'We were very proud we were cavalry pilots, on the front line, and that as cavalry Medevac pilots, we were picking up our own boys, no matter what.'

Other Medevac Units in Vietnam
I enjoyed Maj. Gen. David T. Zabecki's fine article ["The Father of Dustoff," Valor, Apr/May] about the 57th Medical Detachment (Helicopter Ambulance) and Major Charles L. Kelly. Dustoff was not the only medical evacuation unit in Vietnam. The 1st Air Cavalry Division's 15th Medical Battalion had a Medevac platoon. Our call sign was Medevac. All Dustoff units—the 57th, the 283rd, the 498th, etc.—were spread all over Vietnam and were all part of the 44th Medical Brigade. Medevac belonged to the 1st Cavalry. Despite the bravery of Dustoff crews, there were two limitations on their units that were no fault of theirs: 1) Because of the great distances between Dustoff units, sometimes they were far from the wounded; and 2) due to the relatively small number of Dustoff aircraft and the need to conserve their numbers, some missions required gunship coverage if the LZ was still hot.

The 1st Cavalry decided it wanted its own organic air rescue aircraft so as to: 1) have its own pilots, more familiar with air cavalry tactics; 2) to not have to call the 44th Medical Brigade and wait to get aircraft, when they might be available; and 3) to have air rescue aircraft at forward LZs close to the fighting. There were 12 aircraft in the platoon. Medevac aircraft carried a crew of five; Dustoff had four. We had only a small red cross with no white background on our ships and carried two M-60 machine guns for defense. Two Medevac birds each would be assigned to A, B and C Companies of the 15th Medical Battalion and directly supported each of the three combat brigades in the 1st Cavalry.

We were very proud we were cavalry pilots, on the front line, and that as cavalry Medevac pilots, we were picking up our own boys, no matter what. I was a Medevac pilot in 1968 during the Tet Offensive, breaking the siege at Khe Sanh and going into the A Shau Valley. My two Purple Hearts and the six men we lost during that period attest to what Medevac meant to each of us and to the men on the ground in the 1st Cavalry.

Art Jacobs
Franklin, Tenn.

Gone in 60 Seconds
The Phalanx close-in weapons system, or CIWS as it is known in the Navy, [Power Tool, by Jon Guttman, Apr/May] is yet another example of over-engineered and complex weapon systems employed aboard today's ships. The concepts of simplicity and redundancy are being overlooked in the rush to emplace highly complex, and yet unproved, weapon systems.

As a former Navy gunner's mate, I have had discussions with gunnery officers onboard various ships in Philadelphia that have the Phalanx system. The main problem, other than the fact that the system has only been tested under combat conditions once, is that there is no combat reload capability. You state that the entire ammunition load can be fired in less than 20 seconds. Others who work with this system say 60 seconds is the maximum sustained rate of fire. Once that is gone, there is no opportunity to reload under combat conditions due to the complexity of the gun. Perhaps this is why the gun is considered a close-in, last- ditch weapon system?

One only has to read accounts of the Royal Navy's efforts to defend its ships from attacking Argentine aircraft during the Falklands War to see how feeble shipboard gunnery has become. The U.S. Navy has become enamored of high-tech missile and sensor systems at the expense of putting large amounts of steel on the incoming target. There is also the assumption that attacking aircraft or missiles will conveniently close their target one at a time. Tell that to the next ship that has multiple targets closing from as many different bearings and see how far the 60 seconds of fire from the Phalanx counts!

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