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Letters From Readers – September 2007 – Military HistoryMH Issues | 0 comments | Print This Post | Email This Post Ever since [British Prime Minister] Lloyd George, Haig has had his critics and their often-fatuous armchair solutions to the problems he faced. It is telling, however, that try as he might, George could not find anyone willing to take Haig’s place and face his awesome responsibilities. Douglas Rice Geoffrey Norman responds: It simply won’t do to say that Haig didn’t sanction the appalling tactics employed on the first day of the Somme. He had been with the BEF since it arrived in France and should have known how the new weapons—especially the machine gun—had changed the nature of war and given the advantage to the defense. Hadn’t he learned anything at Loos? He should have made his subordinate commanders aware of the new realities and been sure they employed tactics that took account of them. Haig remained attached to the horse long after the facts of the battlefield should have disabused him. Haig’s style of attrition cost him more men than it did the enemy. True, the Germans did not have enough left in the tank to finish off the Allies in March 1918. But they came close and might have brought it off had it not been for the arrival of the Americans (another of those endlessly debatable propositions). What remains, I think, beyond debate is that Haig’s profligate use of men, his insistence on pushing forward with offensives long after they showed any promise of success, resulted in a victory that was only marginally better than defeat, the calamitous effects of which are still being experienced by the British and, indeed, most of the West.
Veracruz [Re: “What We Learned from the Battle of Veracruz,” by Lt. Col. Robert Mackey, June:]. Mackey wrote that William T. Sherman was a participant in the fighting in Mexico. Alas, he was not, much to his disgust and frustration. Instead, he was sent to California, which had previously been seized by American forces. One other clarification: The author states that Matthew Perry was in command of naval forces during the battle. Actually, David Conner was the senior naval officer in the early phase of the operation and was in command during the successful amphibious landing. Overdue for retirement, he was relieved by Perry between the time of the landings and the surrender of Veracruz. So the author is correct, but I thought I’d add my bit recognizing the important contribution of Commodore Conner. Jim Roberts
Robert Mackey responds: While Sherman was a latecomer to the war, it was a seminal event in putting the important role of the West Point–trained professional, vs. the militia leader, as the senior “war fighter” in the minds of most Americans. The Civil War would prove that once again, as men from new graduates of the Class of ’61 to older soldiers such as Sherman, Jackson, et al., were the first to be placed in positions of responsibility on both sides. I greatly appreciate your comments on Commodore Conner and for correcting my oversight. Sadly for Conner’s distinguished career, it was Perry who was credited with the fall of Veracruz, and not Conner. Pages: 1 2
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