plans to rehabilitate his good name by invading Parthia. The omens for a Persian war seemed favorable. News reached Rome that the remaining sons of wily old King Orodes II had assassinated him. Orodes, who had ruled Persia for 20 years after murdering his own father, had been king when Crassus was defeated. Now one of his patricidal sons, Phraates IV (38-2 bc), sat on the bloody Parthian throne.

To consolidate his position, Phraates IV ordered the execution of as many as 30 of his brothers and half-brothers. That brutal action signaled the tenor of his reign. Now more than ever Antony felt the need to achieve greatness. Octavian’s grip on Italy and the West was growing stronger. He had at last defeated Sextus Pompeius using the ships that Antony had loaned him.

Antony’s power base was in the East. If he achieved decisive victory over the Parthians, he could claim to have personally avenged Crassus and gather up untold riches to solidify his position in Rome. Gathering his forces and marching through Cilicia as he had done four years earlier, Antony summoned Cleopatra to join him with their young twins, Cleopatra and Alexander. She was once again pregnant before he sent her back to Egypt.

Before his death Caesar had planned an invasion of Parthia by way of Armenia. Antony now adopted that strategy. From his base in Syria he assembled 60,000 legionaries, along with 10,000 Hispanic and Celtic cavalry. These were joined with an auxiliary force of 30,000 archers, slingers and light infantry from allies and client states. Missing from the ranks were the 20,000 Italian infantry that Octavian had promised. With or without the promised legions, Antony meant to march into Armenia. There, King Artavasdes — who had once encouraged and then betrayed Crassus — anted up 6,000 horses and 7,000 foot soldiers for the common cause.

Subscribe Today

• Did you enjoy our article?
• Read more in Military History magazine
• Subscribe online and save nearly 40%!!!
 

It was said that the size of Antony’s army put fear into men’s hearts as far away as India. But if Plutarch is to be believed, it was not the Indus River that Antony had on his mind but the Nile. Such was his haste to rush back to Alexandria and his mistress that he hastened the Parthian campaign beyond military prudence. After a march of 1,000 miles from Rome to Armenia, he did not allow his Roman soldiers time to rest and refit, but marched at once into Parthian territory. Advancing as rapidly as he could in order to catch the enemy off guard, he let his baggage train lag far behind. Three hundred wagons filled with provisions, extra weapons and siege engines, including an 80-foot-long battering ram, lumbered slowly along dirt roads under a guard of 10,000 men, among them a large contingent of Armenian cavalry.

The Romans and their allies invaded the Parthian province of Media Atropatene (northwestern Iran) in 36 bc. In the recent past the king of Media — an unwilling vassal to the unstable Phraates — had signaled his displeasure with his servitude to Parthia. With luck, he might become an ally of Rome.

Antony boldly moved into Media and laid siege to the important fortress city of Phraaspa, said to house the treasury as well as the wives and family of the Median king. Perhaps Antony was dreaming of making them captive — imitating Alexander, who had captured the harem and family of Darius III. The king of Media, though unhappy with Parthian rule, did not take kindly to Antony’s invasion of his country and assault upon his treasury and harem.

Meanwhile King Phraates, leading his army of 40,000 (at least a fourth of it cavalry) up from the south, learned that the Roman baggage train trailed far behind Antony’s van. He sent a large detachment of horse-archers to take it. When the Parthians approached the lumbering wagons, the Armenian cavalry bolted and withdrew to safety. The Parthians used their deadly bows to reduce the remaining defenders, then plundered and burned the all-important supply wagons.

When news of the loss reached the main Roman army, the Armenian king slunk out of camp and returned to his own country, partly shamed by his men’s behavior and partly because he could see how the wind was blowing. At first Antony resolved to continue the siege of Phraaspa. He had already started to pile up an earthen ramp at the base of the city wall — a time-consuming, dangerous job because the workers were within range of every sort of missile that could be hurled from the city’s ramparts. By then too the fall equinox had passed and the evening air was chill. Without siege engines or the battering ram, and with an active enemy rapidly joining the fray, the siege proved impossible. Antony was now deep inside enemy territory, his lines of communication had been cut, supplies were lost and winter was on the way. He found himself in the same situation that a later emperor, Napoleon Bonaparte, would confront at Moscow in 1812.

Antony decided to sally his cavalry against the gathering Parthians. Seeing his determination, they fled before him, but after a chase of up to six miles he had killed fewer than 100 enemy troops. In the aftermath of a few such indecisive and exhausting battles, he decided that he had no other choice but to retreat. He petitioned Phraates for a parley. When his envoys reached the Parthian camp, they found the king seated on a golden throne, strumming on his bowstring. Phraates promised the Roman envoys that Antony would have safe passage after they dropped his demand for the return of the standards captured from Crassus at Carrhae and the return of the surviving prisoners from that battle. But Phraates lied. A few days after Antony left his protected camp, the Parthians began to harass his columns.

Antony was tempted to take the easier and shorter route home through the flat country of Assyria, but wisely decided to move through the hills toward Armenia instead. The march would be colder and more difficult during that brutal winter, but their route offered some advantage over the hard-hitting Parthian cavalry.

At first the Parthians had some successes against the orderly retreat. On one occasion they nearly cut off the Roman rear guard and inflicted as many as 3,000 casualties. Antony rushed back from the vanguard with his heavy infantry to chase off the mounted archers. Thereafter he placed slingers and spearmen on his flanks and rear to offer a bristly reception to Parthian raids. The Romans often used the testudo to fend off barrages of Parthian arrows. On one occasion the Parthians closed in to try to overwhelm the Roman defensive formation. At a signal the Romans rushed out from behind their protection and killed as many of the enemy as they could catch.

There were 18 running battles and skirmishes between the two armies as Antony hacked his way through the mountain passes back to Armenia and temporary shelter. All the clashes proved indecisive and left both sides cold, exhausted and frustrated.

When Antony reached Armenian territory, the pursuers turned for home. He had lost as many as 20,000 men during the Median invasion. As so often happens in war, more died of disease, cold and despair than in battle. Another 8,000 or more died after Antony reached the borders of Armenia. Even there he did not feel safe. He gave the treacherous Armenian king every sign of friendship but would not dally in his country.

Help HistoryNet by bookmarking to